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The Ultimate Independence of the Federal Courts: 
Defying the Supreme Court in the Exercise of Federal 
Common Law Powers 
RONALD H. ROSENBERG• 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A Defining Federal Court Functions. 
What does a federal court do and what makes a federal court "federal?" 
When a federal court properly obtains subject matter jurisdiction over a 
dispute, where does it find the legal rules for its decision? These seem-
ingly straight-forward and fundamental questions have existed throughout 
the nation's history and they rest at the heart of modem questions analyz-
ing the legitimacy of certain contemporary federal court decisions. As we 
know, federal courts in the American constitutional system differ from 
their state counterparts in a number of significant ways-not the least of 
which is their lawmaking power. This judging authority operates within 
limits. Although federal legislative power may be expansive, federal judi-
cial authority under mainstream theory has its restrictions imposed by con-
siderations of the separation of powers or those related to federalism. 1 
While federal judges may decide cases within their jurisdiction on the basis 
of statutes, constitutions and treaties, they, generally, may not create law 
• Professor of Law, William and Mary School of Law. 
1 The Constitution provides that the judicial power of the United States shall be vested in the Su· 
preme Court and "in such inferior courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish." 
U.S. CONST. art. III, § I. From this textual base it has been argued that Congress is provided with 
sweeping discretion whether or not I) to create any lower federal courts and 2) to define the jurisdiction 
of any such court it does establish. This view finds support in a long line of Supreme Court decisions 
running back as far as 1850. See Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 429-31 (1944) {upholding a 
restriction on federal forum to hear challenges to wartime price controls); Laufv. E.G. Shinncr & Co., 
303 U.S.323, 325, 327 ( 1938) (upholding a restriction on federal court's ability to issue injunctions in 
labor disputes); Kline v. Burke Constr. Co., 260 U.S. 226, 229 (1922) (upholding preclusion of federal 
injunction of a simultaneous state court proceeding for breach of contract); Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8 
How.) 441, 448, 450 (1850) (upholding a restriction on diversity jurisdiction). Taking this approach, 
Congress would certainly have the power to define the rules of decision for the federal courts. 
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themselves using the common law methodology available to state court 
judges.2 Following the Supreme Court's 1938 decision in Erie Railroad 
Co. v. Tompkins,3 the proposition has become axiomatic that "(t]here is no 
federal general common law.'>4 This broad statement sprang from Justice 
Brandeis's holding that the federal Rules of Decision Act required federal 
courts to apply all forms of state law as their rule of decision in the absence 
of specific federal law. Under the U.S. Constitution, federal courts are not 
granted open-ended lawmaking powers and they, "unlike their state coun-
terparts, are courts of limited jurisdiction."5 Such a view of "limited juris-
diction" has been the position of widely-held legal theory regarding the 
extent of the federal judicial power, at least in cases brought under diver-
sity jurisdiction. Increasingly, this has also been the direction given by the 
United States Supreme Court in a number of non-diversity cases-like 
those brought under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Com-
pensation and Liability Act (CERCLAt-which arise under federal law. 
The degree of adherence to this "limited jurisdiction" vision is the subject 
of this article. 
Most generalizations are subject to exception and the restricted 
description of federal judicial authority is no different. While it is true that 
federal courts are not courts of general jurisdiction, the Supreme Court has 
also held that they may create and apply a federal common law in a limited 
2 The vesting of federal jurisdiction in courts does not create the authority to formulate federal 
common law. See Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630,640-41 (1981). The 
definition of the term "federal common law" can be said to refer "to the development of legally binding 
federal law by the federal courts in the absence of directly controlling constitutional or statutory provi-
sions." ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICfiON 33 I (2d ed. 1994) (emphasis added). Professor 
Thomas W. Merrill has defined federal common law as "any federal rule of decision that is not man-
dated on the face of some authoritative federal text-whether or not that rule can be described as the 
product of 'interpretation' in either a conventional or an unconventional sense." Thomas Merrill, The 
Common Law Powers of Federal Couns, 52 U. CHI. L. REv. I, 5 (1985). 
3 Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
4 /d. at 78. Erie overruled Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) I, 18-19 (1842) and reversed a long-
standing practice in the federal courts to recognize a general federal common law, at least in cases 
involving a court's diversity jurisdiction. This development had seemingly been at odds with the earli-
est Congressional policy defining the boundaries of federal court decisional rules. The Rules of Deci-
sion Act, derived from the Judiciary Act of 1789 and currently found at 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (2000), 
provides that "[t)he laws of the several states, except where the Constitution or treaties of the United 
States or Acts of Congress otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded as rules of decision in civil 
actions in the courts of the United States, in cases where they apply." This statute would appear to 
form a mandate requiring that federal courts must use state law as rules of decision in the absence of 
treaty, federal statute or constitutional provision. See Martin Reddish, Federal Common Law. Political 
Legitimacy. and the Interpretive Process: An "Institutionalist" Perspective, 83 Nw. U. L. REV. 761, 
766 (1989) (discussing the rule and indicating that it "is not free from ambiguity in either language or 
histo1' .... "). 
Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers, 451 U.S. 77, 95 (1981 ). See generally U.S. 
CONST. art. I, § 1 ("All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United 
States."); id. art.lll, § 2 (enumerating the extent of the judiciary's powers). 
6 42 u.s.c. §§ 9601-9675 (1994). 
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number of areas in order to effectuate Congressional intent or "to protect 
uniquely federal interests."7 Providing an example of this principle, in 
another case decided on the same day as Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 
Justice Brandeis held that the apportionment of an interstate stream was a 
question for federal common law rather than the law of the adjoining 
states.8 Therefore, federal common law has been recognized as a source of 
legitimate and necessary rules of decision in certain enumerated areas, 
standing as a necessary exception to the Erie rule which describes a much 
more limited federal judicial power. The phrase "federal common law" 
represents those circumstances when federal courts may fashion legal rules 
in a common law way. But when, in theory, can federal courts exercise 
this "special" judicial power and when, in reality, do they actually create 
their rules of decision? 
Since the 1938 Erie decision, this authority to "find" federal common 
law has been increasingly restricted by the Supreme Court. This is espe-
cially true in recent years. The clear trend in Supreme Court pronounce-
ments over the last quarter century has been to confine, not expand, the 
common law powers of federal judges.9 Undoubtedly, this contraction 
reflects the Court's changing views regarding the "appropriate" judicial 
role. However, one situation where court-made common law has been 
found to be appropriate is where a federal court has been asked to fill the 
"interstices" of federal legislation or to create law "[i]n absence of an ap-
plicable Act of Congress."10 In these instances, the courts have been im-
plored by litigants to consider and to decide federal questions "which can-
not be answered from federal statutes alone."11 Obtaining a legislative 
amendment to clarify or "fill in" the missing law apparently is not practical 
or politically possible. Therefore, establishing a federal common law rule 
of decision in this context is a "necessary expedient" to the lawmaking 
process in certain limited situations. 
7 Texas Indus., 451 U.S. at 64 (quoting Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398,426 
(1964)). The Court has identified certain areas as being appropriate for the creation of federal common 
Jaw rules. They include: 
a) federal proprietary interests, Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 
366 (1943); 
b) international relations, Sabbatino, 3 76 U.S. at 425 ( 1964 ); 
c) admiralty, Kossick v. United Fruit Co., 365 U.S. 731, 742 (1961 ); 
d) interstate disputes, Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 
U.S. 92, I 10-11 (1938); 
e) interstate pollution, City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 45 I U.S. 304, 317 (I 981 ), and 
f) enforcement of constitutional rights, Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of 
Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388,392 (1971). 
8 Hinderlider, 304 U.S. at I 10-1\. 
9 See CHARLES A. WRIGHT & MARY KAY KANE, LAW Of FEDERAL COURTS 419 (6th ed. 2002) 
("The Court ... more recently has taken a cautious course toward the recognition of federal common 
law."). 
10 Clearfield Trust, 3\8 U.S. at 367. 
11 D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. FDIC, 3\5 U.S. 447, 469 (1942) (Jackson, J., concurring). 
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All too often, federal legislation is not a model of clarity and specific-
ity. Important statutory omissions and unanticipated issues frequently arise 
and are brought before federal courts for resolution. These courts must 
then determine the meaning of federal statutes within the context of highly 
contested, high-stakes litigation. The CERCLA litigation that is the focus 
of this article presents an example of this phenomenon. In undertaking this 
common lawmaking judicial function, these courts are asked to "create 
law" in order to fill the interstices or silences of statutory schemes and to 
implement Congressional objectives. While it is possible to say there is no 
law that applies to the matter at hand, courts find it irresistibly attractive to 
answer the questions presented to them by litigants and to resolve the dis-
putes. Congress cannot anticipate every statutory consequence, implica-
tion, or nuance and there must be some means of deciding conflicts that 
arise in implementing these statutes.12 To do this, the judging process re-
quires courts to determine a rule of decision applicable to the dispute com-
ing before the court-often when comprehensive Acts of Congress fail to 
address certain issues or are ambiguous. 13 The creation of "interstitial fed-
eral common law" has been upheld in circumstances where it is necessary 
to carry out an apparent yet not clearly specified federal purpose. 14 Assum-
ing that a court should fashion federal common law in these situations, 
where should it look for guidance as to the substance or content of the rule 
when federal statute itself fails to supply the answers?15 How much inde-
pendence should a federal court have to fashion a rule of decision? 
On these questions, the Supreme Court has given specific guidance. In 
1979, the Court set the backdrop for these decisions when it held in United 
States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., that in the absence of a congressionally 
12 /d. at 469-70 (Jackson, J., concuning) ("Were we bereft of the common Jaw, our federal system 
would be impotent."). 
13 Clearfield Trust, 318 U.S. at 367 {"In absence of an applicable Act of Congress it is for the 
federal courts to fashion the governing rule of law according to their own standards."). 
14 The function of this kind of federal common law rule is to effectuate a Congressional plan or 
program. Professor Linda Mullenix has expressed the rationale for interstitial federal common law in 
the following terms: 
In enacting federal statutory law, Congress often expressly delegates federal law-
making authority to the courts, or implicitly does so by creating a general regulatory 
scheme with gaps or general language. In both instances, federal courts have created 
and applied interstitial federal common law to fill in the gaps in federal statutory 
provisions. 
17A JAMES W. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE §124.41(1] {3d ed. 1997). In certain 
instances, Congress may specify that state law should be used as the substantive law for decisions in a 
federal scheme like the Federal Tort Claims Act. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346{b), 2672 (2000). However, in 
other cases, the Supreme Court has upheld the judicial development of a federal common law rule 
structure to give meaning to a statutory gap. See Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 
448, 356-57 {1957) {Justice Douglas finding Congressional intent for federal courts to develop a body 
of common law principles to resolve labor disputes). 
15 HenryS. Friendly, In Praise of Erie-and of the New Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U. L. 
REv. 383,410 {1964) {articulating this two-stage inquiry). 
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mandated rule, federal courts must "fill the interstices of federal legislation 
according to their own standards."16 As expansive as this statement might 
sound, this pronouncement did not mean that in designing the "substance" 
of the federal common law, courts would always develop applicable fed-
eral rules of decision in every case. Rather, in the Court's way of thinking, 
courts could adopt either state decisional rules or fashion their own 
uniquely federal rules. In either case, they would be creating federal law 
using a common law or non-statutory method. To do this, the Supreme 
Court in Kimbell Foods recommended that federal courts should choose 
their rules of decision by using a three-part balancing test which would 
consider whether: (1) the federal program at issue must be uniformly ap-
plied nationwide to effectuate its purpose, (2) the application of the state 
rule would frustrate specific objectives of the federal program, and (3) the 
application of a uniform federal rule of decision would disrupt existing 
relationships based upon state law.17 This tripartite test was later rein-
forced by the Supreme Court in 1994 in 0 'Melveny & Myers v. FDIC, 
where it further restricted the instances in which the creation of a uniform, 
federal body of common law would be permissible. 18 After 0 'Melveny & 
Myers, a federal law-based common law rule of decision would be appro-
priate in the "few and restricted" situations where there is both a uniquely 
federal interest at stake and "a significant conflict between [the] federal 
policy or interest and the use of state law." 19 Therefore, state law would 
generally provide the rule of decision. 
This decision, and others handed down during the 1990s, 20 reflected a 
substantial narrowing of the situations when federal courts would be free to 
fashion a truly "federal" common law-that is, non-statutory and non-
constitutional-rules of decision. The significance of this emergent trend 
is threefold: 1) to reinforce the primary function of legislation as the origi-
nal source of federal, non-constitutional law, 2) to emphasize the primacy 
of state law as the rule of decision in the absence of an explicit federal 
16 440 U.S. 715, 729 (1979). The Court's pronouncements in Kimbell Foods were directed at 
cases involving "controversies directly affecting the operations of federal programs .... " /d. at 727 
(citin~pealjield Trust, 318 U.S. at 367). 
/d. at 728-29. 
18 512 u.s. 79,85 (1994). 
19 /d. at 87 (emphasis added) (internal quotations omitted). 
20 See, e.g., Atherton v. FDIC, 519 U.S. 213, 215-16 (1997) (holding that in a negligence action 
brought by a federally insured bank, state law sets the standard when it is stricter than federal law); 
Kamen v. Kemper Financial Services, Inc., 500 U.S. 90, 108 (1991) (holding that when there is a gap in 
federal law concerning "the allocation of governing powers within the corporation, federal courts 
should incorporate state law into federal common law" unless the state law is inconsistent with the 
federal statute's underlying policies). 
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statutory provision,21 and 3) to limit the power of federal judges to "impro-
vise" federal common law solutions to problems presented by federal stat-
utes and programs. The Supreme Court's message to the lower federal 
judiciary was clear: instances of true common law rule development would 
be the exception and not the rule. Federal courts would be more restrained 
judicial actors. As this article demonstrates, the Supreme Court's direc-
tives have rarely been followed in the CERCLA context. A serious and 
perplexing question resulting from this fact is: why has this been so? 
B. Choice of Law and Environmental Law-Interpreting CERCLA 's 
Liability Provisions 
Four years after its decision in O'Melveny & Myers, the Supreme 
Court addressed the question of selecting an appropriate rule of decision in 
the context of an environmental statute-the Comprehensive Environ-
mental Response, Compensation and Liability Acf2 or CERCLA. CER-
CLA was a hurriedly enacted and poorly drafted statute, whose main pur-
pose was to cleanup hazardous waste sites and to allocate the costs of do-
ing so to "responsible parties." As a statute assessing potentially signifi-
cant cleanup liability, CERCLA constituted a specialized federal tort stat-
ute operating under the minimalist guidance of section 107.23 In the years 
following its 1980 enactment, federal courts have been presented with in-
numerable questions unanswered by the statute and they were asked to 
improvise solutions to many knotty legal questions. In the 1998 case of 
United States v. Bestfoods/4 Justice David Souter, writing for a unanimous 
Court, considered the issue of how to determine the liability of parent cor-
porations for CERCLA-imposed hazardous waste site cleanup expenses 
carried out at the site of one of its corporate subsidiaries. The Bestfoods 
case concluded that a parent corporation's liability under CERCLA could 
be founded either 1) upon direct action as an "operator" of the polluting 
facility or 2) upon indirect or derivative liability based upon "general" and 
"fundamental" principles of corporate law permitting a "piercing of the 
corporate veil," thereby making the parent corporation responsible for the 
conduct of its subsidiary.25 On this second point of "veil piercing" or de-
rivative liability, would state law or a CERCLA-based federal common law 
21 In O'Melveny & Myers, Justice Scalia stressed that a clear federal statute should be followed 
when it provides the answer. However, he anticipated the situation of statutory omission or oversight. 
He wrote: 
Nor would we adopt a court-made [federal common law] rule to supplement federal 
statutory regulation that is comprehensive and detailed; matters left unaddressed in 
such a scheme are presumably left subject to the disposition provided by state law. 
512 U.S. at 85. 
22 42 u.s.c. §§ 9601-9675 (1994). 
23 /d.§ 9607. 
24 524 u.s. 51' 55 (1998). 
25 /d. at 63-64, 70-72. 
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determine liability? Justice Souter strongly suggested, but did not clearly 
confirm, 26 that state corporate law principles should serve as the rule of 
decision for determining this type ofCERCLA liability. His opinion stated 
that state corporate law provided a presumptive starting point for this in-
quiry and he concluded that CERCLA gives "no indication that 'the entire 
corpus of state corporation law is to be replaced simply because a plain-
tiffs cause of action is based upon a federal statute. "'21 
Going even further in this direction, Justice Souter stated that in order 
for a federal statute to reject "bedrock principle[s] ... against this vener-
able common-law backdrop," a law must speak "directly" on the ques-
tion.28 CERCLA, being silent on the topic of corporate successor liability, 
did not "directly" provide an alternative to state corporate law and conse-
quently, the decision suggested that state law should govern.29 The Best-
foods decision strongly reinforces the Supreme Court's recently promoted 
idea that state law should serve as the guide of crucial meaning for federal 
statutory law in the absence of legislative language to the contrary. This 
view reflects and reinforces the increasing preference or presumption in 
Supreme Court opinions running in favor of state legal concepts serving as 
the fundamental meaning of "silent" federal statutes.30 The Court's Kim-
bell Foods, O'Melveny & Myers, and Bestfoods decisions represent a con-
tinuous and an unmistakable message discouraging judicial improvisation 
in the name of creating federal common law. 
26 CERCLA is silent on the question of how to determine whether a parent corporation is liable 
for waste site cleanup expenses and the Bestfoods court refused to directly resolve the choice of law 
dilemma. Justice Souter wrote: 
[T]here is significant disagreement among courts and commentators over whether, in 
enforcing CERCLA 's indirect liability, courts should borrow state law, or instead 
apply a federal common law of veil piercing .... Since none of the parties chal-
lenges the Sixth Circuit's holding that CPC and Aerojet incurred no derivative liabil-
ity, the question is not presented in this case, and we do not address it further. 
/d. at 63 n.9. 
21 /d. at 63 (citing Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471,478 (1979)). 
28 !d. at 62-63. 
29 On remand, the district court ruled that the parent corporation, CPC, was not liable for CER-
CLA cleanup costs either as an "operator" or as a successor corporation under a theory of de facto 
merger. Bestfoods v. Aero-Jet Gen. Corp., 173 F. Supp. 2d 729,759 (W.O. Mich. 2001). Of special 
note was the fact that the court felt bound by the Sixth Circuit's rule that "state law provides the stan-
dard for determining the liability of successor corporations under CERCLA." /d. at 757. As a result, it 
applied Michigan law to determine the successor liability question. /d. at 757-759. 
30 It is not always clear from Supreme Court and Court of Appeals opinions just how the courts 
conceive of the choice of law question. Are they merely implementing the preference for state law, in 
the absence of a clear federal command, expressed in the Rules of Decision Act? Or are they assigning 
substantive content or meaning in a federal common law-making activity? If the final choice of a rule 
for decision is state law, then it does not matter which route the courts take. However, if the decisional 
principle is a newly developed federal (and not state) common law position, then the method for reach-
ing this decision is important. Lower court opinions spuming state corporate law guidance for the 
freedom of establishing their own "common law" view not only ignore Supreme Court direction but 
also choose to set their own policy in a direct lawmaking way. 
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The Bestfoods holding has potential significance in many other CER-
CLA contexts. Beyond the limited issues of parent/subsidiary liability 
presented in the Bestfoods case, CERCLA contains numerous crucial, defi-
nition and liability issues; many lacking specific statutory answers. The 
statute's far-reaching liability scheme was designed to further the Act's 
purpose of "initiat[ing] and establish[ing] a comprehensive response and 
financing mechanism to abate and control the vast problems associated 
with abandoned and inactive hazardous waste disposal sites."31 However, 
CERCLA is not a model of legislative clarity, and the federal courts fre-
quently have been called upon to determine significant liability issues 
raised by the Act. One question-the liability of corporate asset purchas-
ers-has been frequently litigated in the courts of appeal. This litigation 
has reflected substantial confusion over the proper method for determining 
the appropriate rule of decision. It has also produced inconsistent stan-
dards for imposing liability that vary from circuit to circuit all over the 
country.32 While the courts have consistently recognized that CERCLA's 
legislative scheme generally provides for successor-in-interest liability, 
they have also ruled that asset purchasers generally are not liable for the 
conduct of predecessors-in-interest under state corporate law.33 However, 
there are exceptions to this general rule of non-liability for asset purchasers 
under prevailing state corporate law rules. The interesting question that 
arises from an examination of these cases is how are courts selecting their 
rules of decision in these asset purchaser fact situations? The federal cir-
cuit courts are evenly split regarding this fundamental choice of law ques-
tion; some adhering to state law and others fashioning a more expansive 
rule under their presumed federal common law powers.34 After the Best-
31 Anspec Co. v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 922 F.2d 1240, 1241 (6th Cir. 1991). "Liability under 
CERCLA has been described as a black hole that indiscriminately devours all who come near it." 
Gregory C. Sisk & Jerry L. Anderson, The Sun Sets on Federal Common Law: Corporate Successor 
Liability Under CERCLA After O'Melveny and Myers, 16 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 505, 505 (1997) (internal 
quotations omitted). 
32 See Bradford C. Mank, The Demise ofCERCLA 's Federal Common Law, 68 U. CIN. L. REv. 
1157-58 (2000); Lawrence P. Schnapf, CERCLA and the Substantial Continuity Test: A Unifying Pro-
posal {r Imposing CERCLA Liability on Asset Purchasers, 4 ENVTL. LAW. 435 (1998). 
3 See Sisk & Anderson, supra note 31, at 512-13. 
34 For those circuits that apply state law to determine asset purchasers' CERCLA liability, see 
United States v. Davis, 261 F.3d I, 54 (1st Cir. 2001 ); Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Brown 
& Bryant, Inc., 159 F.3d 358, 383 (9th Cir. 1998); Anspec, 922 F.2d at 1248. For circuit court deci-
sions adopting federal common law principles, see B.F. Goodrich v. Betkoski, 99 F.3d 505, 519 (2d 
Cir. 1996); United States v. Mel(ico Feed & Seed Co., 980 F.2d 478,487 n.9 (8th Cir. 1992); United 
States v. Carolina Transformer Co., 978 F.2d 832, 837-38 (4th Cir. 1992); Smith Land & Improvment 
Corp. v. Celotex Corp., 851 F.2d 86, 91-92 (3d Cir. 1988). The Eleventh Circuit, faced with an analo-
gous issue, has held that absent a showing that the Kimbell Food factors show the need for a federal 
common law rule, state law should be adopted as the federal standard for determining whether a limited 
partner may be held accountable for the CERCLA liability of the partnership. See Red wing Carriers, 
Inc., v. Saraland Apartments, 94 F.3d 1489, 1501-02 (lith Cir. 1996). 
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foods, Atherton, and 0 'Melveny & Myers decisions of the 1990s, it would 
seem as though the federal courts would only rarely establish and enforce a 
truly federal common law rule of decision in the limited circumstances 
described by the Supreme Court. This has not been the case with asset 
purchaser liability. 
The principal focus of this article is the way federal courts choose a 
rule of decision in cases of statutory silence. As a specific example of this 
inquiry, this article examines the decisional issue faced by federal courts 
attempting to determine whether corporate asset purchasers should be li-
able for response costs under CERCLA-how they have interpreted the 
Act's silence with respect to asset purchaser liability and how they have 
ruled. As this introduction reveals, federal courts have been confronted 
with the question of selecting an appropriate rule of decision in a large 
number of these cases. Importantly, this choice of law issue arose with an 
established backdrop of Supreme Court precedent strongly suggesting a 
method for making these decisions. As this article's analysis will indicate, 
the lower federal courts have largely ignored the Supreme Court's direc-
tion. Part II of this article will discuss the federal courts' limited power to 
apply federal common law in instances of statutory omission. This impor-
tant inquiry focuses upon federal court authority to choose a rule of deci-
sion and the general approach to statutory interpretation with respect to the 
application of federal common law. How should a court select its rule of 
decision-should it incorporate state law as the rule or should it exercise its 
limited legislative powers to fashion a common law rule? The framework 
for evaluating the merits of a federal rule articulated by the Supreme Court 
in Kimbell Foods and further refined in O'Melveny & Myers and Atherton 
will be discussed in greater detail in this part. 
Part III examines the precise legal matter at issue in the cases under re-
view-does CERCLA liability apply to corporate successors who have 
been asset purchasers? After analyzing the threshold question of whether 
the statutory liability applies to corporate successors at all, the discussion 
then analyzes the general corporate law norms that are available for selec-
tion as the "appropriate" rule of decision in these CERCLA cases. Part IV 
of this article then turns to the issue of how federal courts have acted in 
choosing the appropriate rule of decision in this highly important CERCLA 
context-the assignment of CERCLA liability for purchasers of corporate 
assets. The varying positions taken by the U.S. Courts of Appeal with re-
spect to this question are analyzed, revealing a range of different ap-
proaches to this significant choice of law issue. The Part ends with the 
main conclusion that there has been virtually no appellate court considera-
tion of the Supreme Court's recent precedents. Beyond that, the review 
concludes that these courts appear uncertain about what their proper role is 
in a case such as this. Only a few decisions analyze the question before 
them as a proposition to create federal common law to fill statutory gaps or 
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to provide "interstitial meaning." Finally, Part V evaluates the judicial 
opinions under review and suggests a number of explanations for answer-
ing the question of why the federal appellate courts do not obediently fol-
low Supreme Court mandate. 
II. IDENTIFYING RULES OF DECISION USING FEDERAL COMMON LAW 
POWER 
A. When Does the Authority Exist? 
Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and, generally, they 
must apply federal statutory, constitutional, or state law when resolving 
disputes that properly come before them. However, in certain circum-
stances, they may act as courts of general jurisdiction and fashion a rule of 
decision under their federal common lawmaking authority--one having a 
non-statutory or non-constitutional basis. The exercise of this lawmaking 
power, being the product of rather unconstrained federal court initiative, 
has been the subject of serious academic dispute in the last two decades.35 
Federal jurisdiction alone does not convey authority to create common 
law-the issue in dispute must implicate a uniquely federal interest or the 
court must have been granted authority to create common law under the 
statutory scheme at issue for the court to exercise its limited lawmaking 
powers.36 In recent times, the Supreme Court has approved of the applica-
tion of federal common law rules in six specific areas.37 These include 
suits (1) based on federal statutes that contain gaps in the applicable law, 
which requires courts to create interstitial federal common law;38 (2) by or 
against the United States, or between private parties involving federal pro-
prietary interests;39 (3) involving controversies between states;40 (4) involv-
35 Numerous academic articles have been published examining the emerging federal common law 
doctrine in various areas of the law. Some views have been tolerant, even encouraging, assessments of 
federal court's presumptive lawmaking powers while others have considered this kind of court action to 
be both a violation of the Rules of Decision Act and politically illegitimate. See George D. Brown, 
Federal Common Law and the Role of the Federal Courts in Private Law Adjudication-A (New) Erie 
Problem?, 12 PACE L. REV. 229,260-61 (1992). 
36 Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 45 I U.S. 630, 640-41 (1981 ). 
37 These categories are not mutually exclusive and certain cases may fall under multiple catego-
ries. For instance, in 0 'Melveny & Myers v. FDIC, the suit at issue was brought by the FDIC under the 
Financia1tnstitutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989 and the questions brought to the 
Court implicated both findings of "interstitial meaning" and matters involving federal proprietary 
interests. 512 U.S. 79, 85,88 (1994). 
38 Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448,450-51 (1957). 
39 Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500,512 (1988). 
40 E.g., New Jersey v. New York, 283 U.S. 336,342-43 (1931). In the absence of a relevant stat-
ute, the Supreme Court has original jurisdiction over suits between states, and applies federal common 
law to resolve the dispute because neither states' laws can be applied to resolve the dispute fairly. 28 
U.S.C. § 125l(a) ("The Supreme Court shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction of all 
controversies between two or more States."). 
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ing international relations or international law;41 (5) involving admiralty 
jurisdiction;42 and (6) involving Indian relations.43 This list reinforces the 
idea that, at least in non-diversity cases,44 there is a well-developed com-
mon law tradition in the federal courts reaching at least to these six catego-
ries.45 
These categories of cases found suitable for federal common law 
treatment exhibit traits of necessity and fragility. Regarding need, they all 
appear to reflect the necessity of identifying some form of federal law to 
resolve important disputes touching significant federal interests.46 For in-
stance, it is hard to imagine the resolution of interstate, international, admi-
ralty, or Indian cases without such legal doctrine. Concerning the fragile 
nature of federal common law, this doctrine is clearly a "temporary fix" 
pending a possible, more permanent legislative solution provided by Con-
gress. Federal common law is "subject to the paramount authority of Con-
gress'>47 and is pre-empted when federal statutes or regulations address the 
specific question decided by the federal court.48 With these two principles 
41 Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 426 (1964). 
42 Fitzgerald v. United States Lines Co., 374 U.S. 16,20-21 (1963). 
43 Wilson v. Omaha Indian Tribe, 442 U.S. 653 (1979). 
44 See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 77-78 (1938) (holding that federal judge-made 
law is unconstitutional when applied to diversity cases). 
45 The fortunes of the federal common law doctrine seem to ebb and flow with changing percep-
tions of the appropriate role of the federal courts. See discussion supra Part I. A (discussing how the 
court's views regarding the appropriate judicial role have changed over time). In D 'Oench, Duhme & 
Co. v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 447,472 (1942), Justice Jackson set forth a strong statement endorsing federal 
common law as a legitimate form of federal law when he wrote in his concurring opinion that, 
[Federal law] is found in the federal Constitution, statutes, or common law. Federal 
common law implements the federal Constitution and statutes, and is conditioned by 
them. Within these limits, federal courts are free to apply the traditional common-
law technique of decision and to draw upon all the sources of the common law in 
cases such as the present. 
/d. at 471-72 (citations omitted). Ahhough not explicitly attempting to "fill gaps" in the statute under 
consideration, the case identifies a federal rule to resolve the conflict over which defenses would apply 
to block the payment of a note currently held by a federal agency. See id. at 456-57, 459 (discussing 
how the federal statute informed the court's decision). In finding that the "no consideration" defense 
would not be applicable, the Court effectively used its common law powers to amend the statute before 
it. See id. at 459-60 (holding that the Court would not allow the defense in these circumstances). 
46 See, e.g., New Jersey v. New York, 283 U.S. 336, 344 (1931) (discussing the United States 
Army's interest in the case because the decision effected potentially navigable waters); Sabbatino, 376 
U.S. at 410 (discussing how severance of the federal government's diplomatic relations with Cuba 
could effect the outcome of the case). 47 New Jersey, 283 U.S. at 348. 
48 See City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 314 (1981) ("[W]hen Congress addresses a 
question previously governed by a decision rested on federal common law the need for such an unusual 
exercise of lawmaking by federal courts disappears."). The availability of federal common law theory 
can depend upon a determination that federal statutory law has or has not extinguished it. /d. Often the 
answer given to this question depends upon the Court's attitude about implied federal judicial power. 
See id. at 315 (discussing how federal common law implicates separation of powers concerns in certain 
circumstances (quoting Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 195 (1981))). The City of Milwaukee 
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in mind, it is the judicial "gap-filling" or interstitial interpretive function of 
the first category of cases that is the subject of inquiry in this article. When 
exercising their "common law" powers in this context, the federal courts 
function in the closest analogy to legislative lawmaking by providing deci-
sional rules which give meaning to an incomplete statute.49 It is this law-
making function that holds with it the broadest judicial power-the crea-
tion of critical legal principles in the absence of specific statutory guidance. 
In recent decades, the potential breadth of this authority has given rise to 
Supreme Court doctrinal directives discouraging this behavior.50 
1. Interstitial Gap Filling by Federal Courts Pursuant to 
Congressional Grants of Lawmaking Authority 
As stated above, the Supreme Court has ruled that federal courts may 
create "interstitial federal common law" when Congress has enacted a 
regulatory scheme and has granted, implicitly or explicitly, the federal 
courts the authority to create substantive rules to effectuate the scheme.51 
Congress may delegate such authority by express statutory direction. 52 
Apparently, it can achieve the same result indirectly by creating a statutory 
scheme replete with gaps or one using generalized language without a clear 
solution to specific problems. 53 In these instances, the federal courts con-
clude, sometimes disingenuously, that Congress intended for them to fill 
the "interstices" of the legislation. 54 When this implied grant of lawmaking 
case provides a good example of this phenomenon. This 1981 ruling concluded that Congress, by 
enacting the 1972 Federal Water Pollution Control Act, had impliedly displaced the federal common 
law in interstate water pollution conflicts. /d. at 317. This litigation had previously reached the Su-
preme Court and resulted in a decision holding that federal common law principles applied to such 
cases. See Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 103 (1972) (discussing the applicability of 
federal common law to air and water disputes). 
49 See discussion infra Part II.A.I (discussing courts' legislative function when they engage in 
"gap-fi II ing"). 
50 See, e.g., O'Melveny & Myers v. FDIC, 512 U.S. 79, 87 (1994) (confining the development of 
federal common law to situations where there is a significant conflict between a federal policy or inter-
est and state law); WRIGHT & KANE, supra note 9, at 419 (discussing the Supreme Court's recent 
reluctance to recognize federal common law). 
51 Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills of Ala., 353 U.S. 448,450-51 (1957). 
52 See 17 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 1j 124.41 [I] (3d ed. 2003) 
("In enacting federal statutory law, Congress often expressly delegates federal law-making authority to 
the courts"). 
53 See, e.g., Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363,366-67 (1943) (discussing how 
the Court must devise its own rules oflaw when there is no applicable act of Congress). 
54 For example, in Textile Workers Union, a union sued an employer under§ 301 of the Labor 
Management Relations Act of 1947 ("LMRA") to compel arbitration required by a collective bargain-
ing agreement. 353 U.S. at 449. Section 301(a) grants federal subject matter jurisdiction over suits 
involving contract violations between unions and employers. /d. at 449-50. After an exhaustive review 
of the LMRA's legislative history, the Court held, however, that§ 30l(a) "authorizes federal courts to 
fashion a body of federal law for the enforcement of these collective bargaining agreements and in-
cludes within that federal law specific performance of promises to arbitrate grievances under collective 
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authority is found by courts, it is as a convenient explanation or legal fic-
tion justifying their intervention in cases that they believe need resolution. 
As a matter of perceived necessity, the federal courts find the common 
law power to fill the gaps in an incomplete statute.55 Although sometimes 
confusingly similar to statutory interpretation, the exercise of federal com-
mon lawmaking power is different in that it does just that-it makes new 
law.56 As the Court has said, the authority of the courts to construe or in-
terpret statutes is "fundamentally different from the authority to fashion a 
new rule or to provide a new remedy which Congress has decided not to 
adopt."57 However, there are clear limits on the fashioning of an expansive 
federal common law.58 For instance, courts generally are not free to sup-
plement the rights and remedies provided for by congressional enact-
ments.59 Furthermore, this common law power to fill statutory interstitial 
gaps has been further restricted by stated policies reinforcing traditional 
legal understandings represented by general or common law rules.60 Stat-
utes that "invade the common law [however] are to be read with a pre-
sumption favoring the retention of long-established and familiar principles, 
except when a statutory purpose to the contrary is evident.'>61 To abrogate 
a common law principle, Congress must draft a statute that speaks directly 
bargaining agreements." /d. at 450-52. Federal courts have followed the reasoning and approach taken 
by the Court in Textile Workers Union to create and apply federal common law to multiple federal 
statutory schemes. E.g., Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Brunch, 489 U.S. 101, 110 (1989) (finding 
that "given [the ]language and history [of ERISA] courts are to develop a federal common law of rights 
and obligations under ERISA-regulated plans."); Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 
379-80 (1983) (finding a private right of action under§ IO(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934). 
The inquiry into whether a congressional grant is present involves examining (I) the text of the statute 
for express grants and (2) the statute's legislative history for implied grants. See Textile Workers Un-
ion, 353 U.S. at 451-52 (discussing the "force of the Act" and going on to examine the legislative 
histo'1'J-
See, e.g., Textile Workers Union, 353 U.S. at 455-57 (indicating that the court must, out of ne-
cessi~, fashion a remedy in order to achieve the statute's goals). 
6 Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers, 451 U.S. 77,97 (1981). 
57 !d. 
58 See, e.g., O'Me/veny & Myers, 512 U.S. at 87 (outlining the limits on courts' power to fashion 
federal common law). 
59 This has been especially true in recent efforts to identify an implied right of action for damages 
in federal statutes. See, e.g., Kraholios v. Nat'! Fed'n of Fed. Employees, 489 U.S. 527 (1989) (no 
implied right of action for breach of a duty of fair representation in Title VII of the Civil Service Re-
form Act); see also United States v. Texas, 507 U.S. 529, 537-38 (1993)(holding that the Court cannot 
alter a common law remedy regime that Congress implicitly adopted when it enacted the statute). 
60 See, e.g., O'Melveny & Myers, 512 U.S. at 86-87 (discussing how the long standing common 
law policy acknowledged by 12 U.S.C. § 1821 (2000) directs courts to use traditional, state common 
law rules when Congress does not say otherwise). 
61 Texas, 507 U.S. at 534 (citing lsbrandtsen Co. v. Johnson, 343 U.S. 779, 783 (1952)). This 
presumption applies to both federal and state common law. !d. In considering whether a federal statute 
pre-empts state common law however, courts start with the assumption that "the historic police powers 
of the States were not to be superceded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest pur-
pose of Congress." City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304,316 (1981). 
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to the question addressed by the common law.62 Federal courts are to as-
sume that Congress legislates with the expectation that common law prin-
ciples will remain valid, unless the statute or its legislative history evi-
dences a contrary purpose;63 congressional silence generally does not evi-
dence intent to supplant the existing common law.64 
The effect of Congress's legislating against a common law background 
is that the federal courts' limited authority to create common law is further 
restrained. Federal courts must refrain from filling gaps in statutes that 
were drafted in recognition of firmly established common law principles.65 
The onus is on the federal courts, when faced with such statutes, to conduct 
a thorough investigation of the statute's legislative history and the common 
law setting in which it was drafted to determine whether Congress inten-
tionally omitted a right or remedy, relying instead on established state law 
principles.66 It is only when there is either a grant of authority to legislate 
62 Texas, 507 U.S. at 534. When a statute has spoken directly to a question historically deter-
mined by reference to federal common law, the courts' "commitment to the separation of powers is too 
fundamental to continue to rely on federal common law by judicially decreeing what accords with 
common sense and the public weal when Congress has addressed the problem." City of Milwaukee, 
451 U.S. at 315 (internal quotation omitted). 
63 Texas, 507 U.S. at 534. For example, the Court has held that the "absence of any reference to 
contribution in the legislative history [of the Sherman and Clayton Antitrust Acts] or of any possibility 
that Congress was concerned with softening the blow on joint wrongdoers in this setting makes exami-
nation of other factors unnecessary." Texas Indus., Inc., v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 639 
(1981 ). The Court concluded that "Congress neither expressly nor implicitly intended to create a right 
to contribution." /d. at 640. The Court then examined whether a contribution right was available to 
parties liable for anti-trust violations under federal common law. /d. Contribution was held to be 
unavailable in anti-trust actions because Congress had not authorized the federal courts to fashion such 
a common law right, and because no uniquely federal interests are implicated as contribution actions 
involve private litigants. /d. at 642-43. 
64 Texas, 507 U.S. at 535. The Texas Court held that the Debt Collection Act of 1982 ("OCA") 
left in place the longstanding common law obligation of States' to pay prejudgment interest on debts 
owed to the United States government. /d. at 539. Texas incurred the debts at issue through its partici-
pation in the Food Stamp Program, under which states must reimburse the federal government for a 
portion of the replacement cost for any lost or stolen coupons above a certain "tolerance level." /d. at 
530-31. Texas argued that the DCA precluded imposition of prejudgment interest on any amounts 
owed by states to the federal government. /d. at 532. The Court held that the OCA's silence as to 
states' prejudgment interest obligations was not reason to conclude that the DCA was meant to abro-
gate Texas's common law obligations. /d. at 537. 
65 See id. at 533 (discussing limits on judicial gap-filling when there is a common law back-
groun~. · 
See generally id. at 534; Radclifl Materials, 451 U.S. 630. Separation of powers and federal-
ism concerns are implicated when a federal rule that would displace state law in an area of national 
concern is enacted, and therefore, it is generally the province of the elected representatives in Congress, 
and not of the federal courts (which are insulated from the political process) to fashion such rules. See 
Wallis v. Pan Am. Petroleum Corp., 384 U.S. 63, 68 (1966) (discussing why the Court must be cautious 
about formulating federal common law). These concerns dictate the presumption against fashioning a 
federal common law rule when a federal statute or state law addresses the issue in dispute. See id. 
(finding that the presumption against formulating federal common law was not overcome because there 
was no significant conflict between "a federal policy or interest and the use of state law"). Federal 
courts must heed comprehensive and clear Acts of Congress that expressly or impliedly address dis-
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or a uniquely federal interest at stake, a gap or ambiguity in the applicable 
statutory scheme, and no existing and applicable state law with which to 
answer the question left unaddressed by statute, that federal courts may 
apply federal common law.67 These principles, echoed by Justice Souter's 
Bestfoods opinion, suggest a much less free-wheeling federal common law 
gap-filling power in these situations.68 
2. Cases Implicating "Uniquely Federal Interests" 
Federal common law may also be applied when a case implicates 
uniquely federal interests.69 "Uniquely federal interests" are present if 
there is an overriding federal interest in the need for a uniform rule of deci-
sion or if the controversy implicates the basic interests of federalism. 70 In 
such cases, state law, which presumptively would apply to resolve the is-
sues left untouched by federal statute/1 cannot resolve the controversy ei-
ther because the authority and duties of the United States as sovereign are 
intimately involved, or because the interstate or international nature of the 
controversy makes disposition under state law inappropriate.72 This is 
hardly surprising as a general proposition yet the difficulty exists in identi-
fying those cases where "uniquely federal interests" are or should be para-
mount. Federal common law exists only in such narrow areas as those 
concerned with the rights and obligations of the United States, 73 interstate 
and international disputes implicating the conflicting rights of states, or 
national relations with foreign nations/" and in admiralty cases.75 Federal 
courts may not create new federal common law outside of these few areas. 
In all other cases, state law or federal Constitutional or statutory law ap-
plies.76 But what about the many government programs authorized by fed-
puted issues, and only fashion new federal rules in the absence of such. E.g., Clearfield Trust Co. v. 
United States, 318 U.S. 363, 367 (1943); City of Milwaukee, 451 U.S. at 314 ("[F]ederal common law 
applies '[u]ntil the field has been made subject of comprehensive legislation or authorized administra-
tive standards."') (quoting Texas v. Pankey, 441 F.2d 236,241 (lOth Cir. 1971)). 67 WRIGHT & KANE, supra note 9, at 413-14; see discussion supra Part II.A.I, infra Part II.A.2. 68 See discussion infra Part II.B.3. 69 Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 504 (1988). 70 E.g., id. at 508, 5 II. 
71 Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers, 451 U.S. 77,94-95 (1981). 
72 Texas Indus., Inc., v. Radcliff Materials, 451 U.S. 630,641 (1981). 73 Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 366-67 (1943). Civil liabilities arising out 
of defense procurement contracts, obligations and rights of the United States under contracts, and 
liability of federal officers for official acts are included within this class of actions determined under 
federal common law. Boyle, 487 U.S. at 504-06. 
74 Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 98-100 (1972); Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sab-
batino, 376 U.S. 398,400 (1964). 
75 Fitzgerald v. United States Lines Co., 374 U.S. 16, 20 (1963). 76 
"State laws 'should be overridden by the federal courts only where clear and substantial inter-
ests of the National Government, which cannot be served consistently with respect for such state inter-
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eral legislation yet missing crucial statutory guidance? When should the 
resolution of these programmatic issues be found to present "uniquely fed-
eral interests" justifying a court-made rule of decision? These questions 
are found in the CERCLA issues presented below. 
B. Finding the Substance of Federal Common Law Rules of Decision 
A court's determination that federal common law should apply to a 
disputed issue, because the issue implicates a uniquely federal interest or 
Congress has been found to have granted authority to fill legislative gaps, 
does not automatically grant the court license to establish a rule as it sees 
fit. Once the threshold decision has been made to identify federal common 
law, the court must next determine whether the rule of decision should be 
incorporated from the existing state law or fashioned by the judge.77 This 
has been an interesting and complicated question. In a series of decisions 
reaching back to the 1970s, the Supreme Court has established a near-
presumption in favor of incorporating state law as the rule of decision in 
cases attempting to "fill the gaps" ·in federal programmatic statutes. 78 The 
central case creating this preference was United States v. Kimbell Foods, 
Inc., which articulated a three-pronged inquiry for courts to undertake 
when deciding whether to adopt state law or fashion the applicable rule 
ostensibly under its common law powers.79 The Supreme Court, however, 
consistently has held that federal law governs questions involving the 
rights of the United States that arise under nationwide federal programs.80 
ests, will suffer major damage if the state law is applied."' Boyle, 487 U.S. at 518 (Brennan, J., dissent-
ing). 
77 See discussion infra, this Part (discussing the rules governing the Court's decision regarding 
which law it applies). In some cases the federal legislation will indicate that state law should serve as 
the rule of decision for cases arising under the federal statute. The Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1346(b ), 2674 (2000) is the prime example of this phenomenon. 
78 See O'Melveny & Myers v. FDIC, 512 U.S. 79,87 (1994) (discussing how cases from the time 
of Kimbell Foods to the present have held that the instances when the Court should develop a special 
federal rule are "few and restricted"). 
79 See discussion infra Part II.B. I. Kimbell Foods does not speak of the issue as a federal com-
mon law matter. See generally United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715 (1979). Clearly, the 
Court was filling in the interstitial meaning of the Small Business Act which did not specify the priority 
rules to govern Small Business Administration security interests as against private creditors. /d. at 727. 
It was not interpreting the meaning of the federal Jaw in a conventional sense. In the end, it specified a 
federal rule of decision on the issue of security interest priorities from Texas law, id. at 740, and this 
must be the finding of federal common law. As stated by well-regarded scholars, 
Whether state law or federal law controls on matters not covered by the Constitution 
or an Act of Congress is a very complicated question, which yields to no simple an-
swer in terms of the parties to the suit, the basis of the jurisdiction, or the source of 
the right that is to be enforced. Whenever the federal court is free to decide for itself 
the rule to be applied, and there are many such situations, it is applying, or making, 
"federal common Jaw." 
WRIGHT & KANE, supra note 9, at 414-15. 
80 E.g., O'Melveny & Myers, 512 U.S. 79 (Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and En-
forcement Act of 1989); United States v. Texas, 507 U.S. 529, 530 (1993) (Debt Collection Act of 
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Federal courts are directed to "fill the interstices of federal legislation by 
their own standards" when Congress has failed to speak to areas that com-
prise "issues substantially related to an established program of government 
operation."81 But what is "federal law" in these contexts? Controversies 
that directly affect the operation of such federal programs, however, do not 
inevitably require a resort to uniform federal rules.82 State law, as Kimbell 
Foods holds, can admirably serve as the federal rule of decision.83 When 
well-established commercial rules that have proven workable over time 
govern an area of federal concern, the uncertainties of altering such settled 
commercial practices dictate that courts refrain from creating new uncer-
tainties and "adopt the readymade body of state law as the federal rule of 
decision until Congress strikes a different accommodation. "84 The Rules of 
Decision Act,85 as interpreted by Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins,86 provides 
that state laws impart the rule of decision in federal court cases, unless the 
matter in litigation is governed by the Constitution or by a federal statute. 
Kimbell Foods and subsequent Supreme Court decisions consistently agree 
with this statement.87 Curiously, this view has only been occasionally fol-
lowed in the CERCLA holdings under consideration below. 
1982); Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers, 451 U.S. 77, 89-90 (1981) (Equal Pay Act of 
1963 and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964); Wallis v. Pan Am. Petroleum Corp., 384 U.S. 63, 
67 (1966) (Mineral Leasing Act for Acquired Lands). 
81 United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 727 (1979) (citing Clearfield Trust Co. v. 
United States, 318 U.S. 363, 367 (1943)), accord United States v. little Lake Misere Land Co., 412 
U.S. 580, 594 (1973) (holding that interstitial federal lawmaking is a basic responsibility of the federal 
courtsJ. 
2 Kimbell Foods, 440 U.S. at 727-28. 
83 !d. at 740. 
84 /d. at 739-40. 
8S 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (2000). But see Clearfield Trust, 318 U.S. at 367 (holding that federal law, 
rather than state law, applies to disputes involving the rights and liabilities of the federal government). 
At issue in Clearfield Trust was whether federal common law or state law rules determined Clearfield 
Trust Co.'s liability to the federal government for collecting on a forged check issued by the Federal 
Reserve Bank of Philadelphia. /d. at 364-65. The Court found that federal law governed the dispute 
because the United States exercises a constitutional function or power when it disburses its funds or 
pays its debts. /d. at 366. The authority to issue the check in question originated in the Constitution 
and federal statutes, and therefore the duties imposed on, and the rights acquired by, the federal gov-
ernment should come from the same source. /d. Where no explicit congressional directive exists, the 
court must consider whether state law should apply, or whether the application of state law would 
subject the rights and duties to exceptional uncertainty. /d. at 367. The Rule of Decision Act, there-
fore, is inapplicable where rights and duties of the United States are drawn from federal statute or the 
Constitution. 
86 Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64,78 (1938). 
87 See O'Melveny & Myers v. FDIC, 512 U.S. 79, 87-88 (1994) (discussing how cases from the 
time of Kimbell Foods to the present have held that the instances when the Court should develop a 
special federal rule instead of applying state law are "few and restricted"). 
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1. Kimbell Foods 
The case of United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc. sets forth the Supreme 
Court's modem template for deciding when federal courts may fashion 
federal common law rules. The Court, in this 1979 decision, devised a 
three-factor test to determine when federal courts should ignore the 
"readymade body of state law" and create new common law rules of deci-
sion. 88 It found that federal programs that by their "nature are and must be 
uniform in character throughout the Nation necessitate formulation of con-
trolling federal rules," however, "when there is little need for a national 
uniform body of law, state law may be incorporated as the federal rule of 
decision. "89 The Court articulated that federal courts' first inquiry when 
deciding whether to incorporate a state law rule of decision into federal 
common law should be whether the federal program at issue required uni-
form national rules to effectuate its purpose.90 Whether application of a 
state law rule of decision would frustrate specific objectives of federal pro-
grams,91 and whether application of a federal rule would disrupt commer-
cial relationships predicated on state law were two other factors set forth by 
the Court as framing the decision.92 In the twenty-three years following the 
Kimbell Foods case, these three elements have continued to serve as the 
88 Kimbell Foods, 440 U.S. at 728-29. 
89 /d. at 728 (citing Miree v. DeKalb County, 433 U.S. 25, 28-29 (1977)). The Court in Miree 
held that state law, rather than federal common law, applied in determining whether representatives of 
passengers killed in an airplane crash could recover as third-party beneficiaries to contracts between the 
defendant county and the Federal Aviation Administration. 433 U.S. at 32-33. The Court found that 
only the rights of private litigants were at issue and resolution of the plaintiffs' breach of contract claim 
did not directly affect the United States. /d. at 29. No duties, interests, liabilities, or substantial rights 
of the federal government hinged on the outcome of the litigation, and, therefore, a uniform federal 
common law rule was unnecessary. See id. at 32-33 (discussing the federal government's very limited 
and speculative interest in the case). 
9° Kimbell Foods, 440 U.S. at 728. 91 /d. (citing United Statesv. Allegheny County, 322 U.S. 174, 183 (1944)). The Allegheny Court 
held that a Pennsylvania tax law violated the United States Constitution insofar as it purported to au-
thorize taxation of United States' property interests in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. 322 U.S. at 
192. The Court found that state law could not defeat or limit government actions when the federal 
government properly exercised a constitutional grant of power. /d. at 189-91. Exercise of such consti-
tutional functions presented questions of federal concern that could not be controlled by laws of any 
state. /d. at 183. The Supremacy Clause, the purpose of which was to avoid the introduction of 
disparities, conflicts, and confusions, would be violated if state laws did control the federal govern-
ment's constitutionally authorized functions. /d. 
92 Kimbell Foods, 440 U.S. at 728 (citing United States v. Brosnan, 363 U.S. 237, 241-42 
(1960)). As a matter of federal law, state law was held to govern divestitures of federal tax liens, ex-
cept to the extent that federal statutes had entered the field. Brosnan, 363 U.S. at 240-42. The Court 
recognized that tax liens form part of the machinery for collecting federal taxes, but that Congress 
"came into an area of complex property relationships long since settled and regulated" when it resorted 
to the use of liens. /d. at 241-42. The need for a uniform federal rule was outweighed "by the severe 
dislocation to local property relationships which would result from [the Court] disregarding state pro-
cedures" that governed enforcement of the liens. /d. at 242. 
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Supreme Court's standard setting the judicial policy for federal courts 
grappling with the difficult question of whether they should enter upon the 
field of federal common law rule development and adjudication.93 The 
application of this three-part decision making structure over the years has 
indicated the Supreme Court's decreasing tolerance of the lower federal 
courts' exercise of common law rulemaking powers. It reinforces the 
theme of judicial restraint in the federal courts and a more limited view of 
the legitimate function offederal courts as "law-makers." 
The issue before the Supreme Court in Kimbell Foods was whether 
contractual liens which arose out of federal loan programs took precedence 
over private liens in the absence of a federal statute setting priority for 
creditors.94 The Court first held that the priority of liens stemming from 
federal lending programs was to be determined by reference to federal 
law.95 Both the Small Business Administration ("SBA") and the Farmers 
Home Administration ("FHA") had derived their authority to enter into 
loan transactions from specific federal statutes that had been enacted by an 
exercise of "constitutional function or power;" the Court therefore rea-
soned that the agencies' rights in those transactions also should derive from 
a federal source.96 
The question remaining for the Kimbell Foods Court was whether the 
federal rule of decision regarding the priority ofliens should be determined 
under existing state law or a judicially-created federal rule.97 The Court 
applied the three-factor analysis it had set out and held that the relative 
priority of federal and private liens was to be determined pursuant to non-
discriminatory state laws.98 The agencies' operating practices, which rec-
ognized that states' commercial laws control the Government's security 
interests, undercut the assertion that "a federal rule of priority [was] needed 
to avoid the administrative burdens created by disparate state commercial 
rules.'.w In addition, the unforeseeable consequences of "altering settled 
93 See, e.g., Central Pines Land Co. v. United States, 274 F.3d 881, 890 (5th Cir. 2001) 
(exem£1ifying a federal court's recent application the Kimbell Foods test). 
4 440 U.S. at 718. The Court consolidated two appeals from the Fifth Circuit in Kimbell Foods. 
ld. at 718, 723. Kimbell Foods, Inc. v. Republic Nat. Bank, 551 F.2d 491 (5th Cir. 1977), involved a 
United States' contractual lien that was guaranteed by the SBA. Jd. at 493. The Court affirmed the 
circuit court's decision. 440 U.S. at 740. United States v. Crittenden, 563 F.2d 678 (5th Cir. 1977), 
involved a security interest taken by the FHA in a borrower's farm equipment and crops for loans 
obtained under the Consolidated Farmers Horne Administration Act of 1961. ld. at 679-80. The Court 
vacated and remanded the circuit court's decision to fashion a special federal common law rule giving 
priority to a private repairman's lien over the FHA's lien. 440 U.S. at 740. 
95 Kimbell Foods, 440 U.S. at 726-27. 
96 ld. at 726 (citing Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 367 (1943)). 
97 440 U.S. at 718. 
98 ld. 
99 ld. at 732. 
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commercial practices"100 and the states' relatively uniform laws concerning 
commercial transactions 101 deterred the Court from adopting a federal rule 
regarding loan priorities. With this decision, the Court set out an extremely 
narrow course for federal judges ruling in cases involving federal programs 
lacking clear statutory guidance. The emphasis in Kimbell Foods was 
placed on the maintenance of stable and predictable rules of decision even 
if they were to be derived from the laws of states. Justice Marshall's opin-
ion cast a skeptical eye towards federal agency arguments favoring the 
development of uniform, court-determined rules and found them wanting. 
Apparently, the Court's position has been that Congress must act clearly to 
set forth statutory rules favoring federal interest to a greater degree. Fol-
lowing the Kimbell Foods decision, the freedom of federal judges to con-
trol the development of new legal doctrine under their common law powers 
seemed significantly curtailed. Further Supreme Court opinions would 
reinforce this view, but, as the following analysis of CERCLA decisions 
will reveal, the Court has found very little support in the decisions of the 
lower federal courts, which have largely ignored it. 
2. Post-Kimbell Foods Supreme Court Jurisprudence Regarding the 
Source of Federal Common Law Rules of Decision 
a. Pre-O'Melveny & Myers Cases 
Justice Marshall's opinion in the unanimous Kimbell Foods case set 
the benchmark for finding rules of decision in "interstitial meaning" federal 
common law cases. Several other Supreme Court holdings rendered be-
tween 1979 and 1991 reinforced the same view. This principle may be 
stated in the following terms: With the exception of the relatively few cases 
in which a federal common law rule of decision is mandated by the federal 
statute or right at issue, 102 the general presumption has been that in the ab-
sence of a statutorily provided rule, if state law may be applied to resolve a 
dispute, there would be no need for federal courts to fashion a different 
100 /d. at 739. The Court found that "[i]n structuring financial transactions, businessmen depend 
on state commercial law to provide the stability essential for reliable evaluation of the risks involved." 
/d. (citing Nat'! Bank v. Whitney, 103 U.S. 99, 102 (1881)). Creditors who rely on state law to ensure 
lien priority would have had their expectations thwarted whenever a federal contractual security interest 
appeared and took precedence had the Court created a federal rule of decision in Kimbell Foods. /d. 
101 /d. at 732 n.28. The Government failed to assert any concrete conflicts between the interests 
promoted by the SBA and FHA loan programs and existing state laws. /d. at 740. The Court did 
acknowledge that a federal rule would have been justified if the Government had shown that formulat-
ing special rules to govern priority of federal liens was necessary to ''vindicate important national 
interests." /d. 
102 Generally, there must exist a "significant conflict between some federal policy or interest and 
the use of state law" for federal courts to legitimately fashion common law rules of decision. Wallis v. 
Pan Am. Petroleum Corp., 384 U.S. 63, 68 (1966). 
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common law rule. 103 This view of judicial authority appeared to rein in the 
federal judge's discretion and force courts to presumptively start from a 
position of using state law as the relevant rule of decision. 
After Kimbell Foods, a federal court's decision whether to adopt state 
law or to fashion nationwide federal rules become a "matter of judicial 
policy dependent upon a variety of considerations always relevant to the 
nature of the specific governmental interests and to the effects upon them 
of applying state law."104 In the case of Wilson v. Omaha Indian Tribe, 
decided in the same year as Kimbell Foods, the Supreme Court applied the 
Kimbell Foods three-part test to determine whether a nationwide rule was 
necessary to decide whether changes in a river's course affecting riparian 
land owned or possessed by the United States or an Indian tribe had been 
avulsive or accretive.105 Wilson involved consolidated actions to quiet title 
to land originally granted to the Omaha Indian Tribe under an 1854 
treaty. 106 The eastern boundary of the reservation land was fixed as the 
center of the main channel of the Missouri River, into which a peninsula 
protruded. 107 Over time, the river changed its course, and certain tribal 
land was separated from the bulk of the reservation by the river.108 Peti-
tioners asserted that the river's movements washed away part of the reser-
vation and the soil accreted to the Iowa side of the river, vesting title in 
them as riparian owners. 109 
The Wilson court held that Nebraska state law, and not a judicially cre-
ated federal common law rule, should provide the rule of decision in this 
matter. Even though the case involved a matter concerned with Indian 
tribal property rights, the Court concluded that there was no need to de-
velop a uniform national rule to determine whether changes in a river's 
course affecting riparian ownership rights of an Indian tribe or the United 
States had been accretive or avulsive, so long as the applicable state stan-
103 City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 313 n.7 (1981). The strength of the Kimbell 
Foods view was so strong that it even prompted Justice White to dissent from the Supreme Court's 
denial of certiorari in a case raising the issue in a factual context similar to Kimbell Foods. In Missouri 
Farmers Ass'n v. United States, 475 U.S. 1053 (1986), the Court was asked to review the Eighth Cir-
cuit's ruling that a federal agency regulation provided the appropriate rule for deciding whether the 
Farmers Home Administration retains a continuing security interest in certain collateral following sale. 
For Justice White, making the federal regulation the controlling source of a decisional rule was difficult 
to reconcile with Kimbell Foods, which preferred "non-discriminatory state law" in the absence of a 
"congressional directive." /d. at I 054 (White, J., dissenting). Due to the denial of certiorari, the Su-
preme Court never addressed his concerns. 
104 Wilson v. Omaha Indian Tribe, 442 U.S. 653,672 (1979) (internal quotes omitted). 
lOS /d. at 672-73. 
106 !d. at 658-60. 
107 /d. at 658-59. 
108 /d. at 659. 
109 /d. at 657. 
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dard was applied evenhandedly to particular disputes. 110 Given the Court's 
belief that state law was being equitably applied, the Court found that there 
would be little likelihood of injury to federal trust responsibilities or tribal 
possessory interests. 111 Referring back to an element of the Kimbell Foods 
test, it concluded that the likelihood of injury to tribal interests did not pose 
an actual and significant conflict that would mandate fashioning a federal 
rule. Finally, the Court recognized that states have a substantial interest in 
having their own real property laws resolve such controversies, in that 
there was merit "in not having the reasonable expectations of . . . private 
landowners upset by the vagaries of being located adjacent to or across 
from Indian reservations .... " 112 The Wilson holding showed that, at least 
in 1979, the judicial policy of emphasizing established state law principles 
held sway and this view would control the federal courts until extremely 
strong evidence of countervailing federal interests could be demonstrated. 
However, in 1987 a federal rule of decision was recognized in West 
Virginia v. United States, a case that allowed the federal government, as a 
matter of right, to collect prejudgment interest in breach-of-contract actions 
where the amount due was liquidated, ascertained, or agreed to. 113 After 
suffering two natural disasters in 1972, the State of West Virginia had con-
tracted with the Army Corps of Engineers for the federal agency to prepare 
sites for mobile homes. 114 Under the Disaster Relief Act of 1970 ("ORA"), 
the federal government was authorized to prepare mobile home sites 
"without charge to the United States."115 West Virginia acknowledged the 
bills for services rendered by the Corps, but it failed to make payrnents} 16 
As a result, the United States brought suit against the state to recover 
amounts due on the contract as well as prejudgment interest. 117 
The Court analyzed the Kimbell Foods factors in light of the circum-
stances and held that a federal common law rule allowing for recovery of 
prejudgment interest by the United States was preferable to incorporation 
of state law on this issue} 18 More specifically, the rule "governing the 
interest to be recovered as damages for delayed payment of a contractual 
obligation to the United States" was found not to be controlled by state 
110 /d. at 673. The Court cited United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715,730 (1979), for 
the proposition that courts should not accept "generalized pleas for uniformity as substitutes for con-
crete evidence that adopting state law would aversely affect [federal interests]." Wilson, 442 U.S. at 
673. 
111 Wilson, 442 U.S. at 673. 
112 /d. at 674. 
113 479 u.s. 305, 308 (1987). 
114 /d. at 307. 
liS /d. 
116 /d. 
117 /d. 
118 /d. at 309. 
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statutory or common law. 119 Reminiscent of the well-known decision in 
Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States,' 20 the Court ruled in a way favorable 
to the federal government's financial interest. In its view, incorporation of 
state law would not give due regard to the federal interest in maintaining 
the apportionment of responsibility for payment that Congress devised in 
the DRA. 121 Also, alluding to the Kimbell Foods test, application of a fed-
eral rule would not disrupt commercial relationships predicated on state 
law because a state law would not (of its own force) govern contracts be-
tween a state and the federal govemment. 122 The Court recognized in ap-
plying the federal rule that no state policy compelled deviation from the 
common law rule allowing the federal government to collect prejudgment 
interest and that federal policy called for an interest award. 123 Seemingly, 
in this case the Court considered that the federal interest was great and the 
state interest much less substantial. 
Finally, in the 1991 case of Kamen v. Kemper Financial Services, 
Inc., 124 the Court refused to fashion a federal rule of decision that would 
oblige the representative shareholder in a derivative action brought under 
the Investment Company Act of 1940 ("ICA") 125 to make a precomplaint 
demand126 on the board of directors, even when the demand would be futile 
under state law. 127 Kamen was decided under federal common law because 
119 /d. at 308 (internal citation omitted). 
120 318 U.S. 363 (1943). Clearfield Trost involved the payment of a United States government 
check that had been stolen and was cashed on the basis of a forged endorsement. /d. at 364-65. The 
federal government had delayed in notifying the bank that had paid the check of its forged endorse-
ment. /d. at 365. Under Pennsylvania law, this delay would bar the United States from suing the bank. 
/d. at 366. The exact question before the Court was whether state law or a federal rule of decision 
would control the question of delay. /d. A unanimous Court ruled in favor of a uniform federal rule as 
more appropriate. The Court noted, "The application of state law ... would subject the rights and 
duties of the United States to exceptional uncertainty. It would lead to great diversity in results by 
making identical transactions subject to the vagaries of the laws of the several states. The desirability 
of a uniform rule is plain." /d. at 367. 
121 West Virginia v. United States, 479 U.S. 305,309 (1987). 
122/d. 
123 /d. at 310. 
124 500 u.s. 90 (1991). 
125 15 U.S.C. § 80a-20(a) (2000). 
126 The demand requirement obligates the representative shareholder in a planned derivative suit 
against the board of directors to state its complaint to the board and allow the board either to take over 
the litigation or oppose the suit. Kamen, 500 U.S. at 96. Usually, the board's decision to assume 
control of the suit ends the shareholder's involvement in the action. /d. at I 01. The futility exception 
to the demand rule allows the shareholder to forgo making the demand when a majority of directors are 
financially interested in the challenged transaction or have participated in or approved the alleged 
wrongdoing. /d. 
127 /d. at 92. See also Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471 (1979) (examining whether disinterested di-
rectors can terminate a stockholders' derivative suit under federal statutory law). 
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the cause of action was provided for under the ICA, a federal statute; 128 
however, the rule of decision was derived from state law. 129 The Court 
found that the structure of the demand requirement-that is, when it is re-
quired or excused-actually determines who has the power to control cor-
porate litigation. Therefore, such a basic matter of corporate organization 
relates to the fundamental allocation of governing powers within the corpo-
ration, a traditional state-law matter. 130 
In Kamen, application of the Kimbell Foods factors led Justice Mar-
shall, writing for a unanimous Court, to hold that the states' laws regarding 
whether a demand was required before a shareholder initiates a corporate 
derivative suit, and whether a futility exception to the requirement existed, 
should control the outcome of the case. 131 He reasoned that fashioning a 
universal demand rule would upset the balance of power that state corpo-
rate doctrines had struck between the power of shareholders and corporate 
directors to control corporate litigation. 132 Furthermore, the futility excep-
tion recognized by a majority of states did not impede the regulatory objec-
tives of the ICA because both the exception and the ICA function primarily 
to "impose controls and restrictions on the internal management of invest-
ment companies."133 The Court affirmed that "where a gap in the federal 
securities laws must be bridged by a rule that bears on the allocation of 
governing powers within the corporation, federal courts should incorporate 
state law into federal common law unless the particular state law in ques-
tion is inconsistent with the policies underlying the federal statute."134 Ob-
viously, the Court believed that state corporate law was compatible with 
these federal statutory policies. 
Throughout this period, the Court's consistent application of the Kim-
128 Kamen, 500 U.S. at 97. 
129 
"The presumption that state law should be inco'l'orated into federal common law is particu-
larly strong in areas in which private parties have entered legal relationships with the expectation that 
their rights and obligations would be governed by state-law standards .... Corporation law is one such 
area." /d. at 98. The Court recognized that corporations "are creatures of state law, ... and it is state 
law that is the font of corporate directors' powers," id. at 98-99 (quoting Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471, 
478 (1979}), and discerned nothingin the ICA's regulatory objectives that "evidenced a congressional 
intent that federal courts ... fashion an entire body of federal COJ1'0rate law out of whole cloth." 
Kamen, id. at 99 (internal citations omitted). 
130 /d. at 101. 
131 /d. at 108-09. 
132 /d. at 103. 
133 /d. at 107. Although the Court held that the futility exception did not conflict with the pur-
poses of the ICA, the Court did state that it would "be constrained to displace state law in this area were 
[it] to conclude that the futility exception to the demand requirement is inconsistent with the policies 
underlying the ICA." /d. This statement indicates that the Court places greater emphasis on the second 
prong of the Kimbell Foods test, whether state law conflicts with the puJ1'oses and intent of the federal 
statutory scheme at issue, than on the need for a uniform national rule, or whether a federal rule would 
disrupt commercial relationships predicated on state law. 
134 !d. at I 08. 
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bell Foods test indicates that the three-part test's applicability extends to all 
cases in which federal common law might apply. In these instances, the 
question before the Court was whether to create a federal common law rule 
of decision or to incorporate a pre-existing state law rule. In making that 
decision, the Kimbell Foods holding has established a durable test requir-
ing the federal court to evaluate (1) whether a uniform national rule is re-
quired to effectuate the federal program's purpose; (2) whether application 
of a state law rule would conflict with a policy underlying the federal pro-
gram; and (3) whether application of a uniform federal rule would upset 
existing relationships predicated on state law. The Court used this ap-
proach to evaluate judicial choice of law during the fifteen year period fol-
lowing Kimbell Foods. Rather than waning over the years, the emphasis 
on the Kimbell Foods test has been reinforced by the Supreme Court's 
more recent pronouncements in 0 'Melveny & Myers v. FDIC35 and Ather-
ton v. FDIC. 136 These two decisions in the mid-1990s strengthen the notion 
that federal courts should fashion federal common law when necessary but 
that they should use state rules of decision as their starting point. As the 
discussion concerning CERCLA decision-making indicates, federal judges 
have been reluctant to hear the Supreme Court's message. 
b. O'Melveny & Myers and Atherton 
In these two decisions over a three-year span, the Supreme Court re-
stricted the common lawmaking powers which had been asserted by a 
number of the federal circuits and affirmed its prior holding in Kimbell 
Foods. In O'Melveny & Myers, the Court unanimously rejected a federal 
common law scheme that displaced traditional matters of state concern, 
such as issues of corporate governance and whether the knowledge of cor-
porate directors may be imputed to the corporation, 137 and it held that resort 
to federal common law is warranted only in "extraordinary cases."138 If 
anything, the 0 'Melveny & Myers case emphatically stressed the basic 
135 512 U.S. 79 (1994). 
136 519 u.s. 213 (1997). 
137 O'Melveny & Myers, 512 U.S. at 83-89. 
138 /d. at 89. In constitutional law battles occurring during the latter part of the 1990s, some more 
conservative justices argued that Kimbell Foods represented a limitation in expansive judicial power to 
fashion non-statutory legal principles. In a commerce power case, several dissenting members of the 
Court even emphasized the limited power of federal courts to create federal common law to cases 
which involve "uniquely federal issues or the rights and responsibilities of the United States or its 
agents." Camps Newfound/Owatonna v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 615 (1997) (Thomas, J., 
dissenting). Joined by Justice Scalia and Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Thomas identified Kimbell 
Foods as standing for the idea that "where a federal rule is not essential, or where state law already 
operates within a particular field, we have applied state law rather than opting to create federal common 
law." /d. But even conservative justices can identify "uniquely federal issues" in cases presenting state 
law based challenges to federal military procurement activities. See Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 
u.s. 500, 503-507 (1988). 
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policy of Kimbell Foods and reinforced the notion that a federal common 
law rule was presumptively to be selected from applicable state law princi-
ples absent an extraordinary conflict with extremely important federal in-
terests. At issue in the 0 'Melveny & Myers case was whether, in a suit 
brought by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation ("FDIC") as the 
receiver for a federally insured bank, federal law or state law provided the 
proper rule of decision to determine the malpractice liability of attorneys 
who had provided services to the bank. 139 
FDIC asserted that a federal common law rule should determine the 
outcome of the adjudication of its claims, which were based upon Califor-
nia state law. 14° FDIC further contended that the "content of the federal 
common law rule corresponds to the rule that would independently be 
adopted by most jurisdictions."141 Justice Scalia, writing for the Court, 
forcefully admonished the FDIC, stating that its first assertion was "so 
plainly wrong," that "(t]here is no federal general common law," 142 and 
even if "there were a federal common law on such a generalized issue 
(which there is not), we see no reason why it would necessarily conform to 
that independently ... adopted by most jurisdictions."143 The Court held 
that "California law, not federal law, governs the imputation of knowledge 
to corporate victims of alleged negligence, and that is so whether or not 
California chooses to follow the majority rule."144 The key point on this 
first issue was that state-and not federal-law governed the general issue 
of the imputed knowledge of corporate officers acting against the corpora-
tion's interest. 
At issue under FDIC's second cause of action was a narrower issue-
whether California law was "displaced" of the Financial Institutions Re-
form, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989 ("FIRREA").145 This federal 
statute directs that the FDIC, as receiver, "step into the shoes" of the failed 
savings and loan institution and obtain the rights of the insured depository 
139 O'Melveny & Myers, 512 U.S. at 80-81. 
140 The FDIC assened claims based on two California causes of action: The first required the 
Court to decide whether federal common law or California state law determines ''whether the knowl-
edge of corporate officers acting against the corporation's interest will be imputed to the corporation"; 
and the second required the Court to decide whether federal common law determined ''whether knowl-
edge by officers so acting will be imputed to the FDIC when it sues as a receiver of the corporation." 
/d. at 83. It may be notable that FDIC brought suit as receiver for the failed savings and loan, and not 
in its capacity as the United States government. Arguably, FDIC's case for a federal rule would have 
been stronger if the United States was a party to the action; the litigation otherwise was between two 
private parties. 
141 /d. at 84 (quoting Brief for Respondent 15 n.3). 
142 /d. at 83 (citing Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938)). 
143 O'Me/veny & Myers, 512 U.S. at 84 (internal quote omitted). 
144 Jd. at 84-85 (internal quote omitted). 
145 /d. at 85-86. 
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institution that existed prior to receivership. 146 The FDIC claimed that this 
authority under FIRREA included a nonexclusive grant of rights to the 
FDIC receiver that could be "supplemented" by federal common law be-
cause of the high federal interest in such an area of law. 147 Justice Scalia 
concluded that FIRREA embodied a comprehensive and detailed federal 
regulatory scheme containing specific federal rules of decision on enumer-
ated issues relevant to the FDIC's role as a receiver!48 Employing the 
Latin phrase inclusio unius, exc/usio alterius, Justice Scalia read the statute 
as providing a limited and exclusive list of federal rules which existed 
against the backdrop of state law. 149 Matters left unaddressed by the FIR-
REA were left subject to the disposition of state law .150 
The 0 'Melveny & Myers Court emphasized an important principle of 
federal common law rulemaking-that cases justifying the establishment of 
a "special federal rule" are "few and restricted" and limited to situations 
where there is a "significant conflict between some federal policy or inter-
est and the use of state law."151 The record in the case before it failed to 
indicate such an interest or conflict. 152 Without the requisite "significant 
conflict" serving as the "precondition for recognition of a federal rule of 
decision,"153 judicial lawmaking would be considered illegitimate and state 
law would apply. 0 'Melveny & Myers represents a strong statement by the 
Supreme Court substantially restricting courts' ability to fashion federal 
common law. Even the federal value of "uniformity of law" was rejected 
as an appropriate ground for federal common law rule. 154 The "significant 
conflict" requirement strengthens the Court's prior holding in Kimbell 
Foods, and reiterates the Court's preference for legislatively-created law at 
either the federal or the state level. 155 In some disputes since 0 'Melveny & 
146 Jd. at 86 (internal citation omitted). 
147 ld. 
148 ld. at 86. 
149 ld. at 86-87. 
ISO /d. at 85. 
lSI ld. at 87 (quoting Wallis v. Pan Am. Petroleum Corp., 384 U.S. 63, 68 (1966)). 
IS
2 FDIC argued that the federal deposit insurance fund may be depleted if state law were adopted 
as the rule decision, and such depletion would create a conflict between a "specific, concrete" federal 
policy and state law. /d. at 88. The Court rebuked FDIC's argument by finding that neither FIRREA 
nor prior law set an anticipated level for the deposit insurance fund and that there was no federal policy 
that the fund should always win. /d. 
ISJ Id. at 87. 
154 Justice Scalia rejected the idea that the efficiency of federal agency procedure or work effort 
was an adequate federal policy or interest. Jd. at 88. He wrote that "uniformity of law might facilitate 
the FDIC's nationwide litigation of these suits, eliminating state-by-state research and reducing uncer-
tainty-but if the avoidance of those ordinary consequences qualified as an identified federal interest, 
we would be awash in 'federal common-law rules."' Jd. 
ISS Formulating policy is a role reserved to those "who write the laws, rather than those who in-
terpret them." ld. at 89. Justice Stevens's concurring opinion added further support to this notion when 
he explained that while state courts may engage in judicial rulemaking, federal courts are "courts of 
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Myers between private parties, federal courts have been reluctant to dis-
place state law by finding a significant conflict with a federal interest. 156 
However, it is curious that reference to this case has been conspicuously 
absent from the CERCLA appellate case decisions under review in this 
article. 
The 0 'Melveny & Myers holding was soon restated and reinforced in 
Atherton v. FDIC, 151 where the Court held that absent a significant conflict 
between some federal policy or interest and state law, courts must refrain 
from fashioning rules of federal common law! 58 At issue was whether 
courts should look to state law, a federal statute, 159 or federal common law 
to find the applicable standard to measure the legal propriety of a bank's 
officer's actions. 160 Justice Breyer, writing for the Court, rejected the 
FDIC's assertion that the need for uniformitY. mandated a federal common 
law rule of decision, thereby reaffirming one of Kimbell Foods' central 
premises by stating, "to invoke the concept of uniformity . . . is not to 
prove its need."161 The Court held that the federal statute provided a liabil-
ity floor (gross negligence), and that state law would provide the rule of 
decision if the state liability standard exceeded that of gross negligence. 162 
The crux of the opinion was that a significant conflict between a federal 
policy and state law did not exist, making reliance on or creation of federal 
common law improper. 163 
limited jurisdiction that have not been vested with open-ended lawmaking powers." !d. at 90 (Stevens, 
J., concurring) (citing Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers, 451 U.S. 77,95 (1981)). 
156 See, e.g., Woodward Governor Co. v. Curtiss-Wright Flight Sys., Inc., 164 F.3d 123, 127 (2d 
Cir. 1999). 
157 Atherton v. FDIC, 519 U.S. 213 (1997). 
158 ld. at 225. As in O'Melveny & Myers, FDIC was not acting in its capacity as the United 
States ~ovemrnent, but as receiver for a federally chartered savings association. Jd. 
1 9 The statute at issue was 12 U.S.C. § 1821 (k) (2000), which provides that a "director or officer 
of a federally insured bank may be held personally liable for monetary damages in an [FDIC]-initiated 
civil action ... for gross negligence or similar conduct ... that demonstrates a greater disregard of a 
duty of care (than gross negligence)." /d. at 216 (citing 12 U.S.C. § 1821 (k) (2000)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
160 Atherton, 519 U.S. at 215-16. 
161 !d. at 220. 
162 /d. at 216. 
163 The FDIC invoked two arguments to allege a significant conflict between application of a 
state law standard of conduct and the federal policies that underlie the banking system: (I) a common 
law standard must be applied because the banks in question were federally chartered, and (2) an anal-
ogy to the conflict of laws "internal affairs doctrine." /d. at 221-26. The Court rejected the first argu-
ment by reminding FDIC that federally chartered banks are governed more by state law than federal 
law and to "point to a federal charter by itself shows no conflict, threat, or need for federal common 
law." /d. at 223. FDIC's second argument, an analogy to the internal affairs doctrine, which was 
described as "a conflict of laws principle which recognizes that only one State should have the author-
ity to regulate a corporation's internal affairs" was similarly rebuffed. /d. at 224. The Court held that 
the internal affairs doctrine seeks to prevent conflict by requiring that there be only one point of legal 
reference for an entity, but that nothing in the doctrine indicated that the single source of law must be 
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The Supr~me Court's holdings from Kimbell Foods up through Ather-
ton exemplify a clear attitude of restraint in federal court lawmaking al-
most to the point of demonstrating a general hostility towards federal 
judges fashioning common law rules of decision when state law might ap-
ply to the dispute. Perhaps this view is based upon an attitude that federal 
courts should have more circumscribed and specifically identified sources 
of power. Absent a showing that an action involves uniquely federal con-
cerns and that there is an actual and significant conflict between the appli-
cable state law and the purpose underlying the federal statute at issue, the 
recent Court has insisted that federal courts' hands are tied with respect to 
creating new common law. 164 By emphasizing a predominant legislative 
role in the creation of law and rules of decision, the Court has indicated 
that, especially after 0 'Melveny & Myers and Atherton, the task is not one 
to be undertaken frequently by the federal judiciary. 165 It has also sug-
gested with the rhetoric employed in its decisions that the burden is on both 
the party arguing for a federal common law rule and the court implement-
ing it. As the review of the CERCLA cases demonstrates, this clear ex-
pression of judicial restraint has been ignored by certain lower federal 
courts. 
3. Extending the Kimbell Foods Principle to the CERCLA Context-
the Bestfoods Case 
In United States v. Bestfoods, 166 the Supreme Court addressed the issue 
of whether a parent corporation could have derivative liability for response 
costs due to its participation in or exercise of control over a subsidiary firm 
liable under CERCLA.167 The Court held that: (1) a parent corporation 
may be charged with derivative CERCLA liability as an "owner" for its 
subsidiaries' actions in operating a polluting facility only when state law 
allows the "corporate veil to be pierced"; 168 (2) the "participation and con-
trol" test employed by the district court to evaluate a parent corporation's 
federal. /d. "To find a justification for federal common law in [FDIC's] argument, however, (was] to 
substitute analogy or formal symmetry for the controlling legal requirement ... the existence of the 
need to create federal common law arising out of a significant conflict or threat to a federal interest." 
/d. (citing O'Melveny & Myers v. FDIC, 512 U.S. 79, 85,87 (1994)). 
164 See id. at 224-25. 
165 The FDIC, in both O'Melveny & Myers and Atherton, was not litigating in its government ca-
pacity, but in its capacity as a receiver for failed institutions. Atherton, 519 U.S.a! 225. The FDIC was 
not, in either case, pursuing purely federal interests. /d. If the FDIC were litigating in its governmental 
capacity, the federal interests advanced may have warranted creation of federal common law rules of 
decision in both cases. /d. at 225. 
166 524 u.s. 51 (1998). 
167 /d. 
168 !d. at 55. 
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control of a subsidiary may not be used to impose CERCLA liability; 169 
and (3) a parent corporation may be held liable as an "operator" under 
CERCLA in instances other than the parent's sole operation of, or joint 
venture with, a subsidiary. 170 The first of these holdings bears directly on 
the issue of defining CERCLA liability for corporate conduct by reference 
to state corporate law concepts. The Court did not expressly decide the 
issue of whether federal courts should use new federal common law or 
state law to determine CERCLA liability for parent corporations, 171 but it 
clearly indicated a preference that courts should not use statutory gaps as a 
basis for rejecting fundamental corporate law principles and creating fed-
eral common law. 172 If anything, the Bestfoods opinion reinforced the 
principles espoused in the earlier line of cases stemming from the Kimbell 
Foods case. 
The Bestfoods Court's preference for making fundamental corporate 
law doctrine the rule of decision to determine CERCLA liability appears to 
indicate that the Supreme Court favors adopting state law rules as a matter 
of federal statutory interpretation or as the substantive legal rule under the 
federal common law. 173 The Court's reasoning focused on two points. 
First, it followed the general principle of corporate law that parent corpora-
tions are not liable for the acts of their subsidiaries, and that since that 
principle had not been explicitly rejected by the text of CERCLA, it was 
presumed to apply to the case at hand. 174 A second traditional corporate 
law principle supplemented the first one with the Court's additional hold-
ing that if a court "pierced the corporate veil" or ignored the parent corpo-
ration's legal form, there could be derivative liability for the acts of the 
subsidiary company. 175 
The important point to be taken from the Bestfoods decision is that 
169 Jd. at 59. Justice Souter, writing for the Court, held that the district court's focus on the "rela-
tionship between the parent and subsidiary ... erroneously, even if unintentionally, treated CERCLA as 
though it displaced or fundamentally altered common law standards of limited liability." Jd. at 70. If 
the participation-and-control test was adopted in the CERCLA context, a relaxed CERCLA-specific 
rule of derivative liability ''would banish traditional standards and expectations from the law of CER-
CLA liability." /d. Such a rule, however, cannot arise from congressional silence and the Court found 
CERCLA's silence on the matter "dispositive." Jd. 
170 /d. at 55. A parent corporation could incur direct liability if it actually managed, directed, or 
conducted operations specifically related to the pollution, because such activities fall directly within the 
reaches of CERCLA 's § I 07(a) liability provisions. /d. at 66. 
171 /d. at 64 n.9. The Court did not address the question of whether state law or federal common 
law rules should determine liability under CERCLA because it had not been challenged by the parties. 
Id. This lack of clarity has influenced later federal court decisions to adhere to their own decisions 
favoring and employing the federal common law methodology. See, e.g., United States v. Exide Corp., 
No. 00-CV-3057 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3303, at *18-19 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 27, 2002). 
172 Bestfoods, 524 U.S. at 70. 
173 Mank, supra note 32, at 1190-91. 
174 /d. at 1191. 
175 /d. 
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bedrock state corporate law concepts would not be easily cast aside solely 
because the issue arose in federal CERCLA litigation. Justice Souter ex-
pressed this point by noting that CERCLA' s failure to deal with the par-
ticular issue of parent/subsidiary liability did not mean that the "entire cor-
pus of state corporation law is to be replaced simply because a plaintiffs 
cause of action is based upon a federal statute.''176 Congressional silence 
regarding "a matter as fundamental as the liability implications of corpo-
rate ownership demands application of the rule that in order to abrogate a 
common-law principle, the statute must speak directly to the issue ad-
dressed by the common law."177 This statement suggests that CERCLA's 
broad remedial purposes alone do not justify displacing fundamental cor-
porate law principles and imposing new, federal common law rules for 
corporations assessing liability for response costs. Instead, explicit statu-
tory language contrary to such fundamental principles is required. 
The Bestfoods Court's view of congressional silence on liability ques-
tions would also seem to be relevant with respect to the question of asset 
purchaser liability under CERCLA and it would suggest that current state 
corporation law provides the rule of decision for actions brought under 
sections 107 and 113.178 The Court failed to explicitly resolve whether fed-
eral common law or state law should serve as the rule of decision in Best-
foods. The Court, however, held that federal courts could not invoke 
CERCLA' s silence as to liability of parent corporations to displace or fun-
damentally alter common law standards of limited liability. 179 A well-
developed body of state corporation law existed with respect to corporate 
parent/subsidiary liability prior to CERCLA's enactment. 180 With CER-
CLA's failure to speak directly to the issue, the Bestfoods decision indi-
cates that federal courts should defer to that body of state law as the rule of 
decision when determining liability for response costs. 
A similarly well-developed body of state corporation law exists regard-
ing asset purchaser liability. 181 Nearly every state recognizes that asset 
purchasers do not incur successor-in-interest liability unless one of four 
common law exceptions is met, and there is no "reason to think that states 
176 Bestfoods, 524 U.S. &162-63 (quoting Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471, 478 (1979)). 
177 /d. at 63 (quoting United States v. Texas, 507 U.S. 529, 534 (1993)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
178 State corporation laws must yield to federal common law when they directly conflict with the 
underlying policies ofCERCLA. E.g., O'Melveny & Myers v. FDIC, 512 U.S. 79, 80 (1994). But see 
Mank, supra note 32, at 1194-95 (discussing whether Bestfoods suggests a limited federal common law 
based upon a majority ofstates'laws). 
17~ . Bestfoods, 524 U.S. at 70. 
180 I JAMES D. COX & THOMAS LEE HAGEN, COX & HAGEN ON CORPORATIONS§ 7.16 (2d ed. 
2003). 
181 See, e.g., Anspec Co. v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 922 F.2d 1240, 1250 (6th Cir. 1991) (Ken-
nedy, J ., concurring). 
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will alter their existing successor liability rules in a race to the bottom to 
attract business."182 CERCLA's silence regarding asset purchaser liability, 
it follows, should receive similar treatment to that given parent corpora-
tions in Bestfoods-Congress' silence should be dispositive and federal 
courts should defer to state corporation law rules. When read in conjunc-
tion with Kimbell Foods, 0 'Melveny & Meyers and Atherton, Bestfoods 
strongly suggests that federal courts are quite limited in using federal 
common lawmaking power to fashion new rules of decision that deviate 
from background state law concepts. The four circuit courts which have 
addressed the issue of asset purchaser liability under CERCLA after the 
Bestfoods decision have deferred to state corporation law as the rule of 
decision. 183 On the surface, these results appear to indicate that Bestfoods 
choice of law reasoning has been extended to apply to the asset purchaser 
CERCLA liability context. As the discussion in Part III will indicate, these 
courts have reached a result consistent with Bestfoods in extremely incon-
sistent ways. With Bestfoods, the Supreme Court has made it clear that in 
these statutory "gap filling" situations, the federal courts should have lim-
ited autonomy to make law in the common law fashion. 
III. CERCLA: FEDERAL LAW CREATES A LIABILITY SCHEME FOR THE 
CLEANUP OF HAZARDOUS WASTE SITES 
A Statutory Structure 
CERCLA was enacted in response to the serious environmental and 
health risks posed by industrial pollution.184 This comprehensive statute 
grants the President broad power to command both government agencies 
and private parties to clean up hazardous waste sites, with the desired result 
being that those who are "responsible for any damage, environmental 
harm, or injury from chemical poisons may be tagged with the cost of their 
actions."185 CERCLA's purpose, therefore, is fourfold: (1) to make those 
182 Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Brown & Bryant, Inc., 159 F.3d 358, 364 (9th Cir. 
1998) ~citing Anspec Co., 922 F.2d at 1250). 
1 3 United States v. Davis, 261 F.3d I, 54 (1st Cir. 2001); IBC Mfg. Co. v. Velsicol Chern. 
Corp., No. 97-5340, 1999 WL 486615, at *3 (6th Cir. July 1, 1999); Atchison, 159 F.3d at 358; North 
Shore Gas Co. v. Salomon Inc., 152 F.3d 642,650 {7th Cir. 1998). After Bestfoods, the Sixth Circuit 
addressed the issue of whether the corporate veil could be pierced and a sole shareholder be held jointly 
and severally liable under CERCLA as an "arranger." See Carter-Jones Lumber Co. v. Dixie Distrib. 
Co., 166 F.3d 840 (6th Cir. 1999). The court followed Bestfoods and held that the shareholder could 
have arranger liability if under Ohio law (the forum state) the corporate veil could be ''pierced" because 
of his "intimate participation in the arrangement for disposal" of the waste. /d. at 846. The appellate 
court then held that Ohio law should be applied to resolve the CERCLA liability issues relating to 
corporations and officers, and it remanded the case back to the district court to determine whether Ohio 
law mandated piercing the corporate veil under the facts. /d. at 847-48. 
184 Bestfoods, 524 U.S. at 55. 
ISS S. REP. NO. 96-848, at 13 (1980). 
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who release hazardous substances into the environment strictly liable for 
response costs, mitigation, and third-party damages; (2) to establish broad 
Federal response authority and a fund to remediate contaminated sites and 
mitigate damages where a liable party cannot be found; (3) to provide an 
opportunity for victims to be compensated for their losses and injuries; and 
(4) to provide that the fund be financed, in large part, by the industries and 
consumers who profit from products and services associated with hazard-
ous substances. 186 
CERCLA differs substantially from most other federal environmental 
statutes in that it does not establish a regulatory regime for an ongoing ac-
tivity or for a particular industry. It is purely a remedial statute that looks 
backward to affect the cleanup of locations contaminated by prior conduct. 
CERCLA can be compared to the Resource Recovery and Conservation 
Act ("RCRA") which regulates the treatment, storage, and disposal of solid 
and hazardous wastes. 187 But CERCLA is more than a statute authorizing 
hazardous waste site cleanup. Passed by Congress in the wake of the Love 
Canal episode, CERCLA also attempts to allocate the financial costs of 
cleanup and natural resource damage to those actors believed to be respon-
sible for the past dumping. 188 Unlike many other environmental enforce-
ment statutes, there is no statutory limit to the amount of CERCLA-
imposed cleanup costs!89 The Act's broad remedial goals and the urgent 
public purposes underlying its adoption have been invoked by courts to 
justify their extremely broad interpretation of its liability provisions.190 As 
a result, CERCLA liability has, in fact, been far reaching and has resulted 
in the assignment of substantial cleanup and natural resource damage 
costs. 191 
CERCLA contains a broad array of tools for securing the cleanup of 
hazardous waste disposal sites. Both governmental and private party rights 
of action exist under§ 107(a) of the Act to provide a strong incentive for 
private remediation actions. 192 Increasingly, the government has used its 
186 126 CONG. REC. 30,932 (1980) (statement of Sen. Randolph). 
187 FRANK P. GRAD, TREATISE ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW§ 4A.01(2) (2003). 
188 /d. § 4A.02(1 )(a). 
189 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1994). 
19
° For example, in United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d 1550 (II th Cir. 1990), cert. 
denied, 498 U.S. 1046 (1991), the appeals court held that a lender would be considered to be an "opera-
tor" potentially responsible party merely by holding a security interest and "by participating in the 
financial management of a facility to a degree indicating a capacity to control the corporation's treat-
ment of hazardous wastes." Jd. at 1557. 
191 See generally Blake A. Watson, Liberal Construction of CERCLA Under the Remedial Pur-
pose Cannon: Have the Lower Courts Taken a Good Thing Too Far?, 20 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 199 
(1996). 
192 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1994). A private party may recover "any other necessary costs of re-
sponse ... consistent with the national contingency plan." /d. § 9607(a)(4)(B). The purpose of the 
National Contingency Plan ("NCP") "is to provide the organizational structure and procedures for 
458 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 36:425 
authority under § 1 06 to order one or more potentially responsible parties 
("PRPs") to clean up a site, leaving it to them to locate other PRPs with 
whom to share the costs. Joint and several liability principles apply under 
CERCLA, 193 and PRPs have the right to seek contribution from other per-
sons who are liable, or potentially liable, under § 1 07(a). 194 Contribution 
claims are barred, however, against parties that have entered into settle-
ment agreements with the govemment. 195 In short, CERCLA's liability 
provisions encourage rapid remediation of hazardous waste sites and allo-
cation of the resulting financial responsibility for the cleanup. 
CERCLA has been held to impose strict liability for the recovery of re-
sponse costs associated with hazardous waste cleanups on four categories 
of PRPs. 196 These include: (1) current owners or operators of the hazard-
ous waste facility, unless the PRP meets the requirements for the "innocent 
purchaser defense;" (2) any person who at the time of disposal of any haz-
ardous substance owned or operated the site at which such disposals oc-
curred; (3) any person who by contract, agreement, or otherwise arranged 
for disposal or arranged with a transporter for transport for disposal or 
treatment of hazardous substances owned or possessed by such person; and 
(4) any person who accepts or accepted any hazardous substances for 
transport to disposal or treatment facilities or sites selected by such per-
son. 197 Congress attempted to cast a wide net in designing the four PRP 
categories, reflecting a general theory that "everyone who had some hand 
in the creation of the [hazardous waste disposal] must ... pay to remedy 
it."198 Consequently, CERCLA liability depends on identification of an 
actor as being included in one or more of these four PRP categories, not on 
whether the PRP has actually caused the problem in a linear, causation-in-
fact way. With potential, multi-million dollar cleanup liability and the 
attendant negative publicity, it is not surprising that many potential targets 
of CERCLA cost recovery and contribution actions have strenuously at-
tempted to convince courts that they should be excluded from any one of 
preparing for and responding to discharges of oil and releases of hazardous substances, pollutants, and 
contaminants." 40 C.F.R. § 300.1 (1994). 
193 Joint and several liability is not mandated by CERCLA, but when applicable, its application is 
permitted under principles of federal common law. United States v. Monsanto Corp., 858 F.2d 160, 
171 (4th Cir. 1988); see also 126 CONG. REC. 30,897 (1980) (statement of Sen. Randolph) (stating that 
reference to the terms joint and several liability "has been deleted, and the liability of joint tortfeasors 
will be determined under common or previous statutory law"). 
194 42 u.s.c. § 9613(1) (2000). 
195 /d. § 9613(f)(2). 
196 THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY LAW: PROBLEMS, CASES, AND 
READINGS 633-35 (4th ed. 2002). 
197 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1994). References to CERCLA in the text will refer to section numbers 
included in the Congressionally-enacted bill and not the codified section numbers included in the foot-
notes. 
198 Jerry L. Anderson, The Hazardous Waste Land, 13 VA. ENVTL. L.J. I, II (1993). 
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these four liability-inducing classifications. On the other hand, govern-
mental environmental agencies and private parties who have spent substan-
tial sums of money funding site cleanups have the opposite incentives. 
Although Congress clearly set forth CERCLA's general remedial pur-
pose, its drafting tended to skimp on the important details of assessing and 
allocating liability. On one hand, CERCLA's broad liability provisions 
and its sweeping references to those who are subject to liability could re-
flect Congress's intent to leave refinement of the Act's liability provisions 
to the courts. 199 Alternatively, the statutory silences and other omissions 
could merely reflect the rushed development of the final legislation.200 
Regardless, there is some legislative history indicating Congressional in-
tent to have the federal courts develop a "common law" to supplement the 
Act's limited and incomplete textual provisions.201 Since its original pas-
sage in 1980, courts have struggled with the statute's inadequacies by exer-
cising substantive lawmaking powers to fill in the gaps left by the hurried, 
incomplete drafting of the CERCLA legislation.202 Most notably, the 1983 
decision of United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., found in the CERCLA leg-
islative history support for courts using a federal common law approach to 
199 Watson, supra note 191, at 291-94 (discussing the circularity and vagueness of§ 107(a)). 
This characteristic of the CERCLA legislation could also reflect the twin possibilities that Congress 
either a) hastily moved to enact the statute but it never resolved these crucial issues during the legisla-
tive process or b) tried but failed to reach resolution on these important questions. Rather than reflect-
ing an intentional choice of drafting style, it could merely indicate legislative desperation in the face of 
an i~nding deadline and no clear consensus. 
00 CERCLA, as finally enacted by Congress, represents a compromise between three different 
bills presented on the floors of the House and Senate. As such, there is no committee report for the 
Act. Nevertheless, the floor debates and colloquies regarding the final form of the legislation provide 
some insight into the federal courts' role in interpreting and applying the liability provisions. See, e.g., 
126 CONG. R.Ec. 31,965 (1980) (statement of Rep. Florio) ("To insure the development of a uniform 
rule of law, and to discourage business dealing in hazardous substances from locating primarily in 
States with more lenient laws, the bill will encourage the further development of Federal common law 
in this area."); cf supra note 186 (statement of Sen. Randolph); 126 CONG. R.Ec. 24,337 (Sept. 4, 
1980) (statement of Rep. Albert Gore, Jr.) (stating that federal courts should interpret the Superfund bill 
to create a federal cause of action to impose liability on PRPs). These quotations suggest a role for the 
federal courts in shaping the meaning of the new statute. However, they do not necessarily reveal the 
Congressional intention to establish a new, federal rule of decision separate from state law rules. See 
John Copeland Nagle, CERCLA 's Mistakes, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1405, 1444-45 (1997) (discuss-
ing the improbability of the development of a federal common law interpreting CERCLA). 
201 Watson, supra note 191, at 291. 
202 See, e.g., United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51 (1998); Anspec Co. v. Johnson Controls, 
Inc., 922 F.2d 1240, 1246 (6th Cir. 1991). 
/d. 
We agree ... that § 9607(a) is not ambiguous. However, it may be textually incom-
plete in the sense that it fails to spell out in so many words the universally accepted 
rule that a reference to liability of corporations includes successors-a rule that we 
conclude Congress intended to apply to the definition it used. 
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establish the basic liability questions of the federal statute.203 Numerous 
academic arguments have been raised challenging the accuracy of this con-
clusion as a general matter.204 Suffice it to say, courts faced with complex 
CERCLA litigation issues have turned to the Chem-Dyne rationale as a 
justification providing them flexibility in reaching their rulings. Chem-
Dyne, a district court opinion, has provided the authority for broad claims 
of federal common law rulemaking. 
After the fundamental issues of CERCLA liability had been addressed 
in the first decade of litigation, the federal courts were then asked to an-
swer a second round of questions--often involving questions of indirect or 
corporate successor's liability for CERCLA cleanup expenses. During the 
last fifteen years, federal courts have frequently been asked to rule upon a 
narrow, yet highly important liability issue-when are successor corpora-
tions liable for their predecessor's CERCLA obligations? This, in tum, has 
led to a more narrowly-focused question of when a company purchasing 
the assets of a firm also acquires that firm's CERCLA liabilities. This le-
gal issue-setting the standard for assigning the CERCLA liability of a 
company purchasing the assets of a PRP-raises important liability issues. 
However, beyond this question of defining substantive law, it implicates 
even more significant questions of judicial methods and the legitimacy of 
rules of decision.205 How should federal courts select the appropriate rule 
of decision for a question such as this? The discussion that follows sets 
forth the nature of the choice of rules in the asset purchaser context, and 
then it turns to the more general issue of determining how a federal court 
should give a federal statute meaning in a situation such as this. 
B. Successor-in-Interest Liability Under CERCLA 
The "persons" who are liable under section 107(a), as a general rule, 
are jointly and severally liable for response costs.206 A "person," under 
CERCLA is defined as "an individual, firm, corporation, association, part-
nership, consortium, commercial entity," or government entity.207 CER-
CLA, however, does not define the term "corporation," and the statute's 
203 572 F. Supp. 802, 805-07 (S.D. Ohio 1983) (citing the statement by Rep. James Florio that is-
sues of joint and several liability "shall be governed by traditional and evolving principles of common 
law"). 
204 See, e.g., Nagle, supra note 200, at 1443-44; Sisk & Anderson, supra note 30, at 526. 
205 Watson, supra note 191, at 293 n.387 ("The only real issue that has arisen is whether, in creal· 
ing common law rules to supplement the text ofCERCLA, courts should adopt state law rules or fash-
ion nationwide federal rules."); discussion infra Parts 111.8-C. 
206 See Chem-Dyne, 572 F. Supp. at 808. 
207 42 U.S.C. § 9601(21) (2000). It is clear that the express language ofCERCLA does not I) 
identify corporate successors as a separate category of PRP or 2) specifically list corporate successors 
as a sub-category of ''person." Finding that such successors are to be included as part of the definition 
of "corporation" would require some external rationale for reading this additional meaning into the 
term. 
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legislative history fails to shed light on the legislative intent concerning the 
meaning of the term. 208 There is no indication, therefore, that Congress 
intended "corporation" to mean anything other than a business entity de-
fined by state corporation law.209 Following this reasoning, if state law 
governs the definition of "corporation" for CERCLA purposes, the state 
laws regarding corporate successorship should also be incorporated by 
implicit reference.210 The meaning of the term "corporation" should in-
clude all corporate successors recognized under state law. In addition to 
this argument, the general principles of statutory construction provided 
within the United States Code support such an interpretation. These uni-
form rules of federal statutory construction state that '"company' or 'asso-
ciation' when used in reference to a corporation, shall be deemed to em-
brace the words 'successors and assigns of such company or associa-
tion. "'211 Following this line of thought, corporate successors in interest, 
therefore, could be PRPs under CERCLA solely by virtue of their status as 
a successor and not as a result of their own conduct. 
This argument has been extremely persuasive to the federal courts. 
Every circuit that has confronted the issue of successor-in-interest liability 
has found that Congress implicitly intended for CERCLA response cost 
liability to attach to corporate successors-in-interest.212 The Eighth Circuit 
has suggested that corporate successor liability 
is so much part and parcel of corporate doctrine, [that] it 
could be argued that Congress would have to explicitly ex-
clude successor corporations if it intended its use of a legal 
term of art, "corporation," not to include established concep-
tions of the extent, life span, and path of corporate liabili-
ties.213 
Successor liability furthers CERCLA's two primary goals of providing 
swift and effective responses to hazardous waste sites and placing the costs 
208 Sisk & Anderson, supra note 30, at 511-12. 
209 See id. 
210 See Anspec Co. v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 922 F.2d 1240, 1248 (6th Cir. 1991) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring) ("(T]he existence and status of a 'corporation' ... should be determined by reference to the 
law under which the 'corporation' was created."). 
211 I U.S.C. § 5 (2000). 
212 See North Shore Gas Co. v. Salomon Inc., 152 F.3d 642, 649 (7th Cir. 1998) (citing cases). In 
the early 1980s, this was the position adopted by the EPA and the Department of Justice in an EPA 
enforcement memorandum. EPA Memorandum from Courtney M. Price, Assistant Administrator for 
Enforcement and Compliance Monitoring, Liability of Shareholders and Successor Corporations for 
Abandoned Sites Under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Uability Act 
(CERCLA) 11-16 (June 13, 1984) reprinted in CAROLE STERN ET AL., CERCLA ENFORCEMENT: A 
PRACTITIONER'S COMPENDIUM OF ESSENTIAL EPA GUIDANCE AND POLICY DocUMENTS (1996) at Tab 
I [hereinafter EPA Memorandum]. 
213 United States v. Mexico Feed & Seed Co., 980 F.2d 478,486 (8th Cir. 1992). 
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of such responses on those responsible for creating or maintaining the haz-
ardous conditions.214 Absent successor liability, corporations would be 
able to escape CERCLA liability for response costs that were triggered by 
releases of hazardous substances by dying mere "paper deaths, only to rise 
phoenix-like from the ashes, transformed, but free of their former liabili-
ties. "215 
With this threshold issue resolved in favor of finding that the meaning 
of the term "corporation" under CERCLA included corporate successors, 
the subordinate, and more difficult, question became: When would existing 
liabilities of the predecessor transfer to the successor? This technical, cor-
porate law question would be addressed and decided as a choice of law 
question: Should existing state corporate law or newly-developed federal 
common law principles control this indirect assignment of liability? Fed-
eral courts approached this issue with some regularity as CERCLA litiga-
tion progressed over the last fifteen years. This appellate jurisprudence 
was formed against a backdrop of varied corporate law principles, each 
having different levels of successor liability exposure. As a result, the se-
lection of one successor liability rule or another was considered to be in-
strumental in establishing greater or lesser "flow-through" CERCLA liabil-
ity within the particular circuit or district. A review of these fundamental 
corporate law concepts follows. 
C. General Corporate Law Norms for Successor-in-Interest Liability 
1. The Tension Between the Dynamism of Corporate Form and the 
Continuation of Corporate Liability 
As a general matter, individuals may be held liable for their actions 
under a wide variety of civil and criminal law doctrines. Within this gen-
eral statement, it can be said that corporations and other business organiza-
tions can be subjected to liability as well. However, businesses such as 
corporations are not static entities: they acquire subsidiaries and assets, 
they merge with other companies, they undertake joint ventures, and they 
dissolve when there is no continuing reason for their existence. American 
corporate law tradition has long acknowledged this dynamic nature of 
business firms and it has created doctrines to deal with the difficult ques-
tions surrounding corporate successors. One of the thorniest of these is the 
highly-significant question of when does the successor of a corporation 
exist free of the liabilities of its predecessor? Over the years, American 
corporate law has developed answers to this and other questions--carefully 
balancing the need for business development and innovation with the goal 
of minimizing fraudulent conduct undertaken solely for the purpose of 
214 Anspec, 922 F.2d at 1247. 
215 Mexico Feed & Seed, 980 F.2d at 487. 
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avoiding prior liability. In this process, such difficult line-drawing has 
been the exclusive province of the states in their fashioning of the corpo-
rate law of each jurisdiction. 
State law on successor liability has established patterns that are surpris-
ingly consistent from state to state. In certain situations, successor 
corporations do assume the prior liabilities of their predecessors. For 
example, the surviving entity of two, merged corporations will remain 
liable for the debts of the predecessor corporations in most jurisdictions.216 
The purpose of this extension of corporate successor liability is to prevent 
corporations from evading their previous responsibilities through 
ownership changes effectuated by mergers and buy-outs.217 The 
fundamental concept underlying this rule is that the exchange of corporate 
stock should not relieve a corporation from liability for its misdeeds. 
However, not all corporate recombinations and transitions result in 
continuing legal liability. One major exception to the successor liability 
principle is that "in the vast majority of states, . . . where one company 
sells or otherwise transfers all its assets to another company, the latter is 
not liable for the debts and liabilities ofthe transferor."218 This rule of non-
liability for asset acquisitions arose out of the bona fide purchaser rule,219 
and was designed to promote the free alienability of property and to 
enhance the efficiency of commercial transactions. Mere succession to the 
property of a corporation does not subject the buyer to the seller's 
liabilities.220 Buying a firm's paper clips does not subject it to the seller's 
general legal liabilities. 
The asset purchaser rule--with its widespread and uniform accep-
tance-has become a well-understood principle for structuring corporate 
activities. However, the rule has the potential for manipulation and abuse 
by actors wishing to benefit from its immunity features without genuinely 
engaging in a property purchase. If the asset purchaser immunity were too 
broadly available, corporate existence might be manipulated to secure fre-
quent and unjustified escape from real corporate debts and liabilities.221 A 
216 E.g., Turner v. Bituminous Cas. Co., 244 N.W.2d 873, 875 (Mich. 1976). 
217 See Mexico Feed & Seed, 980 F.2d at 487. 
218 Sisk & Anderson, supra note 30, at 512-13 (emphasis added). 
219 See id. at 513 (citing Graham v. R.R. Co., 102 U.S. 148, 153 (1880)). The bonafide pur-
chaser rule provides that one who in good faith pays reasonable value for assets takes such assets free 
of creditors' claims. !d. 
220 15 W.M. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS,§ 7122 at 227 
(Perm. Ed. 1999) ("(T]he purchasing or transferee company is not liable on the other company's obli-
gations merely by reason of its succession to such company's property."). 
221 There is anecdotal evidence that transactions have been designed to employ the asset sale 
principles of state corporate law to eliminate creditors' claims against predecessor corporations. See, 
e.g., J. Maxwell Tucker, The Clash of Successor Liability Principles. Reorganization Law. and the Just 
Demand that Relief Be Afforded Unknown and Unknowable Claimants, 12 BANKR. DEVS. J. I, 8-9 
(1995). 
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well-advised company might undergo a mandated change in its form, not 
substantially alter its basic business operation and emerge from this process 
having shed legitimate, previously-incurred debts and liabilities. In order 
to prevent this form of abuse, over the years state corporate law throughout 
the United States has developed exceptions to the general rule of asset pur-
chaser non-liability to prevent companies from fraudulently using the cor-
porate form to evade liability. Each state's corporate law set the norms for 
business conduct by setting out asset purchaser liability rules. The doctrine 
which has developed has become remarkably uniform and settled, identify-
ing a number of discrete situations where the substance of a transaction, 
not its form, is of central importance. These four, universally-recognized, 
common law exceptions impose successor liability on corporations when: 
(1) the purchasing corporation expressly or impliedly agrees to assume the 
liability; (2) the transaction amounts to a de facto consolidation or merger; 
(3) the purchasing corporation is merely a continuation of the selling cor-
poration; or (4) the transaction was fraudulently entered into to escape li-
ability. 222 
Although each of these four situations admit some flexibility allowing 
for argument, they set forth a relatively stable standard of corporate succes-
sorship liability under the law of most states. As the Seventh Circuit 
phrased it in North Shore Gas Co. v. Salomon, Inc., these exceptions to the 
general rule of asset purchaser immunity seek to identify only those trans-
actions "where the essential and relevant characteristics of the selling cor-
poration survive the asset sale," thus rendering it equitable to hold the pur-
chaser liable for the seller's obligations.223 The underlying idea in the de-
222 Louisiana-Pacific Corp. v. Asarco, 909 F.2d 1260, 1263 (9th Cir. 1990). The third of these 
exceptions-the mere continuation principle-applies when the successor company seems to merely be 
a reorganized copy of the predecessor corporation. See North Shore Gas Co. v. Salomon Inc., 152 F.3d 
642, 654 (7th Cir. 1998). The mere continuation exception to non-liability of asset purchasers allows 
recovery when the purchasing corporation is substantially the same as the selling corporation. /d. It 
attempts to distinguish bona fide sales of assets between two distinct corporations from fraudulent 
reorganizations of a single corporation. /d. The inquiry under this exception focuses on whether the 
purchaser continues the corporate entity of the seller, regardless of whether the seller's operations are 
continued. /d. 
Application of the exception is based upon equitable factors, though courts generally consider 
five elements in deciding whether to impose successor liability: (I) the divesting corporation's transfer 
of assets; (2) payment by the buyer of less than fair market value for the assets; (3) continuation by the 
buyer of the divesting corporation's business; (4) a common officer of the buyer and divesting corpora-
tions who was instrumental in the transfer; and (5) inability of the divesting corporation to pay its debts 
after the asset transfer. United States v. Davis, 261 F.3d I, 53 (1st Cir. 2001); see also Mexico Feed & 
Seed, 980 F.2d at 487 (stating that the elements of the mere continuation exception emphasize an iden-
tity of officers, directors and stock between the selling and purchasing corporations). No single factor 
is determinative, and courts generally employ a "common sense" approach to decide whether the 
seller's corporate entity has continued after the asset sale. As the Seventh Circuit noted, the exception 
"requires close scrutiny of corporate realities, not mechanical application of a multi-factor test." North 
Shore Gas Co., 152 F.3d at 654. 
223 /d. at 651. 
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velopment of these exceptions is one of an equitable concept of fairness-
that it would be unfair if a corporate successor were able to dodge liability 
while maintaining the essence of the prior enterprise. But state law over a 
lengthy period of time has established legal norms for distinguishing equi-
table from inequitable conduct. 
2. Adding a Fifth Exception to Expand Asset Purchaser Liability 
Drawing the line between legitimate, non-liability producing asset 
transfers and formally correct, yet essentially manipulative corporate trans-
formations has not proved easy for some states. In these jurisdictions, cor-
porate law has evolved to broaden the scope of "pass-through" liability for 
asset purchasers. Some state courts have created a small number of addi-
tional exceptions to the general rule of asset purchaser imrnunity224 with the 
most significant "fifth exception" being the "substantial continuity" or 
"continuity of enterprise" test. The "substantial continuity" test exists as a 
slightly modified variant of the "mere continuation" test listed above with 
the primary difference being that liability may be imposed under this ex-
ception without requiring a continuity of shareholders.225 Originating in a 
line of Michigan products liability cases, the substantial continuity standard 
has been advanced as a way of restricting the immunity granted by asset 
purchasing and expanding the liability of participants in such a structured 
transaction. Not surprisingly, this theory, with its wider liability net, was 
suggested in an EPA memorandum in 1984 as a preferred litigation theory 
for assigning CERCLA cleanup liability.226 Perhaps EPA feared at this 
early stage in the administration of CERCLA that PRPs would successfully 
use existing corporate successorship rules to evade CERCLA cleanup li-
ability. To achieve important CERCLA cleanup goals, the EPA pressed 
this aggressive, non-mainstream view of successor corporation liability. 
There is little debate regarding the applicability of the traditional four 
exceptions to the asset purchaser non-liability principle. However, there is 
disagreement whether the federal courts should expand these four conven-
tional categories of exceptions to include a fifth-the "substantial continu-
224 In Ray v. A/ad Corp., 560 P.2d 3 (Cal. 1977), the California Supreme Coun imposed succes-
sor liability on asset purchasers in what has come to be known as the "product line" exception to asset 
purchaser immunity. See Alfred R. Light, "Product Line" and "Continuity of Enterprise'' Theories of 
Corporate Successor Liability under CERCLA, II MISS. C. L. REv. 63, 68 (1990). Under this rule, a 
successor corporation will be liable for defects in products that a predecessor company manufactured if 
the asset purchaser continues to make the same product even without a continuity of ownership of the 
prior firm. /d. Justified under a theory that the successor company destroyed the plaintiff's remedy 
and because it was in the best position to spread the risk of injury, the doctrine finds liability in the 
absence of any direct causation. See A lad Corp., 560 P.2d at I 0; Light, supra, at 68. Not surprisingly, 
many states have explicitly rejected the theory as have many federal couns. /d. at 69 n.32. This theory 
has not emerged in CERCLA successor liability cases. 
22S Schnapf, supra note 32, at 451-52. 
226 EPA Memorandum, supra note 212, at 11-16. 
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ity" test. These federal courts have resolved this difficult issue of assign-
ing asset purchaser liability for CERCLA response costs with an inconsis-
tent mixture of decisions applying the narrower "mere continuation" 
exception in some circuits, with others adopting the broader and more re-
cently-created "substantial continuity" exception.227 The practical impor-
tance of determining whether creation of the federal common law "substan-
tial continuity" test is permissible judicial lawmaking is that the test sub-
stantially increases an asset purchaser's exposure to liability. A purchaser, 
under the mere continuation doctrine, generally will be free from liability if 
there is a bona fide change in ownership. That same purchaser, under the 
substantial continuity exception, however, is not protected from CERCLA 
liability if, despite a true ownership change, the business operates in sub-
stantially the same fashion as it did prior to the asset sale. Theoretically, a 
court's choice of one rule of decision or the other could have a significant 
impact on successor corporation liability and, as such, could affect a sub-
stantive change in the assignment of financial responsibility for the site 
cleanup. 
3. Examining the "Substantial Continuity" View 
In the first few years following CERCLA's enactment, EPA sought to 
convince courts to expand CERCLA liability for asset purchasers by 
broadening the scope of the traditional mere continuation exception to asset 
purchaser immunity. It had recommended the adoption of a federal com-
mon law standard imposing CERCLA liability if "the new corporation con-
tinues substantially the same business operations as the [predecessor] cor-
poration."228 This "substantial continuity" exception, pushed by EPA in 
early days of CERCLA, attempted to impose successor liability whenever 
the purchaser's business operations retained substantial continuity with 
those of the seller, regardless of whether there was a significant ownership 
change.229 EPA's concern was to fmd solvent PRPs and to extract govern-
ment cleanup costs from them. It did not want to let them melt away 
through the process of corporate reorganization, regardless of the liability 
limitations provided by state corporate law. The agency's intention was to 
attach CERCLA liability to a solvent party whenever it could find one and 
its advocacy of this broader liability standard initially found favor in sev-
eral federal circuit courts. 
227 Ironically, the courts finding for the more sweeping "substantial continuity" position in this 
judicial debate often do so in an effort to obtain "national uniformity" on the crucial question of succes-
sorship legal liability. This article demonstrates that the move to this liability standard has had just the 
opposite effect by recognizing a diversity of liability rules within the federal system that vary according 
to each federal judicial circuit. Also, the "substantial continuity" is an extreme minority rule, thereby 
makin~ the "national uniformity" argument even more difficult to make. 
2 8 Mank, supra note 32, at 1166 (citing EPA Memorandum, supra note 212, at Tab I). 229 See United States v. Carolina Transformer Co., 978 F.2d 832, 838 (4th Cir. 1992). 
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The use of the substantial continuity test in the context of CERCLA 
cost recovery or contribution actions required the courts to reason by anal-
ogy and to transfer legal doctrine from one subject matter to another. The 
Supreme Court of Michigan is credited with first articulating the test in 
Turner v. Bituminous Casualty Co., but it is probably correct to identify a 
line of federal labor relations and products liability cases as earlier roots of 
this expanded liability concept.23° Courts generally consider a series of 
eight factors to determine whether a successor corporation will be held 
liable for response costs under the substantial continuity test: (1) retention 
of the same employees; (2) retention of the same supervisory personnel; (3) 
retention of the same production facilities in the same location; (4) manu-
facture of the same product; (5) retention of the same name; (6) continuity 
of assets; (7) continuity of general business operations; and (8) public rep-
resentations as a continuation of the seller's previous enterprise.231 
Not surprisingly with such a multi-factor test, courts have adopted a 
"totality of the circumstances" approach when determining whether to im-
pose liability. This approach takes into account the individual characteris-
tics of a particular transaction and attempts to ensure that the public policy 
of fairness is afforded to the affected parties. The policy of fairness actu-
ally inserts a ninth factor into the substantial continuity test: knowledge.232 
"[K]nowledge or notice ensures that 'substantial continuation' corporations 
not only would be able to protect themselves through purchase price ad-
justments or satisfactory indemnity provisions, but would be in some way 
responsible for the [hazardous waste discharges] remedied."233 
Those circuit courts that have chosen to apply this as a federal common 
law test in the CERCLA context have reasoned that the "substantial conti-
nuity" theory was warranted 1) because of the need for national uniformity 
with respect to CERCLA and 2) the possibility that parties "would frustrate 
230 See Golden State Bottling Co. v. NLRB, 414 U.S. 168, I 80 (I 973); Mozingo v. Correct Mfg. 
Corp., 752 F.2d 168, 175-76 (5th Cir. 1985); Turner v. Bituminous Cas. Co., 244 N.W.2d 873, 883-84 
(Mich. 1976). 
231 See Carolina Transformer Co., 978 F.2d at 838. 
232 United States v. Mexico Feed & Seed Co., 980 F.2d 478, 488 (8th Cir. 1992) (citing Golden 
State Bottling, 414 U.S. at 180). 
233 /d. The element of knowledge has been accepted as a prerequisite for imposing liability for 
CERCLA response costs under the substantial continuity test. See id. (refusing to impose liability 
because successor corporation did not have notice that the predecessor was identi tied as a PRP); Caro-
lina Transformer, 978 F.2d at 840-41 (imposing liability under the substantial continuity test when 
there was no colorable question of knowledge of and benefit from the predecessor's conduct for which 
CERCLA liability attached); Louisiana-Pacific Corp. v. Asarco, Inc., 909 F.2d 1260, 1265-66 (9th Cir. 
1992) (refusing to apply the substantial continuity test because the successor corporation did not have 
notice of the predecessors PRP status when the offending business practice was discontinued nine 
months before the asset sale). 
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the aims of CERCLA by choosing to merge or consolidate under the laws 
of states which unduly restrict successor liability."234 At least one com-
mentator has argued that uniformity and a relaxed liability threshold, as 
found under the substantial continuity test, would further the purposes and 
goals of acts such as CERCLA, which attempt to establish uniform, far-
reaching, national standards for imposing liability.235 Curiously, although 
the expanded liability standard has been adopted or recognized by four 
circuits, it has not become a uniform rule of decision in the federal courts, 
as more recent decisions have moved away from the expanded liability 
theory. With the current trend in decisions, these earlier appellate court 
decisions run the risk of actually becoming an isolated "minority" position 
on the issue. Prior to the 0 'Melveny & Myers and Bestfoods decisions, 
federal courts had been willing to apply the substantial continuity test for 
the sake of "uniformity."236 In the wake of these more recent Supreme 
Court decisions which emphasize the use of state law norms, the future of 
the substantial continuity test as a federal common law model would seem 
to be seriously in doubt. 
N. COURTS IN ACTION: JUDICIAL INNOVATION IN CHOOSING LAW-
ASSET PURCHASER LIABILITY UNDER CERCLA 
Litigation is one of the unfortunate hallmarks of CERCLA. Due to the 
substantial financial liability associated with being a PRP in a hazardous 
waste site cleanup, significant incentives exist to litigate liability questions 
and to resist expansive theories of responsibility. During CERCLA's first 
decade, the federal and state governments actively sought to find solvent 
parties to pay for the hazardous waste site cleanups that were mandated 
under the act. Due to the size of the costs and the limited economic capac-
ity of current site owners and operators, government attempted to cast its 
liability net broadly, attempting to reach other business entities and indi-
viduals related to defunct or insolvent parties. Not surprisingly, successors 
of firms directly involved in site-polluting activities were targeted as PRPs 
in CERCLA cost recovery and contribution actions. But the term "succes-
234 North Shore Gas Co. v. Salomon Inc., 152 F.3d 642,650 (7th Cir. 1998) (citing Smith Land & 
Improvement Corp. v. Celotex Corp., 851 F.2d 86, 91 (3d Cir. 1988)) (internal quotations omitted). 
But see Anspec Co. v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 922 F.2d 1240, 1249 (6th Cir. 1991) (arguing that the 
laws on successor liability in the fifty states are largely uniform). 
235 See Schnapf, supra note 32, at 439. On the other hand, some critics have rejected the substan-
tial continuity test as excessive and unfair. 
236 Choosing the "substantial continuity" liability rule represents an unusual impulse if the aim is 
to establish national "uniformity" in CERCLA asset purchaser liability determinations. The "substan-
tial continuity" rule has been recognized in a handful of non-CERCLA cases and only in a distinct 
minority of states. To suggest that a federal appellate court's adoption of this liability principle is being 
done to achieve national "uniformity" really means that this rule "should" be the national law as a 
matter of normative policy. Its selection would certainly not be choosing a majority, uniform state 
corporate law principle. 
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sor" has many legal meanings and consequences and these definitions have 
traditionally been established under state corporate law. The wide variety 
of state corporate law traditions provided for a number of kinds of corpo-
rate successors. Importantly, this doctrine also defined the legal rules for 
"passing through" liability to various kinds of successors. Not surpris-
ingly, this question of transferred liability has been encountered in a wide 
range of corporate situations and the law has developed over the years ac-
cording to the policy preferences of each state. The crucial policy question 
presented by this legal question is, when should liabilities of prior legal 
entities be recognized as continuing debts or obligations of corporate suc-
cessors? In every jurisdiction state law has answered this legal and norma-
tive question. 
What about liabilities that are created by federal law? More specifi-
cally, what about CERCLA liability for the recovery of hazardous waste 
site cleanup expenses? Without a general federal corporate law and in the 
absence of a clear statutory directive in CERCLA, the issue of successor 
liability remained an open question awaiting resolution in cleanup cost 
recovery litigation. In fact, many questions existed. How would federal 
courts allocate CERCLA liability in cases where corporate successors were 
listed among the identified PRPs? How should they rule? Would state 
corporate law principles guide their judgment or would they be free to cre-
ate their own corporate successorship rules of decision under an application 
of federal common law rulemaking? These issues were brought to the fed-
eral courts as the federal government and private PRPs sought to find more 
solvent liable parties to help pay cleanup costs. 
Ultimately, a sub issue of the larger corporate CERCLA successor li-
ability issue-that of corporate asset purchasers-rose to the attention of 
the federal circuit courts beginning in the late 1980s and these courts were 
required to select a rule of decision for their circuits. This issue carried 
with it significant financial consequences since the CERCLA-mandated 
cleanup expenses would often run into many millions of dollars. Equally 
important was the fact that clearly responsible PRPs would frequently be 
dissolved or otherwise become non-existent businesses, in financial terms 
unavailable for site cleanup cost recovery. After having spent these mil-
lions of dollars in undertaking remedial action, government and private 
parties began to look for more "indirect" PRPs including corporate succes-
sors, waste facility owners as well as waste disposers. These "indirect" 
PRPs, including asset purchasers, became natural targets of opportunity 
when more "directly responsible" PRPs were not available. 
This effort to secure payment of cleanup expenses from asset purchas-
ing successors ran into an interesting and confusing legal conundrum. 
Measured by traditional, stable and largely-consistent state corporate law, 
many asset purchase transactions were properly structured so as to insulate 
the "buyer" of the corporate assets from the predecessor "seller's" CER-
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CLA liabilities. Since CERCLA did not contain any specific language 
extending cleanup liability to a broader range of corporate successors than 
provided for by state law, there was no way to argue that CERCLA had 
affected an express preemption of state law principles. Beginning in the 
late 1980s, federal courts were asked to find a way to circumvent the limi-
tations imposed by state law, not by way of recognizing an implied pre-
emption in CERCLA, but rather by exercising their federal common 
lawmaking powers. This they did in a number of decisions. By employing 
this analytical approach to the significant asset purchaser liability question, 
the federal appellate courts have adopted a range of positions on this choice 
of law problem with a wide range of justifications. As the prior discussion 
indicates, the United States Supreme Court had decided the pivotal Kimbell 
Foods case in 1979 and that decision should have provided lower courts 
with the analytical framework for determining when to rely on state law 
and when to develop federal common law rules. Curiously, the discussion 
which follows will reveal that prior to 1994, federal courts failed to apply 
the Kimbell Foods three-part test to help them to determine whether to cre-
ate federal common law rules of decision concerning corporate successor 
and asset purchasers' liability for CERCLA-imposed response CQsts. The 
circuits that have decided this issue in the post-1994 0 'Melveny & Myers 
era generally have adopted state law as the rule of decision after considera-
tion of the Kimbell Foods test. This indicates that a circuit split exists re-
garding the propriety of a federal common law exception to the general 
rule of non-liability for asset purchasers. The following discussion ana-
lyzes each of these decisions and finally comes to some conclusions about 
why a federal court would choose to ignore existing Supreme Court prece-
dent and venture into the untethered world of federal common lawmaking. 
A Stage One: The Early Appellate Cases Struggling to Give CERCLA 
Meaning by Choosing Federal Common Law as the Law From the 
States 
1. Smith Land & Improvement Corp. v. Celotex Corp. 
In the mid and late 1980s, the courts had yet to define the statutory pa-
rameters of CERCLA. Even basic liability concepts were yet to be estab-
lished. Section 107 stated that certain categories of parties were "liable" 
for cleanup costs and natural resource damages, but it gave no specific 
guidance on what legal principles would determine how liability was to be 
assigned. Several case decisions during this period formulated crucial le-
gal standards in several areas, relying on a supposed implicit federal com-
mon law authority imbedded within the new statute and contained within 
the act's legislative history. The idea that some conception of the federal 
common law applies to define corporate successor liability stems, in large 
part, from the Third Circuit's 1988 holding in Smith Land & Improvement 
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Corp. v. Celotex Corp.231 In this case, the present owner of a parcel of con-
taminated land, Smith Land & Improvement Corp., spent over $218,000 
remediating pollution caused by an asbestos waste pile that had been 
placed there by a prior land owner, the Philip Carey Company ("Carey").238 
Carey had sold the land to another party in 1963 and by the 1980s, Smith 
Land & Improvement Corporation was the current owner.239 Rather than 
bring a contribution action against Carey, the plaintiff sought "indemnifica-
tion"240 from the defendants Celotex Corporation and Rapid-American 
Corporation (collectively, "Celotex") who were described by the plaintiff 
as "corporate successors" of Philip Carey Company.241 Under this theory 
of the case, Celotex would not be liable under any conventional CERCLA 
liability theory since it did not fit into any of the statute's four statutory 
PRP categories. Any possible CERCLA liability would have to be based 
solely upon corporate law theory having the legal effect of transferring the 
cleanup cost responsibility from the predecessor corporation (Carey) to its 
successor (Celotex).242 This case is especially significant since it con-
fronted the issue of when to extend CERCLA liability to a company on the 
basis of its legal relationship to another, usually defunct, business that is 
clearly a PRP yet is financially unavailable. 
Smith Land presented the United States Court of Appeals for the Third 
Circuit, and the federal appellate courts in general, with a case of first im-
pression on the issue of corporate successor-in-interest liability under 
CERCLA. The court came to the unsurprising conclusion that in enacting 
CERCLA, Congress "intended to impose successor liability on corpora-
tions which either have merged with or have consolidated with a corpora-
tion that is a responsible party as defined in the Act."243 Writing for the 
panel, Judge Weis did not explain, in a clear way, why such as result was 
in line with the Congressional intent other than to suggest that "the costs 
associated with clean-up must be absorbed somewhere."244 This pragmatic 
statement reflected a blunt admission that the court believed that cleanup 
expenses should not be borne by the Superfund or by PRPs when another 
237 85 I F.2d 86 (3d Cir. 1988). 
238 /d. at 87-88. 
239 /d. 
240 /d. at 88. The court probably meant to say that the plaintiffs were attempting to obtain contri-
bution from the defendants for their equitable share of the cleanup costs under CERCLA's § 113. 
241 /d. 
242 As Judge Weis stated, "plaintiff argues that defendants are responsible for Carey's derelictions 
on the theory of corporate successor liability." /d. at 90. Although a novel legal proposition at that 
time, the court was aware of the position taken by EPA in its 1984 enforcement memorandum arguing 
in favor of successor liability under the expanded "continuity of business" or substantial continuity 
theory. /d. at 91 n.2. Even though EPA was not a party to the present lawsuit, its views were noted by 
the court. 
243 /d. at 92. 
244 /d. at 91. 
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solvent actor related in some way to the polluted waste site was in range. 
On a superficial level, this opportunistic view could be justified by the 
court's belief that corporate successors were, in reality, the same business 
or individuals who had been the PRPs and that to think otherwise was to 
permit legal form to overwhelm actual substance. 
However, the conclusion that Congress intended CERCLA liability to 
reach corporate successors did not answer the question of what the law 
should be. In a confusing process of reasoning, the court concluded that 1) 
the concept of corporate successor liability was "neither completely novel 
nor of recent vintage,"24s 2) the policy reasons for making successors liable 
for torts applied with equal force in the CERCLA context, and 3) Congress 
expected the courts to develop a federal common law to supplement the 
CERCLA statute.246 This largely unsupported syllogism led the court to its 
conclusion that Congress implicitly intended for successor corporate liabil-
ity to be read into the law by federal courts exercising common law pow-
ers. Curiously absent from the court's discussion was any mention of a 
rationale for selecting a common law rule of decision or any reference to 
the Supreme Court's Kimbell Foods decision which had been issued nine 
years earlier. Also, while the court could have done so, its decision lacked 
any significant policy analysis of which successor corporations should bear 
the cleanup costs caused by its predecessor. 
By fashioning this new federal common law, the court in Smith Land 
indicated that the general doctrine of successor liability would be added to 
the meaning of CERCLA, although only in the context of corporate con-
solidations and mergers. The opinion specifically disavowed a more gen-
eral application of its ruling in other contexts. It did note, in passing, that 
successorship situations involving the purchase of assets were to be gov-
erned in a way that "the successor will not be saddled with the seller's li-
ability except under certain conditions."247 This decision reflected a strong 
policy position intent on finding a non-governmental "deep pocket" to pay 
the cleanup costs imposed by CERCLA. 248 The Smith Land court dealt 
with the source of its authority in a casual way, stating that it recognized a 
new corporate successor rule governed by "traditional concepts" and "gen-
245 /d. 
246 /d. 
247 /d. (citing Polius v. Clark Equip. Co., 802 F.2d 75, 77 (3d Cir. 1986)). In Polius the court 
said: "(u]nder the well-settled rule of corporate law, where one company sells or transfers all of its 
assets to another, the second entity does not become liable for the debts and liabilities, including torts, 
of the transferor." 802 F.2d at 77. 
248 The only policy-based rationale for imposing the costs of hazardous waste site cleanup on a 
successor corporation was the vaguely-expressed concept of unjust enrichment benefiting the corporate 
purchaser. The Smith Land case states that as between the Superfund or a successor, the successor 
should bear the costs. "Benefits from use of the pollutant as well as savings resulting from the failure 
to use non-hazardous disposal methods inured to the original corporation, its successors, and their 
respective shareholders and accrued only indirectly, if at all, to the general public." 851 F.2d at 92. 
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eral doctrine."249 Unmistakably, though, the court emphasized that state 
law should be the substance of its rule, especially if it presented a national 
uniformity not easily manipulated by forum shopping.250 The Smith Land 
case does reflect the attitude that it is the judicial role to resolve litigated 
conflicts, and in so doing, it is the appropriate role of the federal courts to 
choose rules of decision consistent with their view of the underlying statu-
tory policies. In this case, however, the Third Circuit's holding did not 
carefully analyze its decision-making as either statutory interpretation or 
the creation of a federal common law. It did not acknowledge the limited 
role in judicial lawmaking that the Supreme Court had articulated in Kim-
bell Foods. The Smith Land court left the clarification of this point for 
later courts. 
2. Louisiana-Pacific Corp. v. Asarco, Inc. 
Two years after the Third Circuit's Smith Land decision, the Ninth Cir-
cuit faced a similar issue in Louisiana-Pacific Corp. v. Asarco, Inc. 251 In 
this case, Asarco produced slag as a by-product of its copper smelting ac-
tivities in Ruston, Washington.252 Over a period of nearly fifteen years, 
Asarco transferred the slag to Industrial Mineral Products (IMP) to be mar-
keted as a filler material to stabilize the ground at log sorting yards.253 
Louisiana-Pacific was one of IMP's customers who used the slag and was 
later forced by the government to clean up its yards when it was found that 
heavy metals from the slag had leached into the soil and the groundwa-
ter.254 In the mid-1980s, L-Bar Products, Inc. bought substantially all of 
the assets of IMP.m Louisiana-Pacific then brought a CERCLA action 
against Asarco for recovery of the costs it incurred in cleaning up the slag 
pollution at its facility. 256 In an attempt to deflect or reduce its own poten-
tial CERCLA liability, Asarco then filed a third-party lawsuit against L-
249 /d. A year later, a district court in Massachusetts would adopt the traditional rules of succes-
sor liability in the context of an asset purchaser following the reasoning of the Smith Land holding. In 
re Acushnet River & New Bedford Harbor Proceedings, 712 F.Supp. 1010, 1012-13 (D. Mass. 1989). 
250 Smith Land, 851 F.2d at 92. In remanding the case to the district court for further considera-
tion, the Third Circuit directed the lower court to "consider national uniformity; otherwise, CERCLA 
aims may be evaded easily by a responsible party's choice to arrange a merger or consolidation under 
the laws of particular states which unduly restrict successor liability." !d. 251 909 F.2d 1260 (9th Cir. 1990). 
252 /d. at 1262. 
253 /d. 
254 /d. The exact relationship between Asarco and IMP was unclear in the appellate court's de-
scription of the facts of the case. 
255 /d. 
256 /d. 
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Bar Products seeking contribution from it based on L-Bar's status as a cor-
porate successor of IMP through the purchase of IMP's assets.257 In its 
defense, L-Bar asserted that it was not responsible for IMP's CERCLA 
liability as an asset purchaser under principles of existing Washington State 
corporate law.258 The district court agreed and it granted L-Bar's motion 
for summary judgment.259 
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the lower court and in so doing it agreed, 
without discussion, with the Smith Land conclusion that Congress in-
tended, as a general matter, to impose CERCLA liability on corporate suc-
cessors.260 For the reasons stated above, courts have consistently come to 
this conclusion, reasoning that any other CERCLA interpretation would 
lead to massive evasion of the statute's cost-shifting rationale. The court 
adopted the Third Circuit's conclusion without analysis, but apparently it 
did so by way of interpreting the meaning of the federal statute at issue.261 
But where would the substance of corporate successorship law be found? 
Judge Wright stated that, in agreement with the Smith Land court, "the 
issue of successor liability under CERCLA is governed by federal law"262 
and by this, he meant federal common law.263 By taking this approach, the 
Ninth Circuit fell into the common judicial pattern of giving CERCLA 
meaning by resorting to the "federal common law." To these courts, com-
mon law meant cases of non-statutory and non-constitutional interpreta-
tion, that is, cases where the federal court develops a rule of decision 
through its autonomous rulemaking power. This approach accepted the 
view first expressed in the influential 1983 district court decision of United 
States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., which held that CERCLA's legislative history 
251 Jd. Asarco actually was asking the Ninth Circuit to employ its federal common law powers to 
adopt the "substantial continuity" or "continuing business enterprise" exception to the non-liability 
principles of traditional corporate successorship law. /d. at 1265. This suggested expansion of liabil-
ity, derived from the Turner v. Bituminous Casualty Co. case, 244 N.W.2d 873 (Mich. 1976), was 
declined by the Louisiana-Pacific court on the ground that it would not be applicable under the facts. 
Louisiana-Pacific, 909 F.2d at 1265-66. The court used unusual analogical reasoning to reach its 
conclusion that the expanded continuing business enterprise exception did not apply to this case. It 
concluded that the current facts were not as egregious as those in an earlier FIFRA case, Oner II, Inc. v. 
EPA, 597 F.2d 184 (9th Cir. 1979), where the court had found the doctrine to be applicable. See Lou-
isiana-Pacific, 909 F.2d at 1265-66 (explaining the factual differences that make Oner II a more egre-
gious case). 
258 Louisiana-Pacific Corp. v. Asarco, Inc., 29 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1450, 1452 (W.O. Wash. 
1989). 
259 /d. at 1453. District Court Judge Bryan applied state law-Washington State-to the question 
of successor liability concluding, inexplicably, that there was not a significant difference between 
federal and Washington law. /d. at 1452. 260 909 F.2d at 1262. 261 /d. at 1263. 
262 /d. 
263 Jd. at 1263 n.l. This is a curious conclusion since the Smith Lond court never clearly speci-
fied that it was fashioning federal common law. 
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reflected the view that the federal courts were expected to create common 
law to supplement the statute, and that such rules would be acceptable if 
they furthered the policies underlying CERCLA.264 Springing from this 
limited authority, the Louisiana-Pacific court took this charge as a broad 
grant of authority to create federal law from whatever sources it wished to 
use. But what sources would be consulted and what methods would be 
used? 
The Louisiana-Pacific court made absolutely no reference to the Su-
preme Court's Kimbell Foods decision or the methodology that case set out 
for deciding these kinds of cases. Without explanation, the court ruled that 
it "must look to other circuits and the states for guidance in fashioning the 
federallaw."265 Mirroring the Third Circuit's Smith Land holding, the Lou-
isiana-Pacific court decided that the "traditional rules of successor liability 
in operation in most states should govern. "266 Why choose these state rules 
of decision? Perhaps the Ninth Circuit believed that the corporate succes-
sorship liability rules were substantially similar from state to state thereby 
creating "national uniformity" and, as a result, preventing forum or juris-
diction-shopping by corporations seeking favorable legal rules. Establish-
ing such a consistent pattern of state law would suit a federal system of 
hazardous waste cleanup liability and would also result in a predictable and 
easy-to-implement liability scheme for courts. In its drive for universally-
consistent legal rules, the Louisiana-Pacific court believed that it retained 
considerable flexibility within its federal common law rulemaking powers 
to craft non-uniform and non-traditional legal rules when the purposes of 
CERCLA would be "frustrated by state law."267 Finding this frustration of 
statutory purpose was held by the court to be within its discretion as it 
"found" the common law.268 In this way, the Ninth Circuit preserved for 
itself a broad role in identifying federal statutory goals and great autonomy 
in selecting the federal common law that would advance those goals. 269 
264 See United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802, 808 (S.D. Ohio 1983) (explaining 
that the policy ofCERCLA was to provide nationwide uniformity due to the fact that the pollution of 
land, ~oundwater, surface water and air presents potentially interstate problems). 
65 909 F.2d at 1263. The court did say that it was looking elsewhere for guidance because Con-
gress had not addressed the issue of CERCLA successor liability. 
266 /d. (emphasis added). 
267 /d. at 1263 n.2. 
268 See id. (finding that a state law that unduly limits successor liability could "cut off the EPA's 
ability to seek reimbursement from responsible parties ... [which] would result in great expense to the 
taxpayer, which is contrary to CERCLA's purposes"). 
269 As a demonstration of this judicial freedom to determine federal common law, the Louisiana-
Pacific court felt that potentially it could expand the reach of the asset purchaser liability beyond the 
limits of traditional Washington State corporate law. Asarco had asked the court to embrace the more 
expansive "continuing business enterprise" position in an effort to hold L-Bar liable even though an 
asset purchaser would not be liable under traditional principles. /d. at 1265. While the court did not 
reject Asarco's request, it did hint that it could have adopted the expanded exception. /d. at 1265-66. 
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Interestingly, the court reached a similar result to that which would have 
been obtained following the Kimbell Foods analysis. As with other deci-
sions in the circuits, however, that Supreme Court precedent does not ap-
pear to have influenced the analysis in the case. 
B. Stage Two: Widening the Net for Corporate Successor Liability by 
Announcing Federal Rules of Decision to Achieve CERCLA 's 
Purposes 
l. United States v. Mexico Feed & Seed Co.270 
The Eighth Circuit encountered the issue of CERCLA successor liabil-
ity in United States v. Mexico Feed & Seed. The facts in this case gave a 
federal appellate court the first opportunity to consider the asset purchaser 
fact pattern. As with many of the early CERCLA decisions, EPA had 
spent over $1 million in cleaning up a rural Missouri site contaminated 
with waste oil containing PCBs being stored for later reprocessing.271 EPA 
then sought a recovery of costs from the owners of the land, the waste oil 
company that owned the storage tanks which had been filled with the PCB-
laced oil, and the corporate successor of the tanks' owners.272 The 
principal defendant in Mexico Feed & Seed, Moreco Energy Co., had pur-
chased a competitor's assets, including tanks that contained and leaked 
contaminated waste oil.273 Under the facts before it, the district court ap-
parently believed that it could not impose successor liability against 
Moreco Energy under the traditional corporate asset purchaser doctrine 
known as the "mere continuation" rule.274 However, it found for the fed-
eral government and imposed joint and several liability for the $1 million 
270 980 F.2d 478 (8th Cir. 1992). For convenience, the Eighth Circuit's decision will be styled in 
the footnotes as Mexico Feed & Seed II and the District Court's opinion in the case, United States v. 
Mexico Feed & Seed Co., 764 F.Supp. 565 (E. D. Mo. 1991 ), as Mexico Feed & Seed I. 
271 Mexico Feed & Seed II, 980 F.2d at 482-83. 
272 !d. at 483. 
273 !d. The asset purchaser Moreco Energy operated a pre-existing waste oil refining business and 
purchased the assets at issue to gain access to the seller's waste oil trucking operation. !d. The pur-
chaser primarily was interested in obtaining the trucks, routes, drivers and collective expertise that the 
seller had accumulated. !d. at 483. The court applied the mere continuation exception and found that 
the purchaser could not be liable for response costs. !d. at 489 (discussing Moreco's liability under the 
mere continuation and substantial continuation exceptions). Acquiring the trucking network could not 
render the purchaser a mere continuation of the successor because the purchaser was a pre-existing 
competitor, already engaged in the business of the seller. !d. 
274 /d. at 487. The district court appeared determined to find a theory that would support its find· 
ing of the joint and several liability of Moreco Energy. In fact, it is not clear that the United States 
even argued that Moreco Energy should be liable as a corporate successor under the legal theory 
adopted by District Judge Gunn. Mexico Feed & Seed I, 764 F. Supp. at 572 n.3 (rejecting the govern-
ment's argument under the consolidation or de-facto merger exceptions to asset purchaser immunity). 
Perhaps, the court believed that Moreco Energy was the only solvent "deep pocket" remaining and 
upon whom the sizable cleanup liability could be imposed. Also, it did not help Moreco Energy that its 
counsel failed to appear on the first day of trial without requesting a motion for continuance. /d. at 568. 
2004] THE ULTIMATE INDEPENDENCE OF THE FEDERAL COURTS 477 
upon Moreco Energy based upon an expanded "substantial continuity" 
theori75 which extended successor liability in a wider range of situa-
tions.276 Moreco Energy took its appeal to the court of appeals.277 The 
appellate court considered two issues: 1) whether a corporate successor 
was a PRP under § 107 of CERCLA and 2) what theory of successorship 
liability would be applied in CERCLA cost recovery cases.278 Both of 
these issues were questions of first impression in the Eighth Circuit, and 
the court eagerly ruled on both questions. 
The threshold issue was whether CERCLA's use of the term "corpora-
tion" included corporate successors within its meaning.279 Judge Beam, 
writing for the court, agreed with all of the previous federal court decisions 
finding that "successor corporations are within the meaning of 'persons' 
for the purposes of CERCLA liability."280 He approached this question as 
a matter of statutory interpretation attempting to fix the meaning of the 
term to both capture the implied congressional intent and to effectuate the 
purposes of the statute.281 In terms of implied meaning, the court turned to 
the general statutory rule of construction contained in Title 1 of the United 
States Code that deemed references to corporations to "inherently include 
corporate successors."282 Other courts had reached the same conclusion 
that in enacting CERCLA, Congress implicitly intended for this more ex-
tended definition of "corporation" to be read into the narrower definition 
actually written into the statute.283 To buttress this view, Judge Beam ech-
oed the Sixth Circuit's view in Anspec that corporate successor liability 
was a traditional legal understanding presumptively to be included into the 
term "corporation."284 So long-settled was this concept in his view that 
Congress would have had to "explicitly exclude successor corporations if it 
275 Mexico Feed & Seed I, 764 F. Supp. at 572 (citing United States v. Distler, 741 F. Supp. 637, 
641 (W.D. Ky. 1990)). The district court spent absolutely no time analyzing the question of what law 
should determine the rules of decision for the successor liability question. Judge Gunn concluded that 
Moreco Energy was liable as a successor corporation under the "substantial continuity'' or "continuity 
of enterprise" exception to the asset purchaser non-liability rule. /d. at 573. Unfortunately, the court 
did not elucidate its reasons for complete adoption of the Distler test or its rationale for finding that it 
was satisfied. 
276 Moreco Energy, the corporate successor to the waste oil re-processor, was particularly moti-
vated to appeal this judgment since the entire (or a substantial portion) of the $1 million award was 
likely to fall on its shoulders. The predecessor corporation, Pierce Waste Oil Service, had been dis-
solved .r;ears earlier and it had ceased to exist as a corporate entity. !d. at 572. 
2 7 Mexico Feed & Seed If, 980 F.2d 478 (8th Cir. 1992). 
278 /d. at 486. 
279 /d. 
280 /d. at 487. 
281 !d. at 486. 
282 /d. 
283 E.g., Anspec Co. v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 922 F.2d 1240, 1246 (6th Cir. 1991 ). 
284 Mexico Feed & Seed If, 980 F.2d at 486. 
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intended its use of the legal term of art, 'corporation,' not to include estab-
lished conceptions of the extent, life span, and path of corporate liabili-
ties."285 To finally reinforce this opinion, the court held that CERCLA's 
fundamental purpose of assigning cleanup costs to "those responsible for 
creating or maintaining the hazardous condition" would be defeated if pol-
luting corporations could reinvent themselves and "rise phoenix-like from 
the ashes [of their prior corporate forms], transformed, but free from their 
former liabilities."286 Thus, the meaning given to "corporation" should 
effectuate this basic statutory purpose so as to avoid easy circumvention 
and evasion of cleanup liability. 
Up to this point in the analysis, the Mexico Feed & Seed court fol-
lowed the general pattern of prior federal appellate decisions by broadly 
interpreting CERCLA's use of the term "corporation" to include corporate 
successors. On the second issue before it, the court ruled consistently with 
the Fourth Circuit in Carolina Transformer Co. that a firm purchasing the 
assets of another should be liable for the obligations of the seller when it 
represented a "substantial continuation" of the prior company's business.287 
This represented an expansion of the prevalent state corporate law "mere 
continuation" rule which the Eighth Circuit thought was "justified" under 
its view of the fundamental purposes of CERCLA.288 Bringing this CER-
CLA issue within two previous lines of decision in the labor and products 
liability fields, the court believed that the broader liability rule was neces-
sary to avoid statutory evasion.289 Notably, the court did not clearly or 
thoroughly address the strictly legal question of why this more "liability-
friendly" test would be selected as its circuit rule in CERCLA cases. 
Without a clear source of federal statutory or constitutional law to guide it, 
the court awkwardly maneuvered to justify its choice not with reference to 
prevailing corporate law standards but rather with the policy goal of 
achieving the CERCLA purpose of finding a party to shoulder site cleanup 
costs.290 Once again, rather than employing the choice of law analysis di-
rected by the Supreme Court's Kimbell Foods decision, the Eighth Circuit 
struggled to improvise a rule of decision on this crucial issue based upon 
28S /d. 
286 /d. at 486-87. 287 See id. at 487-90 (discussing Moreco's liability under the "substantial continuation" test). The 
appellate court's inability to use either the "mere continuation" and the "substantial continuity" tests to 
find successorship liability due to the specific facts of the case reinforces the Fourth Circuit's finding 
that successor liability is justified only where the facts so indicate. See United States v. Carolina Trans-
former Co., 978 F.2d 832, 837 (4th Cir. 1992). In Mexico Feed & Seed, the Eighth Circuit did not 
discuss whether federal common law or state law should provide the rule of decision because the par-
ties failed to raise the issue. Mexico Feed & Seed 11, 980 F.2d at 487 n.9. 288 Mexico Feed & Seed 11, 980 F.2d at 488. 
289 /d. 
290 See id. 
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its own view of the overarching CERCLA policy rather than any system-
atic view of appropriate federal court lawmaking authority. After affinn-
ing the district court's use of the "substantial continuation" rule,291 the ap-
pellate court reversed on its application the finding that the asset purchaser, 
Moreco Energy, did not substantially continue the prior business.292 
The Mexico Feed & Seed decision is significant for at least three rea-
sons. First, the appellate court did not identify the source of its substantive 
legal choices. Nowhere was it clearly stated whether the court was acting 
to fashion federal common law or merely interpreting congressional intent 
in enacting CERCLA. Needless to say, the suggested guidance incorpo-
rated in the Kimbell Foods decision was not even mentioned in the Eighth 
Circuit's opinion. In fact, Judge Beam appeared to be genuinely confused 
about whether state or federal law properly applied to the issues at hand.293 
To the extent that he believed he was using federal law, Judge Beam's pur-
pose was to establish nationally-unifonn CERCLA rules that would treat 
similarly-situated parties fairly. Ironically, the court adopted an asset pur-
chaser liability test that generally did not find any resonance in any state's 
corporate law and would create liability in an entirely unequal fashion. 
Second, the Mexico Feed & Seed opinion specifically described the 
purpose of traditional corporate successorship law as providing rules "to 
prevent corporate successors from adroitly slipping off the hook"294 or 
evading "debt through transactional technicalities."295 This characteriza-
tion of state corporate law rules viewed them mainly as devices assisting in 
the achievement of CERCLA cost recovery policies. However, the court 
overlooked the fact that these rules do more than prevent fraudulent eva-
sion of pre-existing and enforceable liabilities; they set the legal boundaries 
between lawful and illicit transactions. In fact, the widespread adherence 
to the general "mere continuation" exception to the asset purchaser non-
liability rule reflected a remarkable consistency on the nonnative policy 
question of where this boundary should be. Not all corporate transactions 
would be collapsed under the traditional principles--in fact, asset purchas-
ers are presumptively exempt from successorship liability unless they fall 
into one of four articulated exceptions.296 
291 /d. at 489. 
292 /d. at 489-90. 
293 This confusion is best revealed by a footnote comment of Judge Beam. He stated that: 
[t]he issue of whether federal or state law should be used in analyzing successor li-
ability was not raised by the parties and we do not decide it. However, considering 
the national application of CERCLA and fairness to similarly situated parties, the 
district court was probably correct in applying federal law. 
/d. at 487 n.9 (emphasis added). The court did not amplify its reasoning. 
294 /d. at 487. 
295 /d. 
296 /d. Applying this mainstream corporate successorship law to the facts at hand would not have 
made Moreco Energy, the asset purchaser, liable for the site cleanup costs. Surprisingly, the Eighth 
480 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 36:425 
Third, the court aggressively expanded the reach of the traditional suc-
cessorship rules that have been recognized in nearly all jurisdictions by 
affirming the district Court's adoption of the "substantial continuity" test 
for the asset purchaser liability in the CERCLA context. Judge Beam ruled 
that the "substantial continuity" test was "justified" in this area as a means 
of preventing the evasion of CERCLA cleanup liability. 297 In reaching this 
result, the court seemed determined to establish a principle that would deny 
a "responsible party" the opportunity of using corporate successorship 
rules as a means of negating CERCLA liability through careful transac-
tional design. Apparently, the panel believed that new legal barriers had to 
be constructed which would prevent well-advised actors from escaping 
their otherwise legitimate financial responsibilities. Nowhere does the 
court explain why pre-existing and stable corporate asset purchaser doc-
trine was inadequate to the task of drawing the line between continuing and 
terminating liability in asset purchaser situations. 
The only justification suggested for this expansive ruling was that 
"corporate successor liability [should] be imposed in such a way to further 
CERCLA's essential purpose of holding responsible parties liable."298 But 
this is an entirely circular statement since determining who is "responsible" 
depends entirely upon the legal theory establishing who is liable as a cor-
porate asset purchaser successor. The asset purchaser is not liable based 
upon its acts or status as a waste site owner or operator, arranger for haz-
ardous waste disposal or transporter. Rather, liability stems from a vicari-
ous form of liability based solely upon its corporate successor status. The 
court in Mexico Feed & Seed appears to have selected a broader, more ex-
pansive liability doctrine in order to make it easier for the federal govern-
ment to shift cleanup expenses to an available, solvent party having some 
successorship relationship to the actual PRPs. Under this interpretation of 
CERCLA, the court has ascribed a legal meaning to the concept of CER-
CLA liability based upon its own view of "responsibility" under the statute. 
In its eagerness to find a way to shift costs, the court has not only ignored 
available state corporate law as a rule of decision under the Kimbell Foods 
rule but also has articulated an interpretation of CERCLA purposes that 
finds little actual support in the text or the legislative history of the statute. 
Circuit ruled that even utilizing the expanded reach of the "substantial continuity" exception to the 
general asset purchaser non-liability principle would still not have led the court to find Moreco Energy 
liable. /d. at 490. The Eighth Circuit's opinion in Mexico Feed & Seed is notable in suggesting that the 
achievement of CERCLA's cost recovery purposes demanded that a broader liability rule than that 
imposed under mainstream state corporate law be adopted by the courts. Nowhere is there evidence in 
the record of this case indicating that abusive CERCLA evasions had taken place. The court seemed to 
adopt its legal conclusion as a preventative measure. 
297 /d. at 488. 
298 /d. at 489. 
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United States v. Carolina Transformer Co.299 
481 
In Carolina Transformer, the Fourth Circuit was presented with the 
familiar fact situation of the federal government seeking to identify solvent 
PRPs from whom they could recover cleanup costs.300 Here, the EPA had 
sued a number of PRPs in an effort to recover nearly a million dollars in 
cleanup costs for work it had done in the remediation of the PCB-
contaminated site where Carolina Transformer had salvaged and repaired 
used electrical transformers.301 The group of PRPs facing this potential 
multi-million dollar liability included Carolina Transformer Co., two indi-
vidual directors and stockholders, and FayTranCo, a corporate purchaser of 
most of Carolina Transformer's assets.302 The district court granted EPA's 
motion for summary judgment and it found all defendants jointly and sev-
erally liable for all of EPA's response costs303 and, in addition, imposed 
treble punitive damages for their refusal to comply with EPA's cleanup 
order.304 Interestingly, the trial court reached its conclusion on Fay-
TranCo's asset purchaser liability by accepting the government's argument 
that it possessed a federal common law-making power and that CERCLA 
demanded that it develop a nationally-uniform rule of decision.305 Not only 
did District Court Judge Boyle assume that CERCLA created liability for 
corporate successors in general, he felt it within his power to apply a "sub-
stantial continuity" or "continuity of enterprise" test for asset purchaser 
liability to attach liability to FayTranCo.306 While this choice of substan-
tive law was made in the name of securing "national uniformity," the dis-
trict court's opinion cited no CERCLA case or legislative authority for its 
choice. 
The Fourth Circuit affirmed the lower court's ruling on the basic ques-
tions of statutory meaning.307 Not surprisingly, Judge Widener's opinion 
joined the three other circuits in holding that CERCLA liability of "per-
sons" reaches the successors of corporations or other business entities as a 
299 978 F.2d 832 (4th Cir. 1992). 
300 /d. at 834. 
301 /d. at 834, 841. The district court had a warded EPA response costs of over $977,000 and, in 
addition, punitive damages of three times that amount ($2.9 million) for a grand total of $3.9 million. 
/d. at 841. The Fourth Circuit affirmed this judgment in its Carolina Transformer ruling. /d. 
302 See United States v. Carolina Transformer Co., 739 F. Supp. 1030, 1033-35, 1040 (E.D.N.C. 
1989) (explaining the relationship between the co-defendants and their liability for the cleanup). 
303 /d. at 1036, 1040. 
304 /d. at I 040. 
305 See id. at I 038-39 (stating that, because "CERCLA is a federal statute which is designed to 
promote an overriding federal interest[,) ... [but) does not address the issue of successor liability[,) ... 
the court must fashion federal rules of decision which further the interests ofCERCLA"). 
306 Carolina Transformer, 978 F.2d at 840. 
307 /d. at 837. 
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matter of congressional intent.308 However, this inferred conclusion of 
statutory coverage did not contain any particular legal theory of successor 
liability. Where should the appellate court look? One thing is certain, the 
Carolina Transformer court did not consider the decision making method-
ology set forth by the Supreme Court's Kimbell Foods decision. Ground-
ing his opinion on "traditional and evolving principles of federal common 
law," Judge Widener suggested that federal courts possessed a broad dis-
cretion in fashioning rules of decision in individual cases.309 In the Fourth 
Circuit's view, Congress intended for federal courts to supply these rules 
"interstitially" to achieve CERCLA's purposes and it was up to federal 
judges to determine when this was necessary.310 
Judge Widener elaborated his major point by holding that this general 
successorship liability principle extended CERCLA liability to asset pur-
chasers under certain situations.311 In a more careful discussion of corpo-
rate law theory than undertaken by the district court, the appeals court ap-
proved of the lower Court's decision to adopt and apply the broadened 
liability-extending "substantial continuity" test.312 Curiously, Judge 
Widener suggested that CERCLA did not require any fixed liability theory 
but rather, federal courts possessed great contextual flexibility to choose 
the rules "justified by the facts of each case."313 In the truest common law 
style, the court reserved for itself federal common lawmaking powers to 
supply the missing links in statutory design. But what policy emphasis 
would discipline such broad discretion? The Carolina Transformer court 
was persuaded that it should select a liability theory that would implement 
its view that "CERCLA is a remedial statute [and] its provisions should be 
construed broadly to avoid frustrating the legislative purpose."314 In its 
view, the pre-eminent legislative purpose was finding a "responsible party" 
to shoulder the cleanup costs that had been incurred by the government.315 
But who should be "responsible" for CERCLA costs when a corporate 
successor had purchased the assets of a polluting predecessor? Certainly, 
CERCLA did not answer this fundamental liability question. Resorting to 
the norms of traditional and highly-consistent state corporate law theory 
apparently would not suffice because a legally well-advised party could 
308 /d. 
309 /d. 
310 /d. at 837-38. 
311 See id. at 838 (explaining that asset purchasers take on liabilities of the predecessor corpora-
tion when one of four exceptions are met: (I) the successor expressly or impliedly agrees to assume the 
liabilities of the predecessor; (2) the transaction may be considered a de facto merger; (3) the successor 
may be considered a "mere continuation" of the predecessor; or (4) the transaction is fraudulent). 
312 /d. 
313 /d. at 837. 
314 /d. at 838 (citing Anspec Co. v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 922 F.2d 1240, 1247 (6th Cir. 1991)). 
315 /d. at 837. 
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structure a transaction that would confine CERCLA liability in the prede-
cessor company and insulate the asset purchaser. In fact, this had probably 
occurred in the FayTranCo transaction in the case. The Fourth Circuit felt 
justified in ignoring state corporate law principles because the application 
of those concepts would have resulted in the avoidance of CERCLA re-
sponse costs.316 The court examined the record and found the "unmistak-
able impression that the transfer of the [predecessor] business to [the suc-
cessor] was part of an effort to continue the business in all material re-
spects yet avoid the environmental liability arising from the PCB contami-
nation at the ... site."317 
The Carolina Transformer court apparently believed that it was neces-
sary to create its own "federal common law" corporate successor liability 
principles to prevent an otherwise "lawful" evasion of CERCLA. In this 
way of thinking, the Court's formulation of broad successorship concepts 
that would find more solvent "responsible parties" would be justified in the 
name of achieving the basic purposes of CERCLA. Judge Widener be-
lieved that it was legitimate to manipulate corporate successorship doctrine 
in order to replenish cleanup funds that had been spent on site remediation. 
Finding the asset purchasing successors liable would both fill gaps in statu-
tory meaning as well as permit the courts to assign costs to those it be-
lieved were "responsible" for them. Traditional concepts of asset pur-
chaser liability apparently were inadequate to achieve this objective. Thus, 
Carolina Transformer represents the high point of judicial intervention in 
the name of federal common lawmaking: the court identifies the statute's 
goal and then creates a legal rule to achieve the purpose. Once again, the 
Kimbell Foods decision was not a factor in the decision and the O'Melveny 
& Meyers case would not come down for two more years. 
3. Anspec Co. v. Johnson Controls, Inc. and City Management Corp. 
v. U.S. Chemical Company, Inc. 
The issue of successor corporate liability under CERCLA initially 
reached the Sixth Circuit in 1991 in Anspec Company v. Johnson Control, 
Inc.318 The fundamental legal approach taken in Anspec to the choice of 
law problem would dictate the result three years later in City Management 
316 See id. at 837 (stating that, under the facts of the case, the defendant could not be liable under 
the prevailing "mere continuation" doctrine applicable under state corporate successorship principles). 
317 /d. at 841. After reviewing a seemingly tailor made set of facts with which to apply the sub-
stantial continuity test, the court found that the successor corporation satisfied seven of the eight enu-
merated elements of the test /d. at 840-41. The factors are: (I) retention of the same employees; (2) 
retention of the same supervisory personnel; (3) retention of the same production facilities in the same 
location; (4) production of the same product; (5) retention of the same name; (6) continuity of assets; 
(7) continuity of general business operations; and (8) whether the successor holds itself out as the 
continuation of the previous enterprise. /d. at 838. 
318 922 F.2d 1240, 1243 (6th Cir. 1991). 
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Corp., an asset purchaser successorship situation.319 In Anspec, a federal 
district court had dismissed a CERCLA action brought by an existing land-
owner, Anspec, who had cleaned up a parcel of industrial land that had 
been contaminated by a prior owner and operator, Ultraspherics.320 As in 
most of these cases, the facts describe a tangled web of corporate behavior. 
After selling the property to Anspec, Ultraspherics was formally merged 
into the Hoover Group, a subsidiary of a larger finn, Johnson Controls.321 
Upon completing the site assessment and portions of the cleanup, Anspec 
filed suit under CERCLA and state law to recover the costs associated with 
the remedial work. 322 After being rebuffed in the district court, Anspec was 
successful in convincing the appellate court to join the Third and the Ninth 
Circuits in ruling that CERCLA imposes transfer cleanup liability on cor-
porate successors in a merger situation.323 
The most interesting feature of the Anspec court's holding was that it 
reached its conclusion purely as a matter of statutory construction and not 
as an exercise of federal common lawmaking power.324 In fact, the court 
took great pains to argue that its interpretive approach did not involve the 
court in "creating or fashioning" federal common law.325 Without citing or 
mentioning Kimbell Foods, Judge Lively cited the Supreme Court decision 
in Texas Industries, Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., for the proposition that 
a federal court was only empowered to create federal common law when 
Congress had left it to the courts to "flesh out" a statute by fashioning sub-
stantive rules or when a federal rule of decision was needed to protect 
uniquely federal interests.326 The Anspec court stated a clear view that it 
wished to avoid venturing into the realm of federal common law decision-
making-a position that stands in stark contrast to other appellate holdings 
very willing to embark into federal common lawmaking.327 The Sixth Cir-
cuit in Anspec refused to characterize its action in this case as ')udicial 
319 City Mgmt. Corp. v. U.S. Chern. Co., 43 F.3d 244,246 (6th Cir. 1994). 
320 Anspec Co. v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 734 F. Supp. 793, 793-94, 796 (E.D. Mich. 1989). In 
this decision, District Judge Zatkoff granted motions to dismiss for all of the corporate defendants 
including Ultraspherics, which had actually disposed of the hazardous sludge and liquids from a metal 
and plastic grinding process and degreaser wastes into an underground storage tank and two above-
ground tanks which were spilled onto the ground and into the groundwater. Anspec, 922 F.2d at 1243. 
In its ruling, the trial court found no CERCLA liability because Ultraspherics no longer existed as a 
corporate entity and the two corporate successors were not to be considered PRPs under the statute. 
Anspec, 734 F. Supp. at 795. 
321 Anspec, 922 F.2d at 1243. 
322 /d. 
323 /d. at 1245. 
324 /d. at 1245-47. 
325 /d. at 1245-46. 
326 /d. at 1245 (citing Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 631, 640 (1981 )). 
327 /d. at 1246. 
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lawmaking," rather choosing to describe its function as mere statutory in-
terpretation.328 CERCLA, the court said, was a law that was not "ambigu-
ous" but rather, "textually incomplete."329 Therefore, the court's task was 
to discern Congress's intent in enacting § 107(a), the principal liability 
provision in CERCLA. Acting with this purpose, Judge Lively had little 
. difficulty in deciding that Congress had intended to include successor cor-
porations within the meaning of the term "corporation" when it passed 
CERCLA.330 
After reaching this conventional conclusion on the question of CER-
CLA liability for corporate successors, the Sixth Circuit remanded the case 
back to the district court with a brief instruction.331 As almost an after-
thought, the appeals court ordered the lower federal court to follow Michi-
gan law in its application of successor liability.332 By deciding the thresh-
old "interpretive" issue that Congressional use of the term "corporation" in 
CERCLA's § 107 impliedly included corporate successors, Judge Lively 
did not explain how federal courts in his circuit should determine successor 
liability. There was no consideration of the choice of law question and no 
discussion of the reasoning behind his limited instruction to employ state 
law.333 Curiously, the appellate court gave no attention to the question of 
328 /d. at 1245-46. The Sixth Circuit's determination that the state law definition of"corporation" 
should be followed under CERCLA to impose liability on successors-in-interest overturns what was 
considered a persuasive Sixth Circuit district court case. See United States v. Distler, 741 F. Supp. 637 
(W.O. Ky. 1990). The Distler court held that because the language in CERCLA §§ 101 and 107 was 
ambiguous, that Congress "intended [for] the courts to develop common law'' to interpret the two 
sections. /d. at 640. Citing Smith Land, the Distler court stated that "courts applying the doctrine of 
successor liability in CERCLA cases are to apply it in such a fashion as to further the goals of the Act 
whether that be done by applying the traditional rule (mere continuation] or some variation (substantial 
continuity]." /d. at 642. The court adopted and applied the substantial continuity test and imposed 
successor-in-interest liability for response costs. /d. at 642-43. The court's analysis is contrary to that 
in Anspec, and presumably superceded. 
:!29 Anspec, 922 F.2d at 1246. 
330 This conclusion resulted from an analysis combining factors including 1) the "universal ac-
ceptance" of the usual meaning of the term "corporation," 2) the United States Code's general construc-
tional rules defining the words "company" and "association," and 3) the overall legislative purposes of 
CERCLA emphasizing swift and effective site cleanup and the "polluter pays" principle. /d. at 1246-
47. This third element, the legislative purposes of the statute, resulted in the Sixth Circuit ruling that 
''the remedial nature of CERCLA 's scheme requires the courts to interpret its provisions broadly to 
avoid frustrating the legislative purposes." /d. at 1247. Such an interpretive emphasis would seem-
ingly provide courts with a basis for attaching the broadest possible meaning to any liability-related 
provision within CERCLA. 
331 /d. at 1247-48. 
332 /d. at 1248. 
333 Judge Kennedy's concurring opinion in Anspec differed from that of the majority opinion in 
that it directly applied the Kimbell Foods factors to determine whether the court should create federal 
common law to resolve the issue of successor liability. /d. at 1249-51. However, even while employ-
ing the Kimbell Foods analysis, the conclusion mirrored that of the majority by looking to state law. /d. 
at 1251. The issues in Anspec were not seen by Judge Kennedy as requiring a national common law 
resolution, and the states' laws regarding successor liability were found to be generally uniform. /d. at 
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why state law should govern this issue of federal law or why federal courts 
should be bound by state law rules. Again, conspicuous in its absence was 
any reference to the Supreme Court's holding in Kimbell Foods or the rest 
of its federal common law jurisprudence. Since the facts in Anspec pre-
sented only a corporate merger and a parent/subsidiary relationship, the 
issue of successor liability in the asset purchaser setting was never consid-
ered. Three years later, the circuit decided City Management Corp. v. US. 
Chemical Co./34 which presented that precise question. 
City Management Corp., like many CERCLA disputes, involved a 
highly convoluted fact pattern. City Management attempted to purchase a 
Michigan-based solvent reclamation business known as U.S. Chemical Co. 
or USC.335 After extensive negotiation between the parties, the two firms 
entered into an "asset purchase and sale agreement" for all of the tangible 
and intangible assets of USC's business operations.336 City Management 
agreed to pay $720,000 over a fifteen year period and to assume any haz-
ardous waste cleanup liability on USC's Roseville, Michigan property.337 
City Management did not know that at the same time it was working to 
acquire USC's assets, USC had already been notified by EPA that it had 
been labeled a PRP for contributing hazardous wastes to the Metamora 
Landfill in Lapeer County, Michigan.338 EPA had initiated a cleanup of 
that landfill and the agency had spent $44 million in response costs up to 
that point.339 It was now identifying PRPs-like USC-who would be 
allocated shares of the cleanup expenses.340 The initial EPA Allocation 
Report had assessed USC a minimum share of $5.3 million for cleaning up 
the site.341 During its negotiations with USC, City Management was not 
informed by USC about the Metamora landfill cleanup liability.342 This 
news would come to it after the deal had been closed when a group of 
1249. The relevant state corporate laws were not found to frustrate CERCLA's "polluter pay" policies, 
because in adopting "state corporate law on the issue of who is a liable 'corporation' under § 9607, 
specific state rules that are unreasonable, aberrant, or hostile to federal interests will not be applied." 
/d. at 1250 (citing Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471,479 (1979)). Judge Kennedy also stated that appli-
cation of a federal common law rule would "disrupt commercial relationships predicated on state law" 
and "create uncertainty in future commercial transactions." /d. (citing United States v. Kimbell Foods, 
Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 729 (1979)). Judge Kennedy reasoned that state corporate law has "evolved over 
decades and [is] frequently codified in state statutes, is well developed and easily discovered and ap-
plied. By contrast, at least in the near term, there is no established body of federal common law on the 
issues ~resented in this case." 922 F.2d at 1250-51. 
3 4 43 F.3d 244 (6th Cir. 1994). 
335 /d. at 247-48. 
336 /d. at 248. 
337 /d. 
338 /d. at 247. 
339 /d. 
340 !d. at 248. 
341/d. 
342 /d. at 247. 
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PRPs contacted City Management informing it that the PRPs expected it to 
pay USC's share of the cleanup expense.343 
Rather than wait for the PRPs to come after it in a CERCLA cost re-
covery action, City Management sought a declaratory judgment stating 
that, as the purchaser of USC's assets, it was not liable as a successor cor-
poration to USC for any of USC's environmentalliabilities.344 The district 
court granted summary judgment to City Management, finding that it did 
not have successor liability under any of the exceptions to the mainstream 
asset purchaser non-liability rule.34s On appeal to the Sixth Circuit, the 
appellate court began its analysis by stating flatly that the Anspec decision 
dictated the resolution of the case.346 In Judge Milburn's opinion, the ear-
lier Anspec holding provided controlling precedent in two ways: 1) it di-
rected that CERCLA liability contains successor corporations within the 
meaning of "person," and 2) it stated that successor liability would be de-
termined by state law rather than federal common law.347 This latter con-
clusion-that state law established the operative rule of decision-was 
stated as the circuit rule and the sole issue for the court was deciding what 
Michigan corporate law was as it applied to asset purchasers.348 After care-
fully reviewing the applicable state law, the Sixth Circuit decided that 
Michigan law followed the mainstream "mere continuation" exception to 
the asset purchaser non-liability principle.349 Having Anspec as the govern-
ing circuit opinion, the court did not feel compelled to explain why it 
should apply state law in this situation. It was just following precedent.3so 
343 !d. at 248. 
344 /d. at 249. 
34
s Anspec Co. v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 814 F. Supp. 624,638-39,641-42 (E.D. Mich. 1993). 
346 City Mgmt., 43 F.3d at 250. 
347 /d. 
348 /d. at 250-53. 
349 /d. at 252-53. 
3
so The court did make a confusing comment in drawing this conclusion. Judge Milburn distin-
guished City Management from Mexico Feed & Seed by stating that since Mexico Feed & Seed was 
"decided by applying federal law rather than state law, it is clearly inapplicable to this case." /d. at 253. 
This comment suggests that the City Management court thought that state law could not serve as the 
rule of decision in a federal common lawmaking ruling. In this way, its decision was clearly wrong. 
The Sixth Circuit has reiterated its support for the AnspedCity Management line of cases in later opin-
ions by citing them for the proposition that questions of corporate successorship liability rules are to be 
derived from state law. See, e.g., IBC Mfg. Co. v. Velsicol Chern. Corp., 1999 WL 486615, at *2 (6th 
Cir. July I, 1999) (citing Anspec for the proposition that "[i)n determining whether one corporation is a 
successor of another, we apply state law"); Cytec Indus., Inc. v. B. F. Goodrich Co., 196 F. Supp. 2d 
644, 654 (S.D. Ohio 2002) (citing City Mgmt. for the proposition that "[t]he liability of a successor 
corporation for CERCLA liability is determined by reference to state corporation law, rather than 
federal common law"). 
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4. B.F. Goodrich v. Betkoski351 
The Second Circuit finally reached the issue of CERCLA successor-
ship liability in B. F. Goodrich v. Betkoski, which was one component of an 
exceedingly long and complex series of federal court cases initially styled 
B.F. Goodrich v. Murtha.352 This case involved the cleanup of two Con-
necticut landfills whose remedial costs had been resolved by consent de-
cree for nearly $5.4 million.353 At this point, two PRP coalitions, mostly 
composed of large corporate waste disposers that had been included in the 
settlement, sought to shift part of their liability to other generators and 
transporters which had not been included in the earlier consent decree.354 
In addition, the federal government and the State of Connecticut also pur-
sued additional cleanup costs against non-settling parties.355 Curiously, the 
district court was particularly unsympathetic to all of these plaintiffs and it 
had granted summary judgment in favor of most of the defendants.356 The 
Second Circuit heard the appeal from the district court's disposition and it 
considered the corporate successorship issue as one of a large number of 
CERCLA questions.357 
Without formulating any particular theory, the district court had 
granted summary judgment in three corporate successor situations where 
the business and assets had been sold and the buyer was being targeted by 
the government as a PRP solely on the basis of successorship status.358 
Apparently the success of Mexico Feed & Seed and Carolina Transformer 
had emboldened the federal government into making this kind of legal ar-
gument in later cases such as this one. The Second Circuit in Betkoski ad-
dressed the threshold question of whether CERCLA assessed liability to 
successor corporations in the conventional manner previously adopted by 
351 99 F.3d 505 (2d Cir. 1996). 
352 See B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Murtha, 958 F.2d 1192 (2d Cir. 1992); B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Munha, 
855 F. Supp. 545 (D. Conn. 1994); B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Munha, 840 F. Supp. 180 (D. Conn. 1993); 
B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Murtha, 815 F. Supp. 539 (D. Conn. 1993). 
353 Betkoski, 99 F.3d at 512. 
354 /d. at512-13. 
355 /d. at 512. 
356 The industrial coalition attempted to add II 51 PRPs as third party defendants but Judge Boyle 
only allowed 41 parties to be joined. /d. at 5 II. Beyond this, summary judgment was granted to every 
third party defendant that had requested that relief and the court later dismissed, on its own motion, 
nearly all of the remaining defendants including many who had never moved for summary judgment. 
/d. at 513. The governmental plaintiffs did not fare much better with the court finding that they had 
failed to adequately prove their additional cleanup costs. /d. 
357 /d. at 515-20 (discussing component parts, releasability, negligible amounts, EPA designation, 
successor liability and transporter site selection in its analysis of the district court's CERCL.A interpre-
tation). 
358 B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Murtha, 840 F. Supp. 180,185,190-91 (D. Conn. 1993). 
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the Anspec, Carolina Transformer and Mexico Feed & Seed courts.359 In-
terpreting the statute as had all the previous courts of appeal, the Second 
Circuit concluded that "CERCLA's statutory language, properly read, pro-
vides for successor liability."360 By embracing this position, Judge Car-
damone did nothing out of the ordinary; but merely joined every other ap-
pellate court that had considered the point. 
But what was to be the substantive law implementing the concept of 
successor corporate liability? And how should the federal court fashion 
this rule of decision? As had been the case in prior decisions, the Betkoski 
court emphasized the advancement of CERCLA "goals" as the primary 
policy rationale for selecting its legal standard?61 
The Betkoski court found that "because the substantial continuity test is 
more consistent with the Act's goals, it is superior to the older and more 
inflexible 'identity' [or "mere continuity"] rule."362 However, Judge Car-
damone did not articulate which of CERCLA's goals made the substantial 
continuity rule superior. Instead, he emphasized that CERCLA is a "broad 
remedial statute" and that it should be construed liberally to give effect to 
its purposes.363 Once again, the rhetoric of "holding responsible parties 
liable for the costs of the cleanup" was employed without any inquiry into 
why and under what circumstances an asset purchaser should be considered 
"responsible."364 The Betkoski court knowingly selected the "substantial 
continuity" liability theory as the "appropriate legal test for successor li-
ability under CERCLA"365 because it believed this standard would capture 
more responsible parties and allocate more liability. Viewing its function 
as selecting a legal liability principle consistent with its own view of statu-
tory purposes, the court apparently believed that it had wide discretion to 
fashion the law. 
One thing that was clear from Betkoski was that the Second Circuit did 
not mention or adopt the decisional methodology of either Kimbell Foods 
or 0 'Melveny & Myers, which had been issued by the United States Su-
preme Court two years before. There was nothing unusual about this omis-
sion. However, the court seemed to intentionally isolate itself from the 
Supreme Court's direction. So certain was the Betkoski court of its deci-
sion that it refused a subsequent request to reconsider the matter specifi-
359 Betkoski, 99 F.3d at 518 (noting that Anspec, Carolina Transformer and Mexico Feed all held 
that CERCLA makes "successor corporations liable, in certain circumstances, for their predecessors' 
acts"). 
360 /d. 
361 /d.at519. 
362 /d. 
363 /d.at514. 
364 /d. (emphasis added). 
365 /d. at 519. 
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cally in light of these two, relevant, Supreme Court precedents.366 The 
main Betkoski opinion did not cite the O'Melveny & Myers decision nor its 
explicit statement that cases justifying the creation of a special federal 
common law rule of decision were "few and restricted" and limited to 
situations where there is a "significant conflict between some federal pol-
icy or interest and the use of state law."367 The demanding tone of the Su-
preme Court policy reflected in the Kimbell Foods, 0 'Melveny & Myers, 
and Atherton line of decisions, and the policy of judicial restraint they es-
poused, was completely sidestepped by the Second Circuit in Betkoski. 368 
366 Two of the losing parties in Betkoski petitioned the Second Circuit for a rehearing due to the 
court's failure to cite Kimbell Foods and O'Melveny & Myers. See B.F. Goodrich v. Betkoski, 112 
F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 1997) (denying petition for rehearing). The petitioners suggested that the court's 
choice of a federal common law rule of decision was inconsistent with another contemporaneous deci-
sion, Pescatore v. Pan Am. World Airways. Inc., 97 F.3d I (2d Cir. 1996). In a per curiam order deny-
ing the petition, the court recognized Kimbell Foods and 0 'Melveny & Myers. but insisted that their 
lawmaking was justified in light of these cases. Betkoski, 112 F.3d at 90-91. Explaining its action, the 
court's order stated that "[its] primary reason for adopting a federal common law rule was the concern 
that allowing state law rules such as the inflexible and easily evaded 'identity' rule to control the ques-
tion of successor liability would defeat the goals of CERCLA." /d. at 91. Clearly minimizing the 
strength and direction of the two Supreme Court opinions, the Second Circuit continued to stress its 
empirically-untested proposition that state rules were "lenient" and that they would result in a "defeat" 
of federal CERCLA policy. /d. Clearly, the court had been convinced during the prior appeal that this 
was true and no petition for rehearing would reverse this idea. 
367 O'Melveny & Myers v. FDIC, 512 U.S. 79, 87 (1994) (quoting Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 
U.S. 647,651 (1963) and Wallis v. Pan Am. Petroleum Corp., 384 U.S. 63,68 (1966)). 
368 Not all federal appeals courts ignored the Supreme Court's Kimbell Foods decisional method-
ology in CERCLA cases at the time of the Betkoski decision. For instance, in Redwing Ca"iers. Inc. v. 
Saraland Apartments, 94 F.3d 1489 (lith Cir. 1996), the Eleventh Circuit confronted a similar choice 
of law issue in a case raising the issue of whether a limited partner may be held liable for the partner-
ship's CERCLA liability. That court identified the central problem when it noted that "[o]ne of the 
more significant gaps in CERCLA 's scheme arises where the right to recovery created by the Act 
confronts state law governing business entities like corporations and partnerships." /d. at 1499. While 
admitting that federal courts had reached differing conclusions on whether state or federal common law 
provides the appropriate rule of decision, the court held that ultimately federal law determines the issue 
ofCERCLA liability. /d. at 1500. 
However, with that conclusion the Redwing Carriers court employed the Kimbell Foods analysis 
to detennine whether "federal law'' should be a unifonn common law rule or the applicable state law 
rule. /d. at I 501. Its conclusion was that the Kimbell Foods factors directed it to select a rule of deci-
sion "according to the applicable state law rule." /d. The third Kimbell Foods factor, "the potentially 
unsettling effect of a federal common law rule on relationships grounded on state law," provided the 
strongest support for applying state law as the rule of decision. /d. at I 502. At issue was limited part-
ner liability, a concept created and defined by state statute. The court found that existing state law 
limited-partnership statutes define the breadth of limited liability, and "[g]iven the popularity of the 
limited-partnership structure ... [the court] hesitate[ d) to upset the expectations investors have under 
current state law rules by adopting a federal common law rule." /d. In conclusion, the court found that 
there was "no imperative need to develop a general body of federal common law to decide cases such 
as this." /d. at 1501 (quoting Wilson v. Omaha Indian Tribe, 442 U.S. 653, 673 (1979)). The court's 
carefully-crafted opinion stands in stark contrast to the asset purchaser decisions ignoring the Supreme 
Court's direction, basing decisions upon the court's own view of the appropriate achievement ofCER-
CLA goals through broad federal common law rules for decision, and the willingness to recognize 
stable commercial expectations. 
2004] THE ULTIMATE INDEPENDENCE OF THE FEDERAL COURTS 491 
Rather, the appellate court concluded that it had the authority to fashion a 
rule of decision imposing CERCLA liability on asset-purchasing corporate 
successors that exceeded the stringency of the consensus corporate law 
theory all in the name of furthering CERCLA' s statutory purposes and 
limiting avoidance.369 The decision bore the hallmark of the Fourth Cir-
cuit's ruling in Carolina Transformer. Regardless of the limited, law-
creating role described in the Kimbell Foods series of decisions, the Bet-
koski court viewed its judicial function as one of shoring up deficiencies in 
an important remedial statute-CERCLA. Once again, the court consid-
ered its function as reinforcing its own view of CERCLA's fundamental 
purposes and developing legal liability principles to effectuate those pur-
poses. 
C. Stage Three-Shifting the Choice of Law Rules after the Bestfoods 
Decision-Beginning to Recognize the Limits of Judicial Authority 
1. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. Brown & Bryant, 
Inc.37o 
In the aftermath of 0 'Melveny & Myers and Atherton, the Ninth Cir-
cuit was presented with an opportunity to revisit its earlier holding in Lou-
isiana-Pacific Corp. v. Asarco, Inc. 371 that the parameters of successor li-
ability under CERCLA are to be fashioned by federal common law.372 In 
that prior case, the Louisiana-Pacific court had joined the Third Circuit's 
position in Smith Land & Improvement that recognized judicial authority to 
employ federal common law rulemaking to establish a rule of decision in 
the asset purchase corporate successorship context.373 Exercising its com-
369 There was no clear evidence that these successors were attempting to "game the system" by 
structuring transactions in a manner to limit vicarious liability. The court, perhaps influenced by the 
possibility that parties would use conventional, state corporate asset purchaser rules in ways that would 
avoid continuing CERCLA liability, exercised its common law powers to announce a rule that would 
deter this practice. The Betkoski court believed that it was justified in creating federal law to guard 
against the possibility of such a manipulative result in the name of furthering CERCLA goals. No 
empirical data, analysis or particular statutory language supported such an interpretation. Betkoski, 99 
F.3d at 519. 370 159 F.3d 358 (9th Cir. 1998). 371 909 F.2d 1260 (9th Cir. 1992). The Louisiana-Pacific court held that federal common law 
applied to determine an asset purchaser's CERCLA liability, and upheld a district court's grant of 
summary judgment to an asset purchaser from whom contribution was sought under state law succes-
sor-in-interest theory. /d. at 1262-63. The court adopted state successor liability laws as the rule of 
decision because they mirrored those of most states, and refused to extend asset purchaser liability by 
adopting the substantial continuity test. /d. at 1265. The court found that the asset purchaser had no 
knowledge of the predecessor's CERCLA liability or of the waste generated by the predecessor's 
discontinued business practices, and the Ninth Circuit reserved its decision on whether to adopt the 
substantial continuity test because of the lack of knowledge. /d. 
372 Atchison, 159 F.3d at 361. 373 Louisiana-Pacific, 909 F.2d at 1263. 
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mon law powers in Louisiana Pacific, the Ninth Circuit adopted a rule 
based upon prevalent state corporate law norms. Within the context of that 
case, this meant that the court selected the mainstream "mere continuation" 
principle to serve as the common law rule in CERCLA asset purchaser 
situations within the Ninth Circuit.374 
In Atchison, PureGro, a purchaser of assets from a defunct 
owner/operator, was sued in a private cost recovery and contribution action 
as a successor-in-interest under CERCLA by another PRP wishing to em-
ploy the "substantial continuity" exception to asset purchaser nonliabil-
ity.375 The district court had been willing to apply this expanded liability 
test but it concluded that the facts did not justify a finding of successor 
liability and granted summary judgment for PureGro.376 On appeal, the 
Ninth Circuit was asked to reassess its prior Louisiana-Pacific decision 
from two, self-interested perspectives. First, the appellant PRP railroad 
desired for the court to exercise its federal common law powers to expand 
CERCLA liability by adding an additional successor liability exception-
the "substantial continuity" test-and applying it to the facts at hand.377 
Second, the respondent, PureGro, argued that "recent Supreme Court deci-
sions" had undermined the Louisiana-Pacific holding that federal common 
law governs the CERCLA successor liability issue and that this more re-
cent precedent required the application of state law to the question. 378 In 
Atchison, then, the appeals court was asked by a party to reinterpret its 
prior federal common law rule of decision to embrace the more expansive 
"substantial continuation" exception to the general non-liability principle 
applicable to asset purchasers.379 The court refused to do this, but in reach-
ing this conclusion it considered and struggled with the method of analysis 
that was expressed by the Supreme Court in O'Melveny & Myers and 
Atherton. Most unusual in this case was the fact that the Ninth Circuit 
ruled twice, issuing two opinions: one "original opinion,"380 followed ten 
months later by an "amended opinion."381 A comparison of the two Atchi-
son decisions vividly demonstrates just how hard it is for federal judges to 
374 /d. at 1265-66. 
375 Atchison, 159 F.3d at 361. 
376 /d. 
377 /d. at 361-62. 
378 /d. at 362. 
379 /d. at 364. In fact, the railroad PRPs had convinced the district court to adopt the "substantial 
continuation" exception. /d. at 361. However, even applying this more generous standard, the district 
court had found the "substantial continuation" exception inapplicable under the facts of the case and 
granted summary judgment to the asset purchaser, PureGro. /d. 
380 Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Brown & Bryant Inc., 132 F.3d 1295 (9th Cir. 1997) 
Hereinafter, this opinion will be styled as Atchison I. 
381 Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Brown & Bryant Inc., 159 F.3d 358 (9th Cir. 1998). 
Hereinafter, this opinion will be styled as Atchison II. 
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relinquish their discretionary control over the formulation of common law. 
In the first or "original" Atchison opinion, the Ninth Circuit directly 
considered the appeal from PureGro's point of view that the Supreme 
Court's O'Melveny & Myers and Atherton decisions challenged the earlier 
Louisiana-Pacific ruling that had easily assumed that federal courts could 
fashion a rule of decision from their common lawmaking powers.382 It did 
so only after the issue was raised for the first time on appeal by PureGro.383 
In fact, Judge Daly Hawkins titled this section of his opinion "Revisiting 
Louisiana-Pacific" and began it with a statement that PureGro had made a 
"persuasive argument that the Supreme Court's decisions ... call into 
question the ease with which Louisiana-Pacific created a set of federal 
rules for successor liability under CERCLA."384 The court then reiterated 
the main points made in 0 'Melveny & Myers and Atherton that federal 
common law rulemaking was needed only in "few and restricted" instances 
and that the party requesting such a rule has a "heavy burden" to prove that 
there is a need for uniformity or that state rules conflict with federal pol-
icy.3ss 
Beyond stating the policy of the Supreme Court's recent decisions, this 
first opinion adopted and applied the three-part Kimbell Foods analytical 
methodology, finding: 1) no need for federally-imposed uniformity in an 
already largely uniform, state corporate law and 2) no conflict between 
state rules and federal policy.386 Interestingly, on this second point, Judge 
Daly Hawkins directly debunked the frequently-suggested "conflict with 
CERCLA" justification for federal courts exercising common law powers 
to expand asset purchaser liability. He wrote that: 
[S]ince states already have rules in place to prevent the use 
of the corporate form to avoid liability, the only possible 
justification for a new, federal (and more expansive) rule is 
to "enrich the fund" by imposing liability on more asset pur-
382 Atchison I, 132 F.3d at 1299-1302. 
383 /d. at 1299 n.2. Reflecting the court's ambivalence towards the entire issue of the Supreme 
Court-mandated restraint in fashioning federal common law rules, Judge Daly Hawkins added the 
following introduction to his consideration of the question: "Although we do not have to entertain it, 
we exercise our discretion to do so since it is a purely legal question of considerable significance." /d. 
With this comment, the judge suggested that the lower federal courts possessed the option of deciding 
whether or not to follow the pronouncements of the Supreme Court on matters of federal jurisdiction. 
More likely, this remark reflects the difficulty with which federal courts have in declining the opportu-
nity to "make law." 
384 /d. at 1299. 
385 /d. 
386 /d. at 1300-QI. These are: I) whether federal interests require a nationally uniform body of 
law, 2) whether application of state law would frustrate or conflict with specific objectives of federal 
programs, and 3) the extent to which application of a federal rule would disrupt commercial relation-
ships predicated on state law. /d. at 1300 (citing United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 
728-29 (1979)). 
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purchasers . . . . As the Court pointed out in 0 'Melveny, 
these "more money" arguments are unavailing.387 
With this language, the Ninth Circuit had finally expressed the unstated 
reality that federal court manipulation of common law doctrine actually 
constituted illicit, judicial lawmaking that was clearly outside the bounds 
of recent Supreme Court doctrine. The actual policy choice of finding 
more entities "responsible," the court observed, was more appropriate for 
Congress rather than the federal judiciary.388 The prior justification of 
implementing CERCLA policy goals which had been offered in the earlier 
appellate cases was not to be found in Louisiana-Pacific. In addition, in a 
separate part of the opinion, the judge left no doubt about the impact of the 
0 'Melveny and Atherton decisions on the present legitimacy of the Ninth 
Circuit's Louisiana-Pacific decision. He wrote, "While we are reluctant to 
question the essential holding of Louisiana-Pacific, 0 'Melveny and Ather-
ton, intervening decisions by the Supreme Court, squarely refute the wis-
dom of fashioning a federal common law on this issue [of asset purchaser 
liability under CERCLA]."389 
Finally, this original Atchison opinion reached the inescapable conclu-
sion, derived from the Supreme Court's methodology, that "state law dic-
tates the parameters of successor liability under CERCLA."390 With re-
sounding force, the Ninth Circuit both swore fidelity to the Supreme 
Court's federal common law precedent and it defined the CERCLA liabil-
ity rules in asset purchaser situations. 
In an unusual step, Judge Daly Hawkins issued an "amended opinion" 
approximately ten months after releasing the "original opinion."391 While 
the amended ruling did not alter the specific outcome in the case, it did edit 
the language of the prior decision in several significant ways. Most impor-
tantly, his opinion deleted all of the previously quoted material from the 
"original opinion," especially that which suggested that the appropriate rule 
of decision was to be determined with reference to state law. The appellate 
court retained its references to the Kimbell Foods, O'Melveny and Atherton 
decisions, however, it did not mention the Supreme Court's decision in 
Bestfoods that had been handed down merely four months earlier. After 
387 /d. at 130 I. 
388 With reference to the 0 'Melveny & Myers case, the Atchison I court stated that, 
The imposition of liability under any statute "involves a host of considerations that 
must be weighed and appraised .... Within the federal system, at least, we have de-
cided that that function of weighing and appraising is more appropriate[) for those 
who write the laws, rather than for those who interpret them." 
/d. (citing O'Melveny & Myers v. FDIC, 512 U.S. 79, 88 (1993)). 
389 /d. (emphasis added). 
390 /d. 
39t Atchison II, !59 F.3d 358 (9th Cir. 1998). 
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analyzing the substantive corporate successorship issue in a manner consis-
tent with the Kimbell Foods preference for state law, Judge Daly Hawkins 
inserted a new paragraph into the amended opinion which confused the 
final analysis of the choice of law issue.392 He stated that it was not neces-
sary to determine whether state law dictated the parameters of CERCLA 
successor liability "as we would reach the same result under federal com-
mon law."393 By so doing, the court retained its Louisiana-Pacific conclu-
sion based on federal common law decision making despite the fact that the 
court had reasoned that state law should be the source of the decisional 
rule. This is a curious conclusion since it entirely ignores the Kimbell 
Foods, O'Melveny and Atherton analysis which preceded it in the opinion 
and clings to the Court's desire to determine a federal common law rule.394 
Perhaps all it does is establish state corporate law as the substantive basis 
for the federal common law rule. This outcome reveals just how hard it is 
for a federal court to "let go" of the power to interpret statutes and to an-
nounce operative legal rules. It also indicates how difficult it is for these 
same courts to explain the basis for their holdings. 
2. North Shore Gas Co. v. Salomon, Inc.395 
This case involved a familiar fact pattern with a current hazardous 
waste site owner-Salomon, Inc.-seeking other parties who could share 
part of the $20 million CERCLA cleanup costs for a contaminated, Denver, 
Colorado mineral ore processing plant.396 It discovered that the Coke 
Company had mined vanadium and uranium ores in the mid-1930s and had 
regularly transported "radium slimes" to the Denver site for processing and 
disposal.397 Further research had indicated that under a 1941 reorganiza-
tion plan, the Coke Company had sold most of its assets to North Shore 
Gas in exchange for gas company stock. 398 As it turned out, North Shore 
Gas was the only corporation still in existence and solvent when Salomon 
looked for other parties to help pay for the cleanup.399 However, exercising 
392 /d. at 364. 
393 /d. 
394 The Ninth Circuit explains this retention of its control over the selection of the appropriate 
rule of decision in terms that emphasize the similarity of legal outcomes under the state Jaw and the 
federal common law tests. However, it is unmistakable that the court wishes to stress the fact of its 
control by stating that "we choose not to extend the 'mere continuation' exception to include the 
broader notion of a 'substantial continuation."' /d. In spite of its recognition of 0 'Melveny and Ather-
ton, the Atchison II court refused to cede authority over the choice of legal doctrine in the corporate 
successorship context. 
395 \52 F.3d 642 (7th Cir. 1998). 
396 /d. at 645. 
397 /d. 
398 ld. at 646. 
399 /d. at 647. 
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what it considered to be its "federal common law" authority, the federal 
district court granted North Shore Gas's motion for summary judgment 
ruling that the company was not liable under any of the traditional excep-
tions to the general asset purchaser non-liability principle.400 Salomon, Inc. 
appealed this result and the case moved on to the Seventh Circuit for reso-
lution.401 
Strangely, before the Seventh Circuit, neither party briefed the choice 
of law question-should the court apply federal common law or state law 
to the asset purchaser issue?402 Even with the benefit of the then-
contemporaneous Atchison and Bestfoods decisions, the North Shore Gas 
court refused to undertake a Kimbell Foods analysis of the corporate suc-
cessorship issue. Judge Cudahy's opinion revealed that he was aware of 
the issue but he opted to apply what he considered to be federal common 
law, thinking "it prudent to reserve the choice-of-law question until we are 
confronted with a case in which the parties have argued the issue.'..w3 The 
court seemed most interested in joining the "crowd" of other circuits that 
had employed their federal common law powers in earlier cases to identify 
a rule of decision. 
Not surprisingly, the appeals court took the unexceptional first step and 
joined six other circuits by finding that Congress intended to extend CER-
CLA liability to corporate successors.404 It then parroted the reasoning of 
the Third Circuit in the Smith Land case that resort to federal common law 
was warranted because of the need for national uniformity in rules and the 
need to prevent parties from "frustrat[ing] the aims of CERCLA" by taking 
action under protective state law.405 This mantra was repeated without any 
careful analysis or empirical justification. There appeared to be no evi-
dence that the successor corporation had attempted to manipulate the trans-
action in order to avoid CERCLA liabilities. In fact, the entire asset sale 
transaction had been undertaken in 1941 as the result of an effort to comply 
with the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935 which required utili-
ties to eliminate non-utility investments.406 The resulting reorganization 
and later corporate disintegrations led to the fact that North Shore Gas was 
the only currently solvent business entity having any connection to the 
1941 events.407 This, of course, led Salomon Inc. to pursue North Shore 
Gas as a successor who would be responsible for a portion of the defunct 
400 /d. at 651. 
401/d. 
402 /d. at 650. 403 /d. at 650-51. 404 /d. at 649. 405 /d. at 650 (citing Smith Land & Improvement Corp. v. Ce1otex Corp., 851 F.2d 86,92 (3d Cir. 
1988)). 
406 /d. at 646 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 79k (2000)). 407 /d. at 647. 
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Coke Company's CERCLA cleanup costs.408 
Despite its awareness of the recent Atchison decision which had re-
ferred to the Kimbell Foods line of cases and the analytical method re-
quired by the Supreme Court, the Seventh Circuit refused to follow the 
reasoning of O'Melveny & Myers and Bestfoods.409 In light of the explicit 
rejections of such arguments in 0 'Melveny & Myers and Atherton, the 
Sixth Circuit's earlier decision in Anspec and the Ninth Circuit's recent 
decision in Atchison, the Seventh Circuit in North Shore Gas assumed that 
"federal common law supplies the rule of decision"410 without undertaking 
a Kimbell Foods or other kind of analysis. Feeling free to fashion its own 
rule of decision, it referred exclusively to general treatise authority and 
earlier federal decisions in devising its rules for deciding the successor 
liability question. State court decisions were not a factor, at least in terms 
of reference. In the end, the North Shore Gas court decided to analyze the 
successor liability issue under the "mere continuation" exception to the 
general, state-law asset purchaser rule.411 Judge Cudahy took the matter a 
step beyond announcing the applicable legal rule. After an extensive 
analysis, he found that, under the facts developed at trial, an identity of 
ownership existed sufficient to impose successor liability on the asset pur-
chaser.412 The opinion reflected a thorough evaluation of the case but, sig-
nificantly, the appellate court reversed the trial judge's ruling on the suc-
cessor liability question.413 
3. United States v. Davis414 
The latest circuit court to address this CERCLA issue has been the 
408 /d. 
409 North Shore Gas Co., 152 F.3d at 642. See supra Part 11.8.3 for a discussion of United States 
v. Besf.?ods, Inc. 10 /d. See Atherton v. FDIC, 519 U.S. 213, 220 (1997) ("To invoke the concept of 'uniformity,' 
however, is not to prove its need."); O'Melveny & Myers v. FDIC, 512 U.S. 79, 87 (1994) (stating that 
creation of a federal rule of decision is "limited to situations where there is a 'significant conflict be-
tween some federal policy or interest and the use of state law"') (citing Wallis v. Pan Am. Petroleum 
Corp., 384 U.S. 63,68 (1966)); Atchison II, 159 F.3d at 364 (overruling Louisiana-Pacific and stating 
that "(t]he imposition of liability under any statute involves a host of considerations that must be 
weighed and appraised . . . . Within the federal system, at least, we have decided that that function of 
weighing and appraising is more appropriately for those who write the laws, rather than for those who 
interpret them.") (citing 0 'Melveny & Myers, 512 U.S. at 89) (internal quotations omitted). 411 Interestingly, later federal court decisions in the Seventh Circuit interpreted North Shore Gas 
as a case indicating that state law should govern asset purchaser liability determinations in federal 
litigation. See, e.g., Ryan Beck & Co. v. Campbell, No. 02 C 7016, 2002 WL 31696792, at *5 (N.D. 
Ill. Dec. 2, 2002); Fararo v. Sink LLC, Nos. 01 C 6956,01 C 6957, 2002 WL 31687671, at *5 (N.D. Ill. 
Nov. 27, 2002). 412 The court did not discuss whether the substantial continuity test would result in liability be-
cause the issue was not briefed by the parties. North Shore Gas, 152 F.3d at 654 n.8. 413 /d. at 658. 414 261 F.3d I (1st Cir. 2001). 
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First Circuit, which in United States v. Davis held that state law provides 
the rule of decision in suits brought to impose CERCLA liability on asset 
purchasers.415 The United States v. Davis case involved the $55 million 
groundwater and soil cleanup of a ten acre waste disposal site in Smith-
field, Rhode Island.416 After the main PRP-United Technologies Corpo-
ration-had settled with the government, it sought to recover part of its 
liability from non-settling defendants including Black and Decker and 
Electroformers as corporate successors to Gar Electroforming Division, an 
electroplating company that had arranged to dispose of its wastes at the 
Davis site.417 The district court adopted the ruling of the magistrate judge 
who had found that Black and Decker was liable under either state law or 
federal common law successorship rules.418 On appeal, the court was asked 
to choose between these two approaches as a fundamental choice of law 
question.419 
Undertaking consideration of the choice of law question de novo, the 
appeals court surveyed the current circuit split regarding whether federal 
common law or state law should govern asset purchasers' CERCLA liabil-
ity and found the Kimbell Foods and 0 'Melveny & Myers approach con-
trolling, going so far as to describe it as the majority rule.420 Interestingly, 
the First Circuit had previously established the practice of turning to state 
law in similar CERCLA choice of law situations. For instance, in its 1993 
John S. Boyd Co. decision, the court had set forth a circuit rule that federal 
courts should tum "to state contract law to provide the substantive rule, so 
long as it is not hostile to the federal interests animating CERCLA.'>421 
This "not hostile to the federal interest" rule was expressed in the John S. 
Boyd Co. case solely by reference to holdings in other federal courts but 
415 /d. at 54. 
416 /d. at 15, 17. 
417 /d. at 14, 17, 18 & n.l2. Gar had operated an electroplating business in Danbury, Connecti-
cut, producing wastes containing nitric acid, copper, nickel and cyanide. /d. at 35. CWR, a waste 
transporter, had picked up five drums from Gar and the court concluded that these five drums contain-
ing 275 gallons of waste were delivered to the Davis site for disposal. /d. 
418 /d. at 52. 
419 /d. at 52-53. 
420 This position was consistent with prior First Circuit decisions interpreting CERCLA. Curi-
ously, the court had held in previous cases that allhough federal law governed the validity of liability 
agreements under CERCLA, state law would provide the substantive decisional principles in the ab-
sence of specific federal statutory guidance. For instance, in JohnS. Boyd Co. v. Boston Gas Co., 992 
F.2d 401, 406 (1st Cir. 1993), the appellate court had ruled that a "majority of courts have turned to 
state contract law to provide the substantive rule, so long as it is not hostile to the federal interests 
animating CERCLA." The First Circuit reached this conclusion without any reference to the Kimbell 
Foods decision. 
421 JohnS. Boyd Co., 992 F.2d at 406 (using Massachusetts law for guidance in interpreting a 
separation agreement between two corporate parties). See also Am. Policyholders Ins. Co. v. Nyacol 
Prods., Inc., 989 F.2d 1256, 1263 (I st Cir. 1993)(rejecting the use of a uniform federal rule of decision 
to govern interpretation of an insurance policy's scope of coverage regarding CERCLA liability). 
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without regard or reference to the Supreme Court's earlier Kimbell Foods 
precedent. What this suggests is that courts will be persuaded to accept a 
particular line of reasoning from analogous federal decisions as a matter of 
devising their own sense of judicial policy and not as an issue of consis-
tency with Supreme Court direction. This is not to say that the Supreme 
Court is totally irrelevant to the lower federal courts. When a decision of 
the Supreme Court confirms a prior appellate position, the holding will be 
recognized. 
The United States v. Davis court interpreted the Supreme Court's Best-
foods decision as confirming the First Circuit's earlier CERCLA choice of 
law holding in the John S. Boyd Co. case and by referring to Justice 
Souter's Bestfoods opinion which noted that the statute gives "no indica-
tion that the entire corpus of state corporation law is to be replaced simply 
because a plaintiffs cause of action is based upon a federal statute.'>422 In 
its view, the First Circuit combined the Bestfoods and the 0 'Melveny & 
Myers approaches by concluding that state law would presumptively apply 
in these cases unless there was a "specific, concrete federal policy or inter-
est that is compromised by the application of state law."423 After spending 
considerable time in explaining its choice of law methodology, the court 
concluded in one sentence that the application of state law would not frus-
trate any federal objective and by so doing, upheld the use of state law.424 
Apparently, once the circuit established the John S. Boyd Co. rule on 
choice oflaw matters, the issue was largely settled thereafter.m 
V. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS ON JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR 
IN THE ABSENCE OF CONCRETE LAW 
What is a federal court and what should it do? These fundamental 
questions lie at the heart of this article. The general and conventional an-
swer to this question is that the federal judiciary exists to announce and 
implement federal law-that is, federal constitutional, statutory and treaty 
law for the most part. Under this view, the scope of federal court authority 
is bounded by the bodies of law they are charged to apply. In theory, this 
circumscribed notion of federal judicial power presents a restrained vision 
of federal judges and denies them the freewheeling authority of general 
jurisdiction that state court jurists have to create common law when the 
422 Davis, 261 F.3d at 54 (quoting United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51, 63 (1998)). 
423 /d. (quoting Atchison II, 159 F.3d at 363-64). 
424 /d. The commonly-stated rationales for creating a federal common law rule of decision which 
were so persuasive in cases adopting the "substantial continuity" test were never mentioned in United 
States v. Davis. These reasons-the need for national uniformity and the avoidance of responsibility-
received no attention from the court. 
425 /d. 
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situation requires. At least, that is one theory of federal judicial power. 
Another view considers federal judges in a more dynamic way, effectuat-
ing their view of the law to implement federal statutory or constitutional 
policy. Obviously not as constrained as the first vision, this latter approach 
employs the flexibility of statutory interpretation and the potential 
expansiveness of federal common law doctrinal development to announce 
the meaning of federal law. These competing ideas about the appropriate 
role of federal judges reflects a serious disagreement over the allocation of 
power in American society. 
The specific focus of this article has been on the behavior of federal 
courts in defining the legal rules for assigning CERCLA-based liability in 
the corporate asset purchase situation. Although a narrow sub issue of the 
more general corporate successor liability issue, the asset purchase scenario 
is significant because it presents an important legal liability question with-
out a clear statutory answer. CERCLA does not expressly provide for the 
imposition of cleanup liability on corporate successors. In this instance, 
the federal court is being asked to make highly consequential decisions in 
the absence of a clearly identifiable congressional policy preference. Per-
haps this kind of question is just an attenuated form of statutory interpreta-
tion, which asks the court to determine or infer "what would Congress have 
done with this issue" had it addressed it at the time of CERCLA's enact-
ment or revision? On the other hand, the resolution of this issue could be 
viewed as judicial excess. This view of the issue sees judges going beyond 
the limits of statutory interpretation and venturing into the area of explicit 
judicial lawmaking, filling in legal rules without any idea of how Congress 
would have wanted to act. Undoubtedly, identifying the border between 
interpretation and lawmaking is an elusive pursuit-with the boundary 
being more imagined than real. It also presents profound questions about 
the limits on judicial authority-a more political than legal question. 
This research has examined how federal courts of appeal respond to 
this most concrete question-when is a corporate asset purchaser liable for 
CERCLA cleanup costs?-in the face of statutory silence. The following 
discussion draws salient conclusions about this federal court litigation-
litigation that has spanned the past fifteen years. 
A. The Findings of a Review of CERCLA Asset Purchaser Liability Cases 
1. Ubiquitousness of the Asset Purchaser Issue 
Not surprisingly, this issue has come to the attention of all circuits ex-
cept the Fifth Circuit, the Tenth Circuit and the D.C. Circuit over the past 
fifteen years. Throughout the life of CERCLA, there has always been a 
desire on the part of government or private PRPs to identify other PRPs to 
share the cleanup costs or to cover unaccounted-for orphan shares. As the 
initial government-led hazardous waste site cleanups of the 1980s gave 
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way to the government-ordered private PRP site remediation, the hunt for 
other solvent PRPs became more intense. This occurred at a time when the 
cost of cleanups was rising into the multi-million dollar level. With this 
backdrop, it is understandable that existing liable parties would try to cast 
the liability net more broadly to reach corporate successors with CERCLA 
liability. Existing corporate law doctrine in most states, which had devel-
oped over the years, recognized a range of situations where liabilities of 
predecessor corporations would actually "pass through" to bind their suc-
cessors. In the late 1980s, the federal government attempted to use these 
theories to make CERCLA liabilities attach to a larger number of corporate 
successors. In this litigation, federal courts uniformly held that as a general 
matter, Congress intended, through an implied reference, for CERCLA to 
impose liability on corporate successors. This conclusion did not answer 
the more complicated question of deciding what legal principles would 
determine when an asset purchaser would be saddled with the CERCLA 
liability of its seller. The courts would grapple with this issue for more 
than a decade, reaching a range of outcomes following a number of ana-
lytical approaches. 
2. The Clarity and Invisibility of the Supreme Court's Message 
Regarding Federal Court Choice of Law 
In the world of perfect federal court theory, things are straightforward 
and orderly. In this way of thinking, the twin hallmarks of the American 
federal court system are its hierarchical structure and precedential effect. 
The United States Supreme Court stands atop that hierarchy with the re-
gional courts of appeal enjoying a localized supremacy over the district 
courts within their geographical areas. This is a judicial system of perfect 
symmetry in its structural design. As Justice Sandra Day O'Connor has 
recently written, "The Supreme Court's focus is, and must be, broader, for 
our primary purpose is to guide and shape the development of federal law 
generally, so as to enable lower courts to perform their responsibilities 
more effectively and fairly and to guarantee equal justice to all citizens. "426 
When the Supreme Court speaks on a matter pertaining to federal law, 
its rulings are generally treated as controlling precedent in the lower fed-
eral courts. For instance, a court of appeals would look for relevant Su-
preme Court precedent in deciding a case before it. At the very least, the 
legal pronouncements of the high court are ones that must be distinguished 
or confined by judges who wish to reach different results. 
As the discussion in Part II indicates, the Supreme Court has clearly 
expressed its policy regarding the freedom of the lower federal courts to 
426 SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR, THE MAJESTY OF THE LAW: REFLECTIONS OF A SUPREME COURT 
JUSTICE 212 (2003). 
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announce rules of decision under their federal common lawmaking pow-
ers.427 Originating in the Kimbell Foods case decided in 1979 and conclud-
ing with the Bestfoods decision of 1998, the unmistakable policy is one of 
judicial restraint and presumptive reliance on state law theory in the ab-
sence of an alternate federal statutory direction or a significant conflict 
with federal law. The Court's rhetoric over the years has become increas-
ingly severe in its tone and less open to improvisation in the name of fed-
eral common law. These cases have emphasized that statutory gap-filling 
exercises do not routinely authorize federal courts to develop speCialized 
federal rules of decision. As Justice Scalia wrote in the 0 'Melveny & 
Meyers case, "matters left unaddressed in ... a scheme [of federal statutory 
regulation] are presumably left subject to the disposition provided by state 
law.'"'28 State law is to fill the gap in all cases except those truly excep-
tional, "few and restricted" ones where there is a "significant conflict be-
tween some federal policy or interest and the use of state law.'"'29 These 
are strong words that greatly tip the balance towards the use of state law in 
federal cases. 
Throughout this twenty-four year period, the clear message to federal 
courts being asked by litigants to employ the federal common law to fill 
the statutory gaps or omissions was to use state law first and to leave legis-
lative judgments to Congress. The Supreme Court's policy direction has 
opposed federal courts using their untethered initiative to develop legal 
principles without a clearer link to statutory guidance. With this firm and 
highly-detailed Supreme Court guidance regarding the methodology for 
selecting rules for deciding cases such as those involving the CERCLA 
liability of asset purchasers, the results and reasons should have been pre-
dictable and should have consistently applied the mainstream state corpo-
rate law. Strangely, this did not happen. In six of the court of appeals de-
cisions previously discussed, there was absolutely no reference to any of 
the Supreme Court's decisions in the Kimbell Foods line of cases. In fact, 
even in the 1998 North Shore Gas case, the Seventh Circuit acknowledged 
427 See supra Part III. 
428 O'Melveny & Myers v. FDIC, 512 U.S. 79,85 (1994). 
429 !d. at 87. The Court has not been particularly clear about the theory behind its direction to 
choose state law as the rule of decision. In these "gap-filling" situations it has been vague about 
whether state law is selected I) as state law, 2) as the interpreted federal statutory rule or 3) as the 
federal common law. As Justice Scalia remarked in 0 'Melveny & Meyers: 
The issue in the present case is whether California rule of decision is to be applied to 
the issue of imputation or displaced, and if it is applied it is of only theoretical inter-
est whether the basis for that application is California's own sovereign power or fed-
eral adoption of California's disposition. 
ld. at 85 (emphasis added). It would seem as though this question would be more than just one of 
"theoretical interest" and would represent the selection of a state law principle as the substantive federal 
rule. Perhaps the nicety of classification is not that important since state law controls as the rule of 
decision and the most important point is that the federal court is prohibited from fashioning its own 
legal theory to decide the case. 
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the existence of these decisions, but it refused to analyze the choice of law 
issue in light of them because the question had not been briefed by the par-
ties. Oddly, the Seventh Circuit did not order the briefing and rehearing or 
consider the legal issue de novo. It was not until the later Ninth Circuit 
opinion in Atchison and the First Circuit's decision in United States v. 
Davis that the Supreme Court's analytical directive became part of any 
court of appeals decision in a CERCLA asset purchaser case. 
Why has the Supreme Court been substantially ignored for nearly 
twenty years? The answer could be a practical one. It could be that no 
party has briefed the issue arguing Supreme Court precedent and no judi-
cial clerk has ever discovered these cases through independent research. 
While these rationales are possible, they do not seem probable. What 
seems more plausible is that federal courts appear determined to resolve 
the litigation brought to them. Whether claiming to act under their federal 
common law powers or just jumping at the chance to find the "appropriate" 
rule to decide the matter before them, these courts appear to be more inter-
ested in applying the legal principles that they believe fit the case at hand 
than in automatically applying available state law. Federal judges want to 
judge. Until the recent Atchison and Davis cases, the Supreme Court's call 
for limited judicial authority has been largely ignored and avoided by the 
lower federal courts.430 
3. How Do Federal Courts Select a Rule of Decision in the Absence 
of Statutory Guidance? 
Supreme Court precedent is not perfect and it is also not self-
executing. In fact, as this article indicates, these ponderous expressions 
live lives of selective impact. As much as the Court would like to restrain 
federal court activism and initiative, it actually has less effect than many 
would believe. The fact that so few cases actually reach the Supreme 
Court for consideration means that the federal courts of appeal, in reality, 
have the last word on the selection of legal principles and analytical ap-
proaches to common problems.431 An examination of the cases under re-
view in this article would confirm this continuing authority of appellate 
courts. But how did they approach the purely legal question of selecting 
the rule of decision for asset purchasers under CERCLA? The analysis 
reveals a good deal of confusion and an eclectic group of approaches to the 
430 It is interesting to note that the Supreme Court has not been consistent in applying its Kimbell 
Foods decisional methodology even in its own opinions. In Bestfoods v. United States, even though the 
Court emphasized the use of state law to answer questions related to corporate parent/subsidiary liabil-
ity, it did not cite or otherwise refer to the Kimbell Foods, 0 'Melveny & Meyers, and Atherton cases. 
431 Of all of the cases analyzed in this article, Supreme Court review was sought in only two of 
them, and in both cases it was denied. See Smith Land & Improvement Corp. v. Celotex Corp., 851 
F.2d 86 (3d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1029 (1989) and B.F. Goodrich v. Betkoski, 99 F.Jd 505 
(2d Cir. 1996}, cert. denied sub nom. Zollo Drum Co. v. B.F. Goodrich, 524 U.S. 926 (1998). 
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issue. 
While each decision presents unique facts, all of the cases approach the 
same, essentially legal question-does "pass through" CERCLA liability 
attach to an asset purchaser of a prior corporation? The pre-existing firm is 
usually a clearly-liable PRP; but often not solvent or even operating. On 
the other hand, the asset purchasing company is being confronted with the 
prior firm's liability under legal theories that do not respect the asset pur-
chase form of the transaction. Is the asset purchaser immunized from its 
seller's liabilities under the presumptive traditional rule or is it liable under 
an equity-based exception to the rule? At base, each case represents a 
practical attempt to find another liable party to bear part of the CERCLA 
cleanup expense. This important liability question should be answerable 
from the statute that established the legal liability in the first place-
CERCLA. But, unfortunately, it is not. As the prior discussion indicates, 
there is no direct, statutory answer to the general question of successor 
corporation liability. Sensing the potential for a gaping hole in the liability 
of "responsible" parties under CERCLA, all of the court opinions under 
consideration here found that Congress intended for CERCLA liability to 
extend to corporate successors. This result, they reasoned, was justified 
both by analysis of the statute's text as well as by the policy goal of dis-
couraging the easy evasion of the cleanup law. 
These appellate cases easily concluded that under CERCLA, the term 
"corporation" includes successors. As a result of this reasoning, the courts 
established the principle that successor entities could be liable under the 
statute for shares of the sizable cleanup costs mandated by the law. A sec-
ond, and considerably more difficult question, presents itself in these cases. 
It is the question that asks judges to give legal meaning to the corporate 
successor label and to devise rules assigning financial liability in the CER-
CLA context. This represents the heart of the matter-determining who 
must pay and under what circumstances. Liability assignment represents a 
fundamental judicial role for the state court judge announcing tort or con-
tract rules of decision in a common law or statutory system. Where do 
federal judges look to answer these questions in the CERCLA asset pur-
chaser situation? The case analysis reveals several general conclusions 
about the behavior of the appellate courts: 1) they do not approach the 
"rules of decision" question in a unified or consistent way, 2) their action 
reflects a strong sense of obligation to decide the cases before them and to 
advance CERCLA's statutory goals, 3) they generally do not follow Su-
preme Court guidance on the appropriate method for choosing their rules, 
and 4) they often do not have a clear idea of how to select the operative 
legal principle to apply in the asset purchaser cases before them. 
When examining the cases from the perspective of understanding what 
the courts, themselves, believe they are doing in identifying a rule of deci-
sion, four distinct patterns emerge. First, one court-the Sixth Circuit-
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considers its function to be solely interpreting a federal statute. In Anspec, 
the court makes a strong point that it is not fashioning a federal common 
law rule but rather, interpreting § 107(a}-the central liability provision-
consistently with CERCLA's main purposes.432 The court goes to great 
pains to avoid the characterization that it is "making" new federal common 
law. In this way, the appeals court can perform the statutory "gap filling" 
function of providing missing substantive provisions in the name of 
legislative interpretation. 
Second, several courts describe their holdings as establishing federal 
common law with the approval of CERCLA's legislative history. An ex-
ample of this approach can be found in the Smith Land case, where the 
Third Circuit found its authority for this point in the 1983 district court 
opinion in Chem-Dyne and that decision's citation to the floor comment by 
Representative James Florio. Cases taking this view, such as Smith Land, 
Louisiana Pacific and Carolina Transformer, all view themselves as hav-
ing a highly flexible power to fashion circuit rules finding successor liabil-
ity in such a way to achieve what they consider to be fundamental CER-
CLA purposes. In the name of creating federal common law rules that 
provide for a smooth, national uniformity of application, most of these 
courts look to "traditional" or "general" doctrine developed in the states to 
serve as their own rules of decision.433 However, at least one court in this 
group--the Fourth Circuit in Carolina Transformer--did not feel bound by 
prevailing state corporate law norms and considered its common law power 
to be highly fact-sensitive and contextual.434 Acting as a true "common 
law" court, the Fourth Circuit believed that it could develop a rule structure 
from the facts of cases that would come to it. 
Third. In this category of decisions, courts appears genuinely confused 
about what their opinions accomplish. These cases are striking in their 
lack of clarity, with statements as varied as they are "probably" deciding 
432 Anspec Co. v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 922 F.2d 1240, 1242, 1245-46 (6th Cir. 1991). 
433 In Louisiana Pacific, the Ninth Circuit's view was that it was establishing federal common 
law for asset purchaser liability and that law just happened to be the same as the state corporate law in 
California. Later in the Atchison decision, the court reaffirmed its previous position but concluded that 
"we choose not to extend the 'mere continuation' exception to include the broader notion of a 'substan-
tial continuation."' Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Brown & Bryant Inc., 159 F.3d 358,364 
(9th Cir. 1998). This comment appeared to reflect the idea that the appeals court could revise the 
federal common law at some later point but that it chose not to do so in Atchison due to the adequacy of 
the existing rule. 
434 The Carolina Transformer case reviewed asset purchaser liability rules applied by the district 
court and it upheld the trial court's adoption of the more liability-producing "substantial continuity" 
test. United States v. Carolina Transformer Co., 978 F.2d 832, 840 (4th Cir. 1992). Curiously, Judge 
Widener believed that flexible, common law rules would advance the CERCLA goals of I) deterring 
evasion of cleanup liability and 2) promoting uniformity in liability rules. These two goals appear in 
tension if not inconsistent with each other. /d. at 837. 
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federal law,435 they are choosing a "common law" test based on "tradi-
tional" rules rather than that of a given state,436 and they approach cases 
"on the assumption that federal common law supplies the rule of deci-
sion.'7437 Although unclear about exactly what kind of judicial action they 
are taking and not referring to the Supreme Court's directives on common 
law decision making, these courts broadly construe their powers, finding in 
a number of instances that the substantial continuity exception-not a ma-
jority rule-should or could be the rule of decision.438 These courts appear 
to be willing to set the asset purchaser liability rules according to their 
views of what justice and CERCLA policies demand. Frequently, they cite 
the fair and equitable administration of the law439 as well as the need to 
foster national uniformity in rules and the blocking of forum shopping by 
PRPs. These courts also feel free to make and change the rules as their 
perception of the needs change. The conclusion to be drawn from these 
case decisions is that many federal appellate courts have been willing to 
function as common law decision makers even if they did not admit to do-
ing so. 
Fourth. The final category of decisions is represented by the most re-
cent cases and they, at least, mention the federal common law decisional 
methodology established by the Supreme Court in the Kimbell Foods line 
of cases. The most prominent example of this viewpoint is the First Cir-
cuit's decision in United States v. Davis. Davis represents a court directly 
acknowledging the choice of law issue before it and employing the Su-
preme Court's suggested technique without regret. This view accepts the 
fact that federal courts are making common law or non-statutory rules of 
decision, but it is presumptively using state law to fill in the substantive 
rule. While recognizing the autonomy that a number of other circuits had 
demonstrated in using their common law powers to find a non-state law 
"federal substantial continuity test" applying to asset purchase fact situa-
tions, Judge Lipez stayed close to the First Circuit's decisional methodol-
ogy previously announced in the John S. Boyd Co. case and concluded that 
"the majority rule is to apply state law 'so long as it is not hostile to the 
435 United States v. Mexico Feed & Seed Co., 980 F.2d 478, 487 n.9 (8th Cir. 1992). 436 Betkosld, 99 F.3d at S 19. 437 North Shore Gas Co. v. Salomon, Inc., I 52 F.3d 642, 65 I (7th Cir. 1998). 438 Mexico Feed & Seed, 980 F.2d at 488 (adopts the "substantial continuity" test by concluding 
that under CERCLA that test is "justified'' to attach liability to responsible parties); Betkoski, 99 F.3d at 
519-20 (adopts the "substantial continuity" test at a party's urging after concluding that the test is more 
consistent with CERCLA's goals); North Shore Gas, 152 F.3d at 654 n.8 (adopts "mere continuity" test 
after noting that the "substantial continuity" test had not been argued but suggesting that it might apply 
it in the right circumstances). No court ever explains the reasoning behind any of these assertions or 
cone lusions. 439 Nonh Shore Gas, 152 F.3d at 650. 
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federal interests animating CERCLA. "'440 This "majority rule" was drawn 
from the Kimbell Foods tradition as well as the more recent Bestfoods deci-
sion, which the court characterized as leaving little room for the creation of 
a federal rule of liability under CERCLA.441 Under Davis, the federal 
court's main task was twofold: 1) to identify the relevant state law princi-
ple and 2) to decide whether its use "would frustrate any federal objec-
tive.'>«2 Finding no evidence of such "frustration," the court summarily 
concluded that the Connecticut state law was the "correct test for determin-
ing successor liability."443 The Supreme Court would be pleased to know 
that at least one federal circuit was heeding its direction. 
B. The Surprising Case of "Judicial Amnesia" in the CERCLA Asset 
Purchaser Cases 
1. What Decisional Methods Don't the Federal Courts Follow? 
If one only read the opinions of the United States Supreme Court and 
assumed lower federal court fidelity, one would believe that all courts en-
countering the CERCLA asset purchaser liability question would carefully 
and cautiously apply the Kimbell Foods/0 'Melveny & Meyers prescription 
for interstitial common law development. By this it is meant that they 
would first look to the rules provided under state corporate successorship 
law to set the presumptive benchmark and then they would decide whether 
these rules "substantially" conflicted with the policies contained in CER-
CLA. If there was no such conflict, the state law would serve as the fed-
eral common law based rule of decision. On the other hand, if these state 
rules did seriously interfere with the achievement of CERCLA policies, the 
judges would be permitted under their common law powers to fashion an-
other rule of decision more consistent with the statutory goals. Lawsuits 
would presumably focus on the questions of whether interstitial common 
law was warranted and whether a "substantial conflict" with federal law 
existed. At least, this would be the world view under a pristine vision of 
lower court obedience to Supreme Court mandate. As the prior discussion 
reveals, this ideal of a restrained federal judiciary operating within narrow 
bounds of decisional authority plainly does not exist. Federal courts desire 
to judge controversies and to choose their own rules of decision unhindered 
by constraining principles announced from above. 
440 United States v. Davis, 261 F.3d I, 54 (lstCir. 2001). 
441/d. 
442 /d. In Davis, the asset purchaser corporate law principle was derived from Connecticut law 
based on a provision in the asset purchase agreement between the buyer and seller of the assets. /d. at 
53 n.48. In a more contested case on this issue, the selection of which state law controls could be 
extremely important should there be a variation between law of the different states. The federal court 
must also determine what the law of the state actually is and this requires a degree of discretion as well. 
443 /d. at 54. 
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What explains this general avoidance of Supreme Court direction in 
this area of choice of law? Is this an act of poor case briefing by parties, 
inadequate research by law clerks or straightforward judicial defiance? It 
is difficult to assign a clear, singular reason for the observed phenomena. 
While it is true that parties have failed to brief and present the Kimbell 
Foods argument, it is also correct to note that courts possess a de novo 
power to announce what the relevant principles of law are in a given case. 
Courts have also ignored this precedent when it has been brought to their 
attention. Federal judges can also instruct their clerks to research a particu-
lar line of reasoning or authority and they can direct the parties to brief 
issues that were not presented to the courts in the first place. But with the 
exception of the First Circuit in the United States v. Davis litigation, this 
formal approach has largely been the "road not taken" and an explicit ex-
ample of intentional judicial avoidance.444 
2. Explaining "Judicial Amnesia" 
There are several plausible explanations for this fact. First, courts and 
litigants may be confused by the conceptual complexity of the federal 
common law approach of giving interstitial meaning to federal statutes. 
The doctrine in this area may be hard to fathom and more difficult to mold 
into a successful argument. It may be commonly believed that federal 
common law is only available in narrow situations and that it is not readily 
available for "filling in" statutory meaning in cases such as the asset pur-
chaser litigation. Second, perhaps because they are so used to disputing 
matters of statutory interpretation, parties may tend by intellectual habit or 
past practice to argue that a statute should be "interpreted" in a certain way 
even if there is no specific congressional guidance on the particular out-
come. Arguing for a particular interpretation of a "silent" statute may ac-
tually give litigants the opportunity to persuade a willing court to "make 
law" in the name of "interpretation." From the Court's point of view, tak-
ing this supposed "interpretive approach" may allow them to feel comfort-
able in doing what they might consider to be a traditional judicial func-
tion-interpreting existing legal principles. By embracing this interpretive 
characterization, judges could then avoid the criticism that they were 
usurping the legislative function of Congress and legislating from the 
bench. 
Third, courts, even federal courts, like to judge matters coming before 
them. This simple statement has particular resonance in liability-assigning 
444 It is worth noting that the United States Supreme Court has itself forgotten to follow the deci-
sional methodology that it set out for the lower federal courts to follow in Kimbell Foods and its prog-
eny. In fact, a careful review of the Bestfoods decision, where Justice Souter indicated that state law 
should provide the rule of decision, does not even make reference to the Kimbell Foods case as support 
for the direction. See United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51 (1998). Apparently, even the Supreme 
Court can fall prey to the same practices followed by the other federal courts. 
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cases such as the CERCLA asset purchaser litigation that has been the sub-
ject of this article. They wish to weigh the evidence and give a "fair" 
judgment for one party or the other. Expressed in reverse, courts want to 
prevent inequitable results from happening especially when there is an im-
portant policy value at stake. Functioning this way, federal courts, like 
their state counterparts, desire to independently sort through the relevant 
facts and to arrive at a just solution. By following this "judging impulse," 
federal judges apparently behave much the same as the state judiciary de-
spite their narrower decisional focus. 
Fourth, federal courts may view their role as being "implementers" of 
an important federal public health and safety law having a high degree of 
social, environmental, and financial significance. This is especially true 
since the statute at issue-CERCLA-was so poorly drafted, leaving so 
many critical legal questions unanswered. Stepping into this role of fur-
thering Congress' intent would appear natural since CERCLA is viewed by 
many courts as a necessary, "make the polluter pay" law whose goals 
should be reinforced. Within the context of the asset purchaser liability 
issue, federal judges might not want (what they believe to be) "responsi-
ble" parties to escape hazardous waste site cleanup costs through the tacti-
cal use of corporate succession theories and transactional structuring de-
vices. With this outlook, these courts may be willing to identify legal the-
ory that will provide powerful support for the policies underlying the 
CERCLA statute. 
Fifth, and finally, these courts might actually be demonstrating judicial 
defiance of the Supreme Court's directive to employ state law as the rule of 
decision in this kind of case. Although this may sound like heresy in a 
court system designed in a hierarchical fashion, this may actually represent 
the reality. The lower federal courts do not conceive of themselves as 
merely automatons mindlessly applying state law in federal cases. Federal 
judges, usually no shrinking violets, want to judge cases and they wish to 
apply their own judicial discretion in reaching their results. Having a con-
venient case of "judicial amnesia" in these instances also carries little risk 
of reversal since the Supreme Court is extremely unlikely to hear such a 
case and as yet has not heard one. In the end, it is clear that, at least in this 
area of federal environmental law, the federal courts act more like state 
general jurisdiction courts exercising broad lawmaking powers, largely 
unrestrained by the limiting doctrines announced by the Supreme Court. 
The highest court might be the drummer, but the lower federal courts ap-
pear to be dancing to their own beat. 
